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PREFACE

The twenty first (21 st) century has begun as a more challenging
century than the international community has ever imagined or
experienced. From the positive impact of the World Wide Web
(www) and the internet, the international community is
experiencing first hand the fabled global village. Further, with the
realization of the decades-long dream for a united Europe in the
European Union, and the consequential implications on trade,
labor, education, environment, etc., the new century has become a
very unIque one.
On the negative side, however, the new century has also begun
with unprecedented global health challenges, particularly, the
AIDS/HIV scourge which is spreading the globe like wild fire. The
threat of global terrorism has equally contributed in making the
world more insecure than during the Cold War era. Peace in the
Middle East has continued to elude both the affected region and
the world. Thus, the once clearly identifiable hot spots of the world
have multiplied to the point that it appears that no part of the world
is immune to threats of violence or war.
It is against this background that the topic of this work was chosen
as follows: "The Evolving and Challenging Roles of Certain

International Financial Institutions in Developing Countries under
International Law with particular reference to Nigeria, South
Korea, and Brazil. " The goal is to examine how these IFls have
been impacted by these global challenges that were not in
contemplation when the IFls were created. We shall also analyze
how the constituent instruments that created these IFls equipped or
prepared them to combat these global challenges. Further, we shall
critically examine the fate of the developing countries under the
circumstance, using the selected countries of Nigeria, the Republic
of Korea and Brazil as our practical samples.

•

It is no secret that the developing countries and their fragile
economies have been struggling all the way from the twentieth
(20 th) century into the twenty first (21 st) century. It is equally
known that the roles of the IFIs have been evolving partly as a
result of their internal developments, and partly as a result of
external developments occurring in the international environment
that they operate in. It is the realization of the foregoing, and with
hopes of finding ways that the IFIs can positively impact the
developing countries in their quest for sustained development, that
this research is anchored.
This research, therefore, aims to accomplish the following: (1)
argue that the roles of the IFIs as conceived by their founding
fathers were limited to Euro-American interests; and (2) in light of
the developments both within these IFIs and in the international
community, these roles have been greatly impacted, (3) that given
the precarious nature of the economies of the developing countries,
the IFIs must take due cognizance of that in formulating policies
and practices that impact these economies, and (4) that failure to
show sensitivity to the economies of the developing countries will
result in catastrophic consequences for both the developing
countries and the international community.
The limitation placed on this work can not permit one to claim to
have exhausted all the ingredients of this novel topic. My hope is
that this will signal the beginning of further and more robust
exploration of this area of international law . Hopefully, we have
begun a crusade that will attract more positive attention of the IFIs
to the precarious state of the economies of the developing
countries. If that is all we have accomplished here, we shall have
made a very good effort.
J

Sacram(!Jlto, April 2007

S.C.OGBODO
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CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL EXAMINATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS

I

INTRODUCTION

In order to better appreciate the relationship between international law and
the international financial institutions (IFIs), it is pertinent to make some
critical distinctions or clarifications. The first is that the IFIs comprise of two
major components: the international organizationsl and the international
.monetary system2. Second, is an appreciation of the origin of both the
international organizations and the international monetary system as products
of multilateral treaties of sovereign states. Third, is to make a clarification of
11

1. International organizations in this context refer only to the organizations whose membership comprise of
governments or other governmental agencies or organs.
2..Intemation~l monetary system in this context will permit all organizations, institutions, and agencies that deal
~nmarily with fiscal and monetary policies, whether solely owned by governments or in partnership with private
mVestors.

,

1

the fact that the Bretton Woods institutions3 are not the only ones envisaged
in this research4, rather; they form an integral and very important component
of the entire International Financial Institutions that we plan to cover. Fourth,
is to address the question of whether or not the IFIs come under the
regulation of international law and the implications of such regulation.

While the use of the words, "international monetary system," may not create
illusions in appreciation and understanding, the use of the words,
"international organizations" cause some conceptual confusion. Why?
Because a lot of people confuse international organizations5 with nongovernmental organizations, otherwise popularly called NOOs.6 Such groups
that are called NOOs are outside the purview of our research because they are
principally comprised of individual or private membership. Further, most of
3 The Bretton Woods institutions are those that were created at the conclusion of the United Nations conference that
held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in the United States of America in 1944. The conference gave birth to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).
Although the conference had set out to establish a tripartite organization called the International Trade Organization
(ITO), the failure of the ITO gave birth to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
4 ?ther institutions envisaged in this research are those that were created outside the Bretton Woods conference,
which nonetheless, play very critical and important financial and monetary roles in the affairs ofthe developing
COuntries. For example, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Union, the Paris Club and the London
Club.
5. Supra, note 3.
6 No~-goventmental organizations (NGOS) are comprised of individual members who come together to form such a
group In Pursuance of a common public goal or objective. Many of such groups abound all over, for example,
"

2
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them focus on causes that are limited to their community or state or country
such that they lack the spread and impact of theinternational organization s.
Consequently, our research will focus mainly on those two major groups that
comprise the international financial institutions (IF Is ) - international
organizations and the international monetary system. In light of the
foregoing, we shall attempt to define and elaborate on the legal meaning of
the key components of this work by first striving to analyze the theoretical
definition of international law.

II

INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law is the branch of the law that confers rights and demands
obligations from subjects in international relationships.7 Subjects of
international law, indeed, like subjects of any given legal order, implies such
entities that the norms of the legal order in question apply to, as well as the
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), Africa Health Organization (AHO), American Association of Retired
P ersons (AARP), etc.
7 Okeke, C.N., The Expansion of New Subjects of Contemporary International Law Through Their Treaty-Making

,
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regulation of their conduct, by the imposition of duties and conferment of
rights. 8

Theoretically, international law has been broken into two main components
as follows: international private law and the international public law.
International private law involves international relationship between
individuals while international public law, on the contrary, involves
international relationship between states, public agencies or organizations.
For the purposes of our inquiry, we shall be limiting our focus on
international public law because of the states, international public agencies
and organizations subject of our review.
Although international law dominates almost every aspect of our existence,
particularly, in the new 'global village' that the world has developed into,
yet, questions still arise whether international law is a true law. Apparently,
the unique features of international law lend credence to the debate as to the

•
authenticity of international law in the comity of laws. Some of the peculiar

J

Capacity,1973.
8 Ibid, p. 181

,
4

characteristics of international law include the following9:
1. There is no single legislative source of international law. All countries
of the world and the international organizations are empowered to enact
international laws. 10
2. There is no world court that is exclusively empowered to interpret
international laws. There are many courts and tribunals that are
empowered to hear and interpret international law if the parties bring
their cases before the courts. 1 1
3. There is also no world executive branch that is empowered to enforce
international laws. Consequently, states and organizations mayor may
not respect international legal obligations. 12
Another point that must be addressed here, not so much in justification of
the authenticity of international law as much as in thedetermination of the
status of the IFIs under international law , is to review the sources of
intemationallaw. The sources of international hiw form the basis for the

9 Cheeseman, H.R., Contemporary Business Law, 3rd ed, 2000, p. 165
10 Ibid
11 Ibid
J
12 Ibid

,
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adjudication of international disputes by international courts. 13 According
to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice14, there
are four major sources of international law as follows15:
1. Treaties and conventions Treaties and convention's are synonymous with legislations made by
sovereign states at the international level. Treaties are agreements or
contracts entered into between two or more states by the authorized
representatives of the states and duly ratified by the heads of government
of the respective states. While bilateral treaties are made between two
states; multilateral treaties are made among more than two states.
Conventions, on the contrary, although enjoying the same prestige as
treaties, are entered into by duly authorized representatives of
international organizations 16.

13 Ibid
14 OthelWise called the ICJ Statute
15 It is noteworthy that most courts rely on the hierarchy of the sources in their application and authority,
Consequently, most courts will apply and accord more authority to treaties and conventions before they apply any
other source on the list.
16 Some examples of the conventions include the United Nations Convention against Corruption (signing began in
~003), the UJlited Nations Convention of the Carriage of Goods by Sea, the United Nations Convention on Contracts
;r ~he International Sale of Goods, the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, the United
atlons Conven~on on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, etc,

6
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2. CustomCustom is the general pattern of relationship between two or more states
over a reasonably long period of time, which has become obligatory in
such a relationship. In order for a practice to become a binding custom in
international law, it must enjoy two critical qualities as followsI7:
(a) It must be a consistent and recurring practice over a reasonably long
period of time.I8
(b) It must be a binding practice, not one done out of courtesy.I9
Such practice can be found in official government statements, diplomatic
correspondences, policy statements, press releases, speeches, and other
government sources. Since international customs, like domestic customs,
are constantly evolving, such established and internationally recognized
customs generally result in formal treaties between or among such
states.20
3. General principles of law -

•

The international courts may also refer to the general principles of law
17 Cheeseman, H.R., supra, p. 166
18 Ibid
J
19 Ibid

,

7

applicable to civilized nations21. Such laws are typically laws applicable
to the disputing nations which may be traced to their constitutions,
statutes, regulations, common law, or other sources oflaw.22
4. Judicial decisions and teachings.
Although international courts emphasize the point that they are not bound
like the national courts by the doctrine of stare decisis,23 they
nevertheless, refer to their past decisions for guidance. Also, the courts
refer to the teachings and writings of the most qualified legal scholars of
~1

the states in dispute for guidance and direction.24

,

jtvt'l7F":'+.'/'7£?

-1

7

A variety of courts have jurisdiction to decide cases arising from
international law. Such courts are generally called the international courts.
The most notable are the following courts:
1. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) -

20 Ibid
21 .This qualification that the general principles oflaw must meet the acceptance or recognition of 'civilized
natIons', have raised intellectual dust as to whose standard of civilization was intended by the drafters of the statute.
Certainly, the word 'civilized' is very subjective and depends a lot on the perspective of the party applying the
~~n~~rd. No doubt, what an African considers 'civilized' varies to a great extent from what an American considers
2cIVlhzed'. Ditto for South Koreans and Brazilians.
2 Cheeseman, H.R., supra, p. 167
~3 .T~ principle encourages national courts to attempt as much as judicially feasible to follow their past rulings and
eClSlOns in prder to promote judicial harmony and stability. However, international courts make a strong effort to
~sert that they are not guided by the principle even when they refer to their own past decisions.
Cheeseman, \l.R., supra, p. 167.

8
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The ICJ is popularly called the World Court25. It is located in The Hague
in Netherlands and serves as the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations. Only nations or sovereign states may bring suit before the ICJ
arising from bilateral or multilateral relationships26, and the court may be
requested by the General Assembly, the Security Council27 or other
organs and specialized agencies28 of the United Nations to give an
advisory opinion on any legal question. The court is composd of 15
judges with nine-year tenures, and not more than two judges may be
appointed from the same country.
The ICJ's jurisdiction is, however, limited by the following factors:
(a) nations must voluntarily agree to allow the court to hear a
case29, and
(b) nations are not bound by a decision of the ICJ.30

25 See the UN Charter of 1945, supra. Chapter XIV of the UN Charter created The International Court of Justice
(ICI), and designated the court as "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations." The Court was empowered to
"function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice" and forms an integral part of the Charter. (Article 92)
26 .Article 93 (1) provides that all Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the ICJ.
ArtiCle 93 (2) provides, however, that a state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to
the Statute of the ICJ if they meet certain conditions set by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the
Security Council.
;~ Article 96 (1) of the UN Charter, supra.
29 Art~cle 96 ~) of the UN Charter, supra.
30 Art~cle 94 (1) of the UN Charter, supra.
ArtICle 94 (2) <tthe UN Charter, supra.

9
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The ICJ may resolve a case by awarding monetary damages to the successful
party or injunctive relief to the aggrieved party. It may also authorize the
Security Council to take further action.31
2. The European Court of Justice The ECJ is the judicial branch of the European Union. It is located in
Luxembourg and has jurisdiction to enforce European Union law. The court
is composed of judges appointed to represent each member of the EU, and
they serve a six-year tenure. Although the ECJ lacks the enforcement
capability, it relies upon the national courts for the enforcement of its
decisions.
3. Other International Courts Other international courts have been created by other treaties32 to adjudicate
the disputes that are bound to arise from the application and interpretation of
the treaty in question.
4. National Courts The national courts of member states form the bulk of the international court
31 Ibid

~

See for eiample, the courts created by the treaties that created the regional organizations like Andean Common
arket (ANCOM), The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Central American Common

,

10
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system because they adjudicate the majority of cases arising from
intemationallaw. They also possess the enforcement machinery to ensure
that the decision of the court is obeyed. While some countries have
,. designated courts for international disputes, others channel such cases
through their regular court system.33

III

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

International organizations are those whose membership consists of
sovereign governments that come together in pursuance of mutual benefits
based upon multilateral cooperation.34 As we stated earlier, such
organizations are formed by the instrumentality of a multilateral treaty signed
by a group of countries. International organizations, therefore, derive their
legitimacy from the most important source of international law - treaty. A
typical example and the most important of all international organizations is

•
Market, etc.
33 ~n the United States, for example, commercial disputes between U.S. companies and foreign governments or
PartIes may be brought in the federal court under the Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C., 1350). The statute permits a
noncitizen to ~ue another noncitizen in federal district court if the breach outside the U.S. was in violation of a U.S.
treaty or the law of nations.
34 Supra, note 3.,

11

the United Nations35 which was created by a multilateral treaty signed on
October 24, 1945.
The origin of modern 'universal' international organization can be traced to
the Versailles Treaty of 1919 at the end of World War I. The treaty gave birth
to the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization36.
However, the League failed to live up to its mandate by its failure to prevent
such peace-threatening actions of some of the members. For example, the
League could not avert the invasion of China by Japan in 1931, or the
invasion of Finland by the Soviet Union which resulted in the expulsion of
the Soviet Union from the League in 1939. The continued aggression of
Germany at the time could not be contained under the machinery of the
League which ultimately resulted in the outbreak of World War II (19391945). After World War II, the leaders of the victorious Allied Powers
decided to form a new organization to replace the League of Nations, thus,
the United Nations was formed. 3 7

•
35 The United Nations Charter came into force on October 24, 1945.
36 The Versailles Peace Treaty was signed in 1919 after the end of World War I (1914 - 1918). The objective of
~ Treaty was. to establish a multilateral organization that will maintain international peace and security, thus, the
a~e Of1'latlOns was established in 1920. However, the League failed to live up to the task due to the non~;rticlpation of the United States and the expulsion of the Soviet Union.
Note 34, suWa

12

The importance of these international organizations, like the United Nations,
cannot be over-emphasized in the orderly and peaceful relationship of the
world and in the management of international business38. Given the
tremendous changes that the world is constantly faced with, particularly, in
the twenty-first (21 st) century, the need for a more orderly world becomes
more paramount. The concept of globalization39 has, indeed, reduced the
world to a global village. As the world continues to be more interconnected,
the physical barriers that separated one part of the world from another are
dismantled. As labor, goods, services, information, technology, etc., are
transported from one part of the world to another, so are drugs, crimes,
diseases, terrorism40, etc.
Consequently, these institutions have grown to supplement some of the
functions of national governments. They serve as sources of information or
~8 It is important to note that within the UN alone, there are 28 major organizations whose functions facilitate
mternational exchange of goods, services, money, and information. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called
these organizations "soft infrastructure" for international trade ..
~9 Our focus will be limited to economic globalization although there are other dimensions of globalization that
~c1udes technological, political, cultural, environmental, etc. Economic globalization has been defined as the
mternational integration of goods, technology, labor, and capital; that is, firms implement global strategies that link
and coordinate their international activities on a worldwide basis. See Mathew J. Slaughter and Phillip Swagel, Does
Globalization Lower Wages and Export Jobs? (Washington, DC; IMF, 1997), p.l, cited in Donald A. Ball, et aI,
International Business: The Challenge of Global Competition, 10th ed, 2006.
40 ~though there have been previous acts of international terrorism that affected different parts of the world with
V~g num¥ler of casualties, the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States gave a new meaning to terrorism
w en the US President, George W. Bush, declared a war on terrorism. Pursuant to the war on terrorism, the US has

13
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sources of financing41. They also serve as a source of regulation or a source
of jobs42. Increasingly, they provide many services on behalf of the member
states that mutually benefit the members as well as non-members.43 The size
and influence of these organizations differ, as well as the areas of their
operations44. While some are better known due to their political and
economic impact on the international arena, others are more confined to
specific and limited geographical areas.45
Regardless, these organizations qualify to be called 'international' because
they meet the criteria of being comprised of two or more States in their
membership. They also qualify to be called 'organizations,' because they
meet the criteria of having specific and general goals and objectives. Some of
the well-known ones include the United Nations and its predecessor, the
League of Nations, the European Union (EU), the International Labor
invaded Afghanistan and Iraq.

~1 For example, see the UN Commission on International Trade Law which sets conditions and protocols for
mternational transactions.
42 The International Civil Aviation Organization coordinates all international agreements regulating the smooth
operation of commercial airlines across the globe. The World Health Organization coordinates the standardization of "
Pharmaceutical quality and the names of drugs, while the Protocols of the universal Postal Union coordinate the
smooth movement of all postal materials across the globe. See www.un.org/partners/business/index.asp last visited
February 9,2007.
43 Ibid
44 Ibid

is

The wide popularity enjoyed by the World Health Organization cannot be attributed to the International
elecommunication Union which coordinates and allots air wave frequencies to international operators. Although

,
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Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), etc.

IV

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM

The international monetary system, on the other hand, is a group of
organizations that deal specifically with monetary and fiscal policy
fonnulation and enforcement. Again, the international monetary system was a
product of multilateral treaties signed by a group of countries. Thus, they
derive their legitimacy under international law from the most important
source of international law - the treaty. Some of these organizations, like
universal international organizations, consist of sovereign states. On the
contrary, while some of the organizations are not specifically comprised of
sovereign states, they are financed and controlled by the governments behind
their formation. The common characteristic underlying the organizations in
the international monetary system is the fact that they are limited to solely
monetary policy formulation and enforcement in their respective
environment.
i

both organizatiQns serve very critical purposes in the facilitation of international trade, yet the WHO has become a

15
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It is noteworthy that a few of the international organizations may enjoy all

the characteristics of both an international organization as well as an
international monetary system. A good example is the United Nations. It is
comprised of member states while its goals and objectives cover every
conceivable human concern and activity. It is one of the world's largest
employers,46 and has offices and operations in virtually all parts of the
world. The United Nations is also one of the key players in the monetary
environment, making rules and regulations that tremendously impact the
world's economy, while providing critical enforcement tools and agencies
that monitor and enforce compliance. In the same vein, the European
Union47 has developed into another major player in the international

better known organization.
46' It is estimated that about 8,600 people from 170 countries make up the UN staff. The Secretary-General and his
staff take an oath not to seek or receive instructions from any governmental or outside authority. In addition to the
core staff, over 52,000 people work for the UN and its related organizations worldwide. See Ball, D.A., et aI,
~temational Business: The Challenge of Global Competition, 10th ed, 2006, p. 122.
TiusThe ED, which came into existence by the Treaty of Rome 1958, is a supranational entity of European countries.
means that the ED is a regional government representing all the members of the union in their quest for
econo~c and political integration. As a supranational entity, the ED must be distinguished from international
~aruz~tions like the UN or from treaty created entities like NAFT A. While the latter relies upon the goodwill and
1 .t of. Its I¥mbers for cooperation and income, the ED enjoys the power and privilege to tax its members, to enact
e3gl0SIabon, and to enforce its sanctions through its judiciary system. See Ball, D.A. et aI, supra, footnote 48, pp 1 and 131.
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monetary environment. Unlike the United Nations, the EU's membership is
limited to sovereign nations in Europe that have come together to form a
supra-national state or the United States of Europe as it is jokingly described.
With the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), and the
introduction of the euro asa common currency in the Union,48 the European
Union has become a critical actor in the monetary environment. Some of the
organizations under the international monetary system include the United
Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the World Bank (IBRD), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO),
etc.

V

THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE IFIs

It is important to also clarify that the Bretton Woods conference gave birth to
the key components of modem day international financial institutions
{IFIs).49 Although the Bretton Woods conference successfully mid-wifed the

48 Ibid, p. 1}S. The euro became the official currency of the countries within the European Monetary Union on
January 1, 2002 .
. 49 The Bretton ~oods conference was held in 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in the United States of
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United Nations (UN~O , the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD/WORLD
BANK), it nevertheless failed to establish the tripartite International Trade
Organization (ITO), which was intended to be the implementation
organization for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Consequently, the GATT was adopted as a compromise by the conveners of
the conference with a promise to continue work on the imperfect agreement.
By default, therefore, the GATT assumed the status of both an agreement as
well as the implementation organization. That untidy situation was eventually
corrected by the Uruguay Round of Talks51 which created the World Trade
Organization which was empowered to administer not just the GATT52, but
the additional GATS53 and TRIPS54, thereby expanding the scope of the
new organization beyond the limited trade in products which GATT dealt
with.

America. It gave birth to the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, and set the stage for the GATT after the efforts at
establishing the ITO failed. The GATT, however, was established later from the conferences that were held between
1946 and 1948.

~o ~rior to the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, there had been the United Nations Declaration of26

5t

tions on January 1, 1942. The San Francisco Conference of 1945 gave birth to the United Nations.
52 The Uruguay Round of Talks lasted for eight years, beginning from 1986 and ending in 1994.
53 General 4.greement on Tariffs and Trade.
5 General Agreement on Trade in Services.
4 General Agrefment for the Protection of Intellectual Properties.
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The conveners of the conferences that gave birth to all the IFIs were
sovereign nations. In exercise of their sovereign rights to enter into a treaty
with other sovereign nations, they convened, negotiated and agreed to enter
into the agreements that gave rise to the respective IFIs. By so doing, they
satisfied all the conditions of membership for the respective organizations
and agreed to be bound by the obligations attaching thereto and be conferred
with all the benefits accruing therefrom. But more importantly, they
conferred upon the IFIs the requisite rights, powers, privileges and
immunities that are needed for their independent existence as well as
effective operation in the international arena. Such rights and privileges
include the conferment of a distinct legal personality upon the institution, the
treaty clauses empowerment, the explicit authority to develop relations with
other inter-government organizations and non-government organizations, etc.
As creations of the sovereign nations under their exercise of their treatymaking powers, the IFIs are, therefore, recognizable subjects of international
law. Moreover, they are equipped with all the tools for independent existence
and operation as subjects of international law. Further, these 'subjects' have,
J

from inception, asserted their presence and claimed their rights in the

,
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international arena for so long that there presence and influence is well
documented.

VI

APPLICATION OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE IFIs

In order to address the question whether the IFIs are governed by the general
principles of international law; let us examine for a moment the question of
whether the IFIs are qualified subj ects of international law . If they so qualify,
then there will be no scintilla of doubt that they are so governed. If, on the
contrary, they do not qualify as subjects of international law, then they are
outside the governance of international law.
Generally speaking, the subjects of a legal system are the persons or entities
to whom the law attributes rights and duties.55 According to Professor
Okeke56, if the question is posed, "Who is the subject of a certain legal

•
. order?', this means: to whom do the norms of this legal order apply, whose
55 Okeke, C.N., The expansion of new subjects of contemporary international law through their treaty-making
capacity, 197J, which cited Spiropolous, L'individu en droit international, on the same topic of the subjects of a law
and concluded as follows: 'A subject of the law is one to whom the rules of a juridical system are immediately

,
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conduct does this order regulate or license by imposing duties or conferring
rights". This litmus test for determining who is subjected to a given legal

order applies with equal force to both domestic and local law, as well as to
international law. Also arising from the litmus test is the issue of the indirect
application of a law to certain persons or entities. Situations abound where a
law may not be directly applicable to certain persons or groups, nonetheless,
the law will impact the activities of such persons or groups indirectly. But for
now, we must be guided by the analysis of Spiropolous when he emphasized
that the subject of a juridical system must be immediatelJRnddirectly
impacted by that system.57 By the analysis of Spiropolous, it implies and I
agree that if a juridical system fails to immediately and directly impact a
person or entity, then that person or entity was not intended to be subjected to
that system.
Another legal dimension to the question of whether or not the IFls are
subjects of intemationallaw arises from the classical or traditionalist
definition of intemationallaw. According to the classical or traditionalist

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~~d~~~~ed, tqat is to say, one who is directly qualified or obligated by the rules of a juridical system.'

, 57 SUpra, note 16.

,
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definition,58 "international law directly concerns certain entities alone59,
principally States, and reaches individuals only through the medium of such
entities by obligating or permitting the latter to regulate or license individual
conduct in certain ways. " Thus, from the classical or traditionalist
perspective, intemationallaw was created to immediately and directly
regulate the relationship of sovereign states as well as their related entities60.
Assuming we proceed on the truth of this perspective, which I respectfully
disagree with61, it is therefore not in doubt whether the IFls are subjects of
intemationallaw. The IFls we stated earlier are creations of the sovereign
states. By their creation, the states also conferred upon the IFls all the
requisite rights and privileges for the exercise of their legal and corporate
pesonality. It is my position, therefore, that the IFls were borne in mind in
the formulation of the classical and traditionalist definition of international

58 Okeke, C.N., supra. P.9
59 The emphasis of Spiropoulos on the direct application of international law is amplified in this classical definition.
60 Many scholars and writers equate international law with the law of nations, thus re-inforcing the classical and
traditionalist view. See Renault in Encyclopedia Juridique, French ed., Paris 1888, t.1, p.429. Also see Ahrens in the
same publication, all quoted in Okeke, supra.
61 My disagreement with the classical or traditionalist perception of international law is in appreciation of the
gr~und-breaking work begun by Professor C.N. Okeke which recognized, at the time, the new and emerging subjects
~~Intemationallaw. Such emerging subjects like The Holy See, Internationally Umecognized States, National
. Iberation Movements, as well as International Organizations, have become full and active members of the
~te~tionalicommunity since then. See Okeke, C.N., supra. The modem perception of international law as well as
Its subjects must, while giving supremacy to sovereign states and individuals, also accord due recognition and
appreciation to t~e critical roles thatthe other actors in the international community play.
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law by the unambiguous inclusion of "state entities" among the subjects of
the law. Clearly, the IFIs fall squarely within the perception of the classical
or traditionalist's legal prism. Thus, they are intended to be immediately and

directly subjected to, and they are clearly subjects of the general principles of
intemationallaw.

VII CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, we have established that the IFIs were creations of
sovereign states for the purpose of international cooperation on monetary and
financial matters. It is our position that the IFIs qualify as subjects of
. international law because they fall within the purview of institutions created

by sovereign states under the classical or traditionalist perception of
international law. Further, even under the expanded and more contemporary
perception of international law, the IFIs, as key actors in the international

..
arena possess most of the characteristics expected of subjects of international
law. The roles that the IFIs were created to play, and indeed, the roles that
i

they currently play, are of such tremendous consequence that to deny them

,
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their due recognition in international law will amount to ignorance.

We also do appreciate the fact that not all the subjects of a legal system will
influence the legal system with the same size and weight. The same applies
not just in thecomity of nations but a Iso in the comity of the IFIs. Thus, the
International Court of Justice in recognizing the international legal
personality of the Untied Nations in the Reparations ofInjuries case, stated
as follows:
"The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their
nature or in the extent of their rights .... "62
Regardless of the size and influence wielded by any IFI as a bona fide subject
of international law , such IFI must ipso facto possess certain identifiable
qualities that must confer the status of a legal personality to such IFI under
international law .
Okeke enumerated some essential elements that must be attributable to a

•
subject of a legal system or a legal personality as follows63:

i

,
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1. The subject must have duties or responsibilities under that legal system.
2. The subject must have some rights conferred upon it under that legal
system.
3. The subject must possess the capacity to enter into contractual or other

legal relations with other subjects of the system, as well as the capacity to
seek redress under the system.
From the foregoing, therefore, it is clear that the IFIs have obligations under
intemationallaw which imposes a wide range of duties upon them for their
actions in the international arena. Simultaneously, they enjoy a wide range of
rights and privileges under the international law system64. Finally, they
possess the capacity to enter into contractual relationships and also to enforce
their rights under the legal system.65 Having exhausted the issue of the legal
personality of the IFIs under international law, let us now tum our attention
to the historical developments that gave rise to the formation of the IFIs.

~i

See the ICJ's comments in its Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries, Ie] Reports, 1949, p.178
Okeke, Supra p.19

64 Ibid.
65. Ibid

'
i
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CHAPTER TWO

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONs\ND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES

'il

INTRODUCTION

I

!I

I

II

The current relationship existing between most developing economies and
the International Financial Institutions (hereinafter referred to as IFIs) was

PJi./VJ-, '0
developed chiefly by two historical developments. The first development was

-'-

,~

7'·

-~-- ---

the outbreak of World War n66 , and the aftermath of it. The second
development, particularly, with regard to most colonies of the developed
countries, was the attainment of political independence by the former
colonies 67 .

•
66 World War II spanned from1939 - 1945, in an attempt by the Allied Forces to defeat
the threat of German dominance led by Adolph Hitler.
67

AJllOng the former colonies include many African nations, including Nigeria, which

Was a former colony of the United Kingdom. Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960. It
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The current relationship existing between most developing economies and
the International Financial Institutions (hereinafter referred to as IFls) was
developed chiefly by two historical developments. The first development was
the outbreak of World War n

68
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and the aftermath of it. The second

development, particularly, with regard to most colonies of the developed
countries, was the attainment of political independence by the former
. 69
co1omes .

However, in order to better address the origin of the relationship between the
IFIs and the developing countries during this period, it will be appropriate, if

-----,

not necessary, to understudy the period covering the slavery era, the internal

f

management era, and finally, the poskindependence era. Such a distinctive
coverage will, no doubt, shed better historical light on how the relationship
between the IFls was developed and cemented over a long period of time.
Further, it will shed more light on how the IFls became increasingly
is pertinent to note that the United States was not a fonner colonial power.
World War II spanned from 1939 - 1945, in an attempt by the Allied Forces to defeat
the threat of Gennan dominance led by Adolph Hitler.
68

Among the fonner colonies include many African nations, including Nigeria, which
~as a fODIner colony ofthe United Kingdom. Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960. It
IS pertinent to note that the United States was not a fonner colonial power.
69

,
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important in the management of the financial, monetary and political affairs
of the developing countries.

II

WORLDWARIIANDITSAFTERMATH

After WorId War II, most of Europe and other parts of the world were in
ruins. There was urgent need to re-build the damages caused by the war as
well as facilitate international trade on a multilateral and nondiscriminatory
basis. A series of conferences were held to fashion out these institutions and
agreements. The most prominent was held in 1944 at Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire, in the United States, where the organizations and agreements on
the regulation of the new financial and economic relations were developed.
The Bretton Woods conference successfully gave birth to the Bretton Woods
System.

Ii

Generally, the term "Bretton Woods System" comprises the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and
)

Development (IBRD or the World Bank), and the General Agreement on

,
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Tariffs and Trade (GATT).70 The GATT, however, was developed in another
series of conferences, which spanned from the fall of 1946 to mid-1948. The
GATT was designed as a multilateral agreement that will succeed the Havana
Charter and the International Trade Organization, reflecting commercial
policy provisions similar to the Havana Charter chapter on commercial
policy.

While the IMF was created to

~epair

the disintegration of the international

monetary system after the War, and the World Bank was designed to
stimulate and support foreign investment which had declined to insignificant
(

level, the GATT was created to reverse the protectionist and discriminatory
yracti~_s

------

(

~

that had multiplied during the post-war depression years. IMF and
~

GATT were expected to collaborate on exchange policies and trade policies .
. In essence, IMF, the World Bank and GATT were designed to help the
<:

--,

. developed nations achieve their multiple objectives of full employment, freer
. and expanding trade, as well as stable exchange rates. 71

70

~orsefield, Keith J., The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965,3 ed, 1969

71

·
M elel,
G.M., The Bretton Woods Agreement - 25 Years After, 39 Stanford L. Rev.
29
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Whilst the IMF and W orId Bank became instantly effective after their
,--

------

creation, the GATT, ~ll.the contrary, was ineffective and virtually non~-------------~! TZ' -if Y 7 /PvVy.~ ~
existent. However, in 1994, the GATT was reinvigorated by the Uruguay
Round of talks. The apparent ineffectiveness of the GATT before the
Uruguay Round of talks has been attributed to what some commentators
called its "birth defects."n The framers of GATT never intended it to be an
organization, but rather an agreement that will codify the results of the tariff
negotiations as well as some general protective clauses, which would prevent
evasion of the tariff commitments. Hence, GATT was originally planned to
be an embodiment of the results of the tariff negotiations, while the
International Trade Organization (ITO) was planned to be the organizational
't--

__________ ----.,.

framework for the implementation of the GATT provisions.

Like the IMF and the W orId Bank, the initiatives for the formation of an ITO

<-----

and GATT came chiefly from the United States during the end of W orId War

•
235,237,245-246 (1971); reprinted in Jackson, J.R., Davey, W.J., Sykes, A.O. Jr., Legal
Problems of International Economic Relations, 3 ed., West Publishing Co., 279 (1995).

R

.

J51ckson, J.H., Davey, W.J., Sykes, Jr, A.O., Legal Problems of International Economic
. elatIOns, 3 ed. West Publishing Co., 296 (1995).
72

,
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II. These initiatives can be traced to two main sources in the American
economic policy at the end of the war. The first source was the general

J"

,i1
1~
_11'

"Reciprocal Trade Agreements" program, which originated from the 1934
Act, which empowered the United States President to negotiate mutual
reductions on tariffs. The second source was the realization by the United
States of the important role played by international economic affairs in the
genesis of Wodd War II. The ITO and GATT were thus conceived to achieve

,I'C

I'

I,

~I

•

lIt'
I .

the dual objective of providing a multilateral medium for negotiating mutual

i-

!l:

1\-

tariffs reduction and a viable regulator of international economic affairs.

li'.

!lt~ :

}lt.'""

At the inception of the United Nations in 1945, the United Nations Economic

,<I,..

and Social Council (ECOSOC), was established as the principal organ for the
coordination of economic and social issues. The economic issues that
ECOSOC cover includes trade, transport, economic development, and
~

industrialization. The social issues include housing, women's right, racial
discrimination, population growth, children, narcotics trafficking, trans-

!i'

"

~

H

f
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national crime, youth development, the environment, etc.

73

During the

Council's first meeting in February 1946, the United States introduced a
resolution calling for the convening of a "United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment." The resolution was adopted with the principal goal
of drafting a charter for an international trade organization. 74
In the fall of 1946, a committee met in London to consider a "Suggested
Charter for an International Trade Organization" drafted by the United States
government. 75 In early 1947, a drafting subcommittee met at Lake Success,
New York. 76 The full preparatory conference convened again in Geneva,
beginning in April 1947, and ending in October 1947.77 It was at this Geneva
conference that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
drafted, and some progress was made with the tariff negotiations and the ITO

Ball, McCulloch, Frantz, Geringer, Minor, International Business: The Challenge of
Global Competition, 9 ed. McGraw Hill, 149 (2004)
73

.
74 U.S. State Dept. Press Release, Dec. 16, 1945, reproduced in 13 Dept. State Bulletin
970 (1945); 1 U.N. ECOSOC Resolution 13, U.N. Doc. E122 (1946).

See London Report, First Session of the Preparatory Committee (1946); U.N. Doc.
EPCT/CIVI-66 (1946).
75

76

See New York Report, U.N Doc. EPCT/34 (1947); U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.61W.58 (1947)

77

.see U.N. Docs EPCT/A/SRlI-43; EPCT/B/SRlI-33 (1947); U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/SR
1-28 (1947).
.
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charter .

. It is worthy of note that the tariff agreements were negotiated under the

extended authority of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1945. The
United States Congress had hoped that the President would submit the ITO
charter to them for approval. However, when the early drafts of the General
Agreement included some provisional semblance of an organization,
members of Congress criticized the drafts on the ground that the President
had no authority to accept international organization membership for the
United States without congressional approval. Congress had expected that
GATT would be a subsidiary agreement under the ITO charter, depending

upon the ITO charter and the ITO secretariat for servicing and enforcement.
·a!his expectation was based upon the fact that most of the general clauses in

GATT were drawn from comparable clauses drafted for the ITO.78
See Hearings on the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed ITO before the House
and Means Comm., 80th Congress 1st Sess. (1947); Hearings on Operation of the Trade
~ments Act and Proposed ITO before the Senate Finance Comm., 80th Congress. 1st Sess.
78

J

,
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Due to the foregoing reasons and more, neither the ITO charter nor the
GATT was able to pass the litmus test of Congressional assent before the
expiration of the extended Trade Agreement Act in 1948. The GATT, for
instance, needed Parliamentary approval by the Legislature of the other
countries before they could assent to some of the general clauses. However,
in order to avert a complete loss of their efforts, the 22 original members of
GATT signed in late 1947, a "Protocol of Provisional Application" (PPA),
which became effective on January 1,1948. 79 Since then, GATT has been
applied by virtue of this protocol with hopes that at the inception of the ITO
charter, the Protocol would give way to an unrestricted application of GATT.
Unfortunately, this expectation never came through. Although the Havana
conference completed the draft charter of the ITO in early 1948, the United
States Congress had by then gone through a lot of changes that for two years
the President could not get them to approve the ITO, thus causing the demise
Ii

of the ITO. Without the ITO, GATT consequently became by default, the

-o

7:

Protocol of Provisional Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
ctober 30, 1947,61 Stat. Pts.5,6, TIAS No. 1700,55 UNTS 308.

,
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central organization for coordinating national policies on international trade.
However, the search for a replacement of ITO continued.

At the ninth session of the Contracting Parties of GATT, held between
October 1954 and May 1955, a number of amendments were proposed for
GATT and a draft charter for the proposed Organization for Trade

Cooperation (OTC), was completed.

80

Unfortunately, the OTC charter, like

its predecessor (ITO charter), was again rejected by the United States
Congress. The amendments to GATT were, however, accepted under the
authority of the then existing Trade Agreements Act. The inability to approve
\

an organization that will exercise regulatory oversight over GATT, created
the anomaly whereby the nation participants to GATT were referred to as
"contracting parties", rather than as "members."

II

80 See GATT, 3rd Suppl. BISD (1955); Agreement on the Organization for Trade
Cooperation, GATT Doc. Final Act, 9th Session.
J
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By the end of the eight-year Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of trade
negotiations, there had emerged what had eluded all previous efforts - a new
and better-defined international organization and treaty in the form of a
World Trade Organization81. The Uruguay Round did not only succeed in
the formation of the WTO, but also made substantial revisions in the dispute
settlement procedures. Also, while GATT dealt almost entirely with trade in
products, the Uruguay Round included provisions for trade in services
(GATS), and another for the protection of intellectual property (TRIPS),
procurement, investment and agriculture. The new WTO is thus charged with
the responsibility of administering these treaties with hopes of a better
regulation of international trade. Further, unlike the predecessor, the WTO is
no longer a collection of ad hoc agreement, Panel reports and understandings
of the parties82. Rather, all trade obligations are comprehensively dealt with
under the WTO and member states are obligated to all the provisions of all
the agreements.

•
!1 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
8~und of4fultilateral Trade Negotiations (1994) 33 I.L.M. 1125.
Id. See also Cameron, J and Gray, K.R., Principles ofIntemational Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body,
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Interestingly, the formation of WTO during the Uruguay Round occurred by
historical accident. The agenda and the negotiating structure prepared by the
ministers at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986, did not include the
drafting of any organizational charter. Moreover, the planners were aware of
the opposition of the United States Congress, which had earlier struck down
two attempts at forming such organization. In any case, a group called the
FOGS was formed to consider the "Future of the GATT System."
The FOGS group focused on the GATT's relationship with the monetary part
of the Bretton Woods system and on designing the new Trade Policy Review
Mechanism (TPRM).

•

and COlJlparative Law Quarterly, Vol SO, 2001

,
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In May of 1990, the Government of Canada was the first to formally propose
the formation of a W orId Trade Organization.83 The European Union was in
support of this proposal, but suggested a Multilateral Trade Organization
(MTO). The Ministerial Meeting held in Brussels in December 1990, ended
in an impasse. Afterwards, the then GATT Director-General, Arthur Dunkel,
intervened and encouraged the negotiators to go ahead and produce a
complete rough draft of the negotiation results. The draft that was presented
contained a draft charter for a new organization to be called Multilateral
Trade Organization (MTO). From 1990 until December 1993, the negotiators
worked out their differences and the oppositions to the draft charter,
especially the name MTO. This lasted until December 1993, when the
negotiators agreed to a charter proposal with a change of name back to W orId
Trade Organization (WTO). In April 1994, the proposal was finally
formalized at the Morocco summit and ready to be submitted to the
respective governments for ratification.

J

83 SUpra
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Unlike the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 1994
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) covers a much
wider range of trade. It extends beyond goods and now covers services,
intellectual property, procurement, investment, agriculture, etc. Furthermore,
the new trade regime is no longer a collection of ad hoc agreements. An
important principle contained in the WTO Agreement is that member states
have to accept the obligations contained in all the provisions of the
agreement as they cannot pick and choose.
As international relations have become increasingly dominated by economic
factors, the WTO system has moved away from its former, more poweroriented diplomatic approach to a better enhanced rule-oriented approach, as
well as an impartial dispute settlement system. Since it is imperative that
there be fairness in international economic relations, the developing countries
.$hould be given the opportunity to challenge the trade practices of
/·;~eonomically strong countries that usually dominate international

<ht:l~~tiations and multilateral decision-making.

j

,
39

•

III

THE MARSHALL PLAN

Although the Bretton Woods System was already in the making prior to the
end of World War II, it provided the initial support system for the urgent
reconstruction of Europe after the war. Further, the very supportive efforts of
then U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, helped fuel the enormous
financial and logistics support that the United States lent to the reconstruction
efforts. The plan proposed and implemented by George C. Marshall was so
successful that it became popularly known as the Marshall Plan.

84

The Plan was started in 1948 and was so successful that, in two years of
implementation (1950), Europe had achieved a level of industrial production
that was 138 percent more than the level reached in 1938. Part of the Plan
called for the creation of the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC) in 1947. The OEEC was charged with the
. implementation of the Marshall Plan and the facilitation of economic
integration within Europe. By 1961, the OEEC was transformed into the

i'9

84 jValker,

Martin, "George Marshall: His Plan Helped Rebuild Europe," Europe, April
;' 97, pp L2-23; Ball, McCulloch, Frantz, Geringer, Minor, ibid, p.162
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

IV

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS SECONDARY BENEFICIARIES

Of THE IFIs

By the end of W orld War II, most of the presently developing economies

.;

were either under colonial government or just emerging from colonial rule

~

I

into political independence.85 For those still under colonial government, the
support they received from the Bretton Woods System and company were
aimed at sustaining the colonial governments and their limited social,
economic and political programs. On the contrary, those emerging from
colonial rule were rudely shocked at the realization that political
independence was meaningless without economic and financial
independence.86 They realized to their chagrin that they were, in effect, still
tied to the apron string of the former colonial powers that they fought, most
,times bitterly, for political independence.

~d In Africa, most of the countries were still under colonial rule after World War II. Nigeria, for example, became
86 ependent~n October 1,1960.
See Okeke, C.N., International Law in the Nigerian Legal System, California Western International Law

>,'

,
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V

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

ATTAINMENT

Upon the attainment of political independence, most of the developing
countries realized that they lacked the institutional framework as well as the
economic and industrial base to meet the new challenges of independence.
The new political leaders realized to their disappointment that they had to
depend financially on the former colonial masters that they fought for
political independence. This dependence on the former colonial masters, no
doubt, came with a price for the newly independent nations. Thus began a
relationship between the developing nations and the countries and
organizations that provided the financial lifeline.

It

i

Vol. 27" No.2, 1997.
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VI

THE DEBT BURDEN

The reliance of the developing countries upon the financial and technical
assistance of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) has given rise to
the cncept of debt burden. 87 The weight of the debt burden on African
countries, and indeed, other Third W orld88 countries, has become so
unbearable that the figures speak for themselves. The rate at which the debt
of third world countries is increasing exponentially can be illustrated by the
fact that in 1970, the total debt of sub-Saharan Africa countries was 3.7
billion dollars. Thirteen years later, in 1983, it had skyrocketed to 36.8 billion
dollars.

By the year 1990, it had reached the sky limit of 161 billion dollars. 89

The cost of debt servicing adds a human dimension to the implications of the
debt burden on the citizens of any country. According to the United Nations

~? Th~ huge cost of servicing developmental loans obtained by developing countries from the International
lllancial Institutions (IFIs).
The phrase "Third World" is credited to Alfred Sauvy who in 1952 patterned the phrase after the Third Estate of
~1789 French Revolution. Third World countries have become synonymous with the group of new nations of
n, ~a, Asia, and Latin America. They are also classified as the less developed, developing, underdeveloped, the
8~n:dustrialized, the poor, the backward, and/or. the So~t~ern cou~tries.
..
.
'W 1 RD, rle External Debt of Sub-Saharan Africa: Orzgzn, Magnztude and ImpizcatlOns for ActIOn (K.L. Krumm)
" Or d Bank Staf[Working Paper No. 741, Table One.
:
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Human Development Report of 1997,90 Africa alone could have saved the
lives of 21 million children by the year 2000 if the countries had kept the
money devoted to servicing foreign debts. Tanzania, for example, spent
between 1997-98, $189.2 million on debt servicing compared to $65.8
million spent on health care. Another country, Mauritania, spent $87.8
million in 1998 on debt servicing, five times more than the meager $17.4
million spent on health care.91 In the same 1998, Mozambique spent $159
million on debt servicing compared to the $40 million spent on health care.92

VII THE DEBT ORIGIN
As we stated earlier, the second platform that gave rise to the relationship
between developing nations and the International Financial Institutions
(IFIs), was the attainment of political independence by the former colonies of
the developed countries. With respect to these former colonies, the genesis of

tn:m

p , HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997,93, available at http://www.undp.org/hdroI1997/97.htm.
~~
La Fnedman, E.A., Debt Relief in 1999: Only One Step on a Long Journey, 3 Yale Human Rights & Development
92w Journal'191,2000
.

httmWORLD BANK, Mozambique at a Glance, 2, 1999, available at

M j/~.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/moz aag.pdf. See also, IMF & Int'l Dev. Ass'n Republic of
ozamblque, Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (RIPe) Completion Point Document, 15, 1999,
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their debt burden can then be traced to the colonial period.93 For the
purposes of this thesis, therefore, colonial period will be analyzed from both
theslavery phase 94 and theinternal management phase 95, as well as the
post-colonial phase 96during which time most developing countries

accumulated (and still accumulating) more sovereign debts. It is critical to
understudy the era from the different phases because of the different modus
operandi implemented by the colonial masters during the different periods in

question. Such a distinctive analysis will also shed better light on the
changing roles of the IFls in the developing countries.
Presently, however, some commentators have attempted to play down the
historical origin of the debt burden in the developing countries. They have
focused upon the debt acquired by the new leaders of these countries in their
efforts to justify their political mandate in the provision of basic amenities, or
to preserve their national security in the face of domestic strife and

;vailable at http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/country-caselMozambique/mozcompl.pdf.
93 Okeke, C.N., The Debt Burden: An African Perspective, The International Lawyer, Vo1.35, No.4, 200l.
94 Slavery phase will be limited to African and other colonies subject of the slavery experience.
5 Internal management phase will cover the period immediately after the abolition of slavery by the national
~~vernments of the slavery merchants. This period covers the colonialization era.
Wh.en the Bretton Woods conference gave birth to the major IFIs in 1944, almost all of the developing countries
~ere StIllSolonies of the developed/industrialized nations. For example, in Africa, only a handful was independent
th°m the colonial rule during that period, thanks to the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 which shared Africa among
e colonial powers.

,
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conflicts,97 or in stolen funds and other corrupt practices of the ruling
elite.98 While recognizing the huge proportion of the sovereign debt
accumulated by the new leaders, this author, nevertheless, believes that a
comprehensive account of the origin of the debt burden must start from the
colonial era.

SLAVERY PHASE
During the initial period of discovering the "black" colonies, particularly in
Africa, the colonial masters, like good merchants, targeted the people for
exportation to the commercial farms and industries of the west. Their goal
was to "recruit" strong and able-bodied men and women that can be "sold"
for good prices in Europe and later, America. The stronger they came, the
better the price for them. Hundreds of thousands of the strongest and ablest
men and women from different parts of the continent were "bought" through
~7 It ~s reported that out of Africa's 250 billion dollars debt burden, about 20% is related to arms credit. See
WUSsalll, 1., and Underwood, J., "The Problems of Sub-Saharan Africa's Debt and the Solutions, " Washington,
. 98orid
Bank Publications 1989
P
,.
ta eter Komer, et al described such governments as cleptocracies, where the leadership class loots or squanders the
s ~e treasury to the point that it accelerates the sovereign debt of the country. See Peter Komer, et al in The IMF
~c~e D.ebt Cr~sis,.1986, ?'. 36. Many l~aders of.the developing countries ar~ .notorious for corruption while in
te
WIth th~Ir tamted VISIOn that publIc office IS the fastest means to acqumng wealth, they have developed a
un~ e repmatIOn for looting the public treasury with impunity. Classical examples are Zaire under Mobutu, Haiti
erDuvalier, the Philippines under Marcos, Nicaragua under Somoza, Uganda under Amin, the Central African

'bi
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inducement from local chiefs and in many instances through force. In other
cases, some parents were compelled to "sell" their errant and stubborn
children to the human merchants. In extreme circumstances, some were
kidnapped from the villages and sold into slavery without the consent or
knowledge of their parents.

As the transaction became more lucrative, the operators became more
desperate. In the bid to ship more and more of these unfortunate people to
Europe and America, the ships were almost always over-loaded. Many were
reported to have died during transit. Those that took ill and could no longer
inake it to their destinations as healthy and "profitable" labor force were
""reportedly thrown over-board. In the final analysis, the number of Africans
were taken into slavery can never be known, but it still accounts for the
unjustified and unprovoked displacement and dislocation of any human

•

under Bokassa, and Nigeria under Abacha. Recently, two Nigerian state Governors have been arrested in
on char~es of money laundering.
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INTERNAL MANAGEMENT PHASE
~

Given the huge financial losses suffered by the merchants in their bid to take
Africans into slavery, coupled with the increasing riots and resistance of the
slaves at different stages of their captivity, the merchants began to modify
their operational mechanism. More importantly, with the growing public
opinion in Europe and America against the slavery practice, it became

r,'

L
increasingly difficult to continue with the trade. The promulgation of the

~

tf

I!-I

Emancipation Proclamation in America99 and the abolition of slavery in all

t.

British territories in the 1800s, compelled the traders to re-direct their efforts.

til
I

•
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In the light of these legislative prohibitions against slavery in America and

\

,1

~

Europe, the merchants changed their strategy by retaining the labor in Africa

and working them for the same economic goal. In order to accomplish this
new goal, the colonial masters began to infiltrate the local people through
their chiefs and existing governmental structures. 100 The infiltration began

•

{-.
~'--

------------------

.~ T~s was a proclamation issued by President Abraham Lincoln
on January 1, 1863, declaring free all Negro
th

~:~~ the seceded States. It was later reinforced by the 13 Amendment of 1865, which freed the slaves in the
il\'f"'U1lll1g eight states.
Davidso~, B, AFRICA IN HISTORY, 286 (1991). According to the author, " ..... (the) process of infiltration,
advanced until the stage of 'effective occupation' could be reached, behind the screen of 'treaties of
, some~mes described as 'cession' treaties. These were 'signed' with one or another European power by
48

on a veiled peaceful and good faith effort to develop and support the existing
government. Some of the chiefs were induced with gifts and presents. Other
chiefs suspecting mischief and bad-faith resisted the intrusion and invasion of
the strangers into their communities. However, due to their limited access to
superior firearms, the local chiefs could not withstand the more powerful
invaders. Eventually, the resisting local chiefs surrendered to the invaders32.
And in order to retain the remnants of their authority became agents of their
new colonial masters.

It is pertinent to note that this era includes the convocation of the infamous

Berlin Conference 101 in Berlin, Germany. At the invitation of the German
Chancellor, Bismarck, the major European powers - the United Kingdom,
Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, etc., met in Berlin and agreed to
divide the African continent among themselves on the basis of who got where

first. Consequently, Africa was partitioned according to the conquest area of
the conquering European power, and as a result, historical and cultural

------------------------------------------------------------~ef~ Who could seldom or never have understood the intention of their new 'protectors.' See also Okeke, C.N., Int'l

lOW in the 1)Tigerian Legal System, supra.
1 The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 was convened by Germany with a view to having the European powers agree
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boundaries were altered permanently.

After the local authorities surrendered to the overbearing force and influence
of the colonial masters 102, the latter began to engage in the smoke-screen
exercise of signing the "treaties of protection" with the local authorities. The
only justifiable reason for such exercise can be found in the need of the
colonial masters to have some kind of semblance of validity conferred upon
them for their subsequent game plan. If not, how else can it be justified that
after intimidating and compelling the local chiefs to surrender their
sovereignty, the same chiefs will willingly agree to sign a treaty of
protection. In any case, most of the chiefs were illiterates who could neither
read nor write and lacked the ability to fully appreciate the ramifications of
the contents of the treaties. 103 In light of the circumstances of the so-called
treaties, some commentators have argued, and rightly so, that the treaties of

•
~~ the modus of colonizing the newly discovered rich continent of Africa without confusion and conflict.
F 2 S~ch force and intimidation was manifested by colonial rulers in different forms and styles. For example, Sir
~~~enck ~ugard, the former Governor of Northern Nigeria was reported to have "preceded negotiations with short
;: ~ actIOns in orde~ to place himself in a position of strength." Another coloni~l mas.ter, Consul Ra~ph Moor of
d Ig~r Coast ProtectIve was reported to have "moved up and down the Cross River wIth troops shellmg and
l~;troYm~ ~illages before settling down to make 'treaties of friendship' with the frightened people."
DavIdson, B., Africa in History: Themes and Outlines, 286, 1991.

,
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cession lacked validity under international law .104

During the colonization era, the colonial powers embarked upon a doublepronged exploitation of the African continent. First, they mined the various
rich mineral resources including gold, diamond, uranium, coal, tin, copper,
etc., and exported them to their national countries and other parts of Europe
and America to service their local industries and for profit. Second, in the

~

1

process of acquiring the needed machinery for the exploitation as well as

I

sourcing funds to run their Western style government with its expensive
taste, they engaged in accumulating huge national debts on behalf of the
colony. The result was that while Africa was deprived of its natural resources
without adequate compensation in local infrastructure or foreign exchange,
the colonial government was acquiring national debts for generations yet

unborn.

•

-

~-------

~~ Se~ Okeke, C.N., International Law in the Nigerian Legal System, supra. Umozurike O. Umozurike,

Ma rnaiftion~ljLaw and Colonialism in Africa, 3 E. Africa Law Rev. 47 (1970). Makau wa Mutua,

.

'{J 0

Why Redraw the
AfrIca: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 Mich J. Int'I L 6 (1995). Elias, T.O., NIGERIAN LAND LAW AND
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By the time most former colonies became independent in late 1950s and 1960s, they
had been exploited and marginalized for decades. By the time of political
independence, most of the former colonies had accumulated huge national debts
through their colonial governments. In most instances, the struggle for political
independence completely overshadowed the issue of the national debt that the new
independent countries must cope with. The colonial masters also succeeded in
planting very fertile seeds of discord, distrust, and suspicion in the various groups
that were in the vanguard to wrest political power from them. The colonial policy of
divide-and-rule was very effective, and resulted in the different group's inability to
close ranks as a united front. In the process, the new leaders missed the golden
opportunity to request for formal handover and accounting from the colonial
powers. Upon political independence, therefore, most of the former colonies were
uncertain of what their national debts were, and in the circumstances where the
amount was certain, neither could they ascertain the veracity of the amount.

•

(1962). Also, the landmark Nigerian case on the subject matter, Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern

,
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POST-COLONIAL PHASE
~

Under the post-colonial phase, the developing countries fell into more debt as a
result of the following practicesl05:
1. indebted industrialization
2. neglect of agricultural developments
3. failure to diversify exports
4. debt-inducing social reforms
5. cleptocracy
6. developmental gigantomania
7. indebted militarization

INDEBTED INDUSTRIALIZATION:
According to Peter Komer, many developing countries started to engage in the
practice of 'indebted industrialization' 106 or forced industrialization as early as in
. the 1930s when the Latin American countries introduced it. The practice was later
adopted by Asian and African countries after the Second World War when foreign

•

--

~rovinces (1915), (1921) 3 NLR 24 (1921) 2 A.c. 399.
See Komer Peter et aI, The IMF and the Debt Crisis, supra, footnote 95.
See Komer et aI, p. 32 which cited Friedman (1981) as the origin of the concept. I have, however, interpreted
concept as being synonymous with 'forced industrialization', because the developing countries were compelled
embark upon such industrialization under the exigencies of the moment. This position is supported by Canitrot
p. 918) when the author stated that the practice 'was not the product of a sovereign decision derived from an
philosophy' but rather 'the only socially viable alternative, as a consequence of the international economic

,
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exchange income from raw materials dropped drastically due to the international
economic crisis. However, the practice is most prominent in the newly
industrializing countries 107 which have advanced substantially in the industrial
production and manufacture of some products. The logic behind such a practice is
that since the developing countries lack the ability to earn more foreign exchange
from the economically distressed developed countries, the scarce foreign exchange
available should be saved for importation of essential goods and machinery.
Consequently, the developing countries implemented import substitution, which
started with the substitution of imported consumer goods, and graduated to the

""~;\'<

substitution of investment goods by domestic production.
l·tf,t~'1'

\crt3llii~~:

Such a practice was not planned for, but rather forced upon the developing

\:b~~!HI~

\ti2m:
\

countries in reaction to a sudden drop in their foreign exchange earning capabilities

i 'l1llll11'

as a result of economic or political crisis in the developed countries. As a result of
the forced industrialization or indebted industrialization, the developing countries
were also compelled to borrow more loans from the international banks in order to

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

~riSis .... ' This passage was quoted by Komer et aI, in p.32
S07 The Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) include the four Asian tigers (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and
;Uth Korea), Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand, and Chile. These countries are classified as the NICs by the
orld Bank because they possess the following characteristics: (I ) fast-growing, middle-income or higher
economies, (2) they possess a heavy concentration of foreign investment, and (3) they export large quantities of
:anUfactured goods, including high-tech products. Recently, due to the fact that the economies of the four Asian
In~rs h.av~ out-paced the others in the group, the tigers have earned a distinct classification of the Newly
C UStrialIzed Economies (NIEs). See Donald Ball et al., International Business: The Challenge of Global
ompetition, 2006, p. 102-103.
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finance the capital intensive industries. The anticipated savings in scarce foreign
exchange did not materialize as more foreign exchange was needed and sought for

in order to activate the new industries. Additionally, by concentrating almost all the
scarce foreign exchange in the new industries meant that little or none was allocated
to agriculture. The agricultural sector suffered neglect which inevitably resulted in
shortage in food production, which in tum, compelled the government to begin to
import food. The foreign corporations that were engaged to initiate and establish the
')'
1t!1,

new industries contributed their fair share in the depletion of the scarce foreign

f:

exchange by such practices as 'profit transfers and artificially high-priced

(

l)~

...
"

imports. ' 108

i,·

\Sl

t.

With a view to amending the practice of import substitution and yet maintaining the '

\,

\

goal of conserving scarce foreign exchange, some developing countries began to

n

practice export industrialization by exporting manufactured goods. A good example

is Brazil which has engaged in massive production of industrial goods for export.
JJnfortunately, neither the import substitution nor the export industrialization has
y transformed Brazil and other developing countries into the high foreign
earning countries that they aspire to. Rather, the developing countries
ended up with more debts than they owed initially.
j
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~CT OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR:

As we highlighted in the preceding section, one of the fallouts of indebted or forced
industrialization was the neglect of the agricultural sector with the attendant
consequences for the economy. Such neglect usually creates food shortage which
compels the government to embark upon food importation.
Although the government may not completely abandon the agricultural sector
development, however, such development may be so narrowly tailored towards

\..

III

export. According to Komer et aI, such practice tends to imitate 'the policies of

[

their former colonial masters, who often confined the agricultural sector to the

I

Iii

export of one product only - as a cheap raw material for use in the colonial centers. '

I

The powerful influence of foreign corporations in the developing countries further
ensures that the governments follow such narrow agricultural development paths.

The 'vicious circle' 109 that results from the neglect of the agricultural sector
becomes inevitable. As more people are forced to abandon the rural areas to
the urban areas (cities) in search of better paying jobs, the cost of servicing
the urban areas increase. Such cost is financed from the funds that could
e be invested in agricultural sector development. At the same rate,
J
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the demand for more imported food increases which further drains the scarce
foreign exchange. In order to finance the increased pressure on the scarce
foreign exchange, the governments typically resort to increased external
borrowing and increased export production for the limited agricultural
investment.
FAILURE TO DIVERSIFY EXPORTS:

Another familiar cause of the debt crisis in developing countries is the failure

Q

I

of the countries to diversify their foreign exchange earning sources. By

I

•

limiting their major source of foreign exchange to one or two raw materials,
the countries end up loading all their proverbial eggs in one or two baskets
with the attendant risks to the one or two baskets.
Typically, when there is a sudden drop in the demand of the raw material that

forms the bulk of the foreign exchange source of a developing country, all
$,e economic and financial planning that were tied to the source suffer
. legatively.ll 0 In the wake of the economic shock from a drop in foreign

•
revenue, the import prices for essentials like oil, capital goods and

of was the case of the countries that earned most of their foreign exchange from copper in 197417 5. After the
. copper rose steadily, it crashed to almost half. The countries could not survive from another source of

,
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imported food become higher. While the government is not earning enough
foreign exchange, at the same time; it is forced to pay more in imported
goods, oil and machinery. Again, in order to finance the increased demand
for foreign exchange, most developing countries resort to external borrowing
or compensatory financing 111 with hopes that the situation will be
temporary.
DEBT-INDUCING SOCIAL REFORMS:

Under this situation, the government of the developing country either came
into power on the platform of social reforms 112 or suddenly transforms into

a social reform government. In either case, however, the government begins
t~ embark
Q1".l~al'lr.

upon such expensive and foreign exchange draining practices like

in real wages, subsidizing social services like education, health,

lie transportation, etc. With the sudden increase in real wages, the
"~\.IULr.

for imported goods increase, this in tum drains scarce foreign

•
eXchange because their economies relied heavily on copper. The same situation occurred in Nigeria during
slumps of the early 80s because the country relies on crude oil for most of its foreign exchange earnings.
fr p. 35 This is the type of external borrowing targeted for the relief of the foreign exchange shortage which
om l} SUdden drop in the country's foreign exchange earnings.
example, the government of Allende in Chile from 1970-1973. Also, the government of Manley in Jamaica
1976.

,
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The subsidization of social services coupled with increase in real wages
imply that the cost of running the government has increased exponentially
while the government revenue remains stagnant or lower.113 In order to
continue with such program of social reforms, the government must find new
sources to fill the gaps created by the deficits. The situation becomes
compounded by the reluctance of international creditors to continue to
finance economically unviable social reform programs. Consequently, the
government inevitably seeks recourse to the IFIs in order to remain creditworthy and hopefully pull out of the debt crisis.114
CLEPTOCRACY:

l, C2 ltii:i::
1:I~f~Il\W:

I

iUi!;:'

According to Peter Komer et aI, cleptocracy is the practice whereby the

·~;t

. \1f!llUI

'state-class under the repressive leadership of one clan pile up wealth in so
uninhibitedly in foreign exchange accounts or squander such huge sums on
luxury consumption that corruption and self-enrichment become the central
cause of the debt crisis. I IS Further, 'the direct access of these classes to the

•
finance ministries, the central banks and the customs authorities enables them

-----------------113 Ibid
114 Ibid
lIs K.orner, Supra, p. 36
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to operate illegally' .116 Some of the common illegal activities of this rogue
class involve 'the smuggling or raw materials, the diversion of scarce foreign
exchange reserves for private use and the forging of import licenses' .117
As a result of these illegal activities, the affected country suffers massive
capital flight from its economy.118 Unfortunately, the bulk of the capital
that is illegally taken out of the economy eventually re-enters the same
economy as foreign loans.119 The affected country thus finds itself in the
situation where it is paying premium in fees and interest for money that
originally belonged to it. 120
DEVELOPMENTAL GIGANTOMANIA:
Developmental gigantomania121 differs from indebted (forced)
ization 122 because it is not a product of a government's reaction to
"'''U"l3l3ive drop in foreign exchange earnings from raw materials. Rather, it is
by the desire of the developing country 'to realize ambitious

•

Ibid
Ibid
It is estimated that capital flight from Mexico in 1981 and 1982 totaled $12.3 and $13.15 thousand million.
Times, December 1, 1983). Also, it is estimated that between 1976 and 1983, capital flight from
amounted to about $35 thousand million. (Information from the Central Bank of Argentina quoted in HB,
3, 1983)
Ibid
'Ibid J
classification was used by Komer et aI, supra, p. 38.

,
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infrastructural projects in the shortest possible time.' 123 The idea behind
such accelerated developmental projects is that the government hopes that the
projects will in tum generate the much needed foreign exchange, and
ultimately increase state revenue. But what the government fails to factor into
the plan is the added cost of maintaining the projects as well as the expensive
machineries needed to run them. 124
In the process, the government invests huge amounts of scarce foreign
exchange into the projects. In order to sustain the demands of machineries
and maintenance, government is compelled to borrow from external creditors
thereby adding to the debt crisis. 125
INDEBTED MILITARIZATION:
This is the process whereby developing countries accumulate more debt by
their desire to increase their military arsenals and ammunitions. Some of the

~eveloping countries have been driven into 'indebted militarization' by the

~~-

•
Supra
. SUpra
A good example is the 'gigantic' infrastructural development of the Ajaokuta Steel industry by the Nigerian
After many years of spending billions of dollars on the ambitious steel development project, the
eventually abandoned the project.

,
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desire to defend themselves from their neighboring enemies126 or political
enemies127. Others have been driven by the desire to exert their political
independence or military might. 128 While others exploit the l?1ilitarization
policy as a clever means of enrichment and corruption. 129
Regardless of the motive, most developing countries allocate and expend
substantial portions of their national budget to the militarization policy.130
Since most developing countries lack the industrial base for the production of
the arms and military equipments, they wind up buying from the
industrialized countries. The already scarce foreign exchange is spent and
borrowed in order to finance the ambitious militarization policy.

In light of the huge consequences of continued burden of national debt on
developing economies, there have been divergent recommendations on how
Examples of the countries that spent much on their military in order to protect themselves from their neighbors
Israel, Pakistan, South Korea, all of them spending over 20% of their budget on military expenditure in 1980 .
. The Argentine government spent huge sums on arms acquisition immediately before and after their war with the
Over the disputed Falklands Island.
•
T~e Egyptian government spends a substantial percent of its national budget on arms acquisition, partly to
TIts ~lita~ might and partly to prevent internal and external aggressions.
he ~hgenan government has lost substantial amounts of foreign exchange on the sharp practices associated
........~ Importation under the military governments. In order to cover one scandal, the then military headquarters
m Lagos was set ablaze.
,u~cordi~~ to the US ACDA report in 1983, the following developing countries spent over 20% of their budget
OIllmthtary expenditure: South Yemen (45.7%), Ethiopia (42.6%), Syria (35.4%), Israel (34.2%), North
(30.0%), Chad (29.0%), Mozambique (28.9%), South Korea (28.4%), Zimbabwe (25.9%), Mauritania
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best to ameliorate the situation, or at best, resolve it. While some
commentators have proffered suggestions for better and more humane
servicing options, others have preferred ways to "relief'13l the debts by
working out better payment mechanism, while writing-off a substantial part
thereof. Lately, there has been a very concerted and vociferous clamor for
total and unconditional "forgiveness" 132 of the national debts.
"
--,
--

.

-

From the divergent proposals for solving the debt issue, there appears to be a
recent effort directed at what we consider to be escaping or avoiding the debt
obligation. 13 3 For our present purpose, we prefer to classify this approach as
th~scap~ or av~£dance___approach. This approach focuses primarily on how

best to escape or avoid the obligation of current debt repayment. With so

many convincing arguments rooted on moral and legal jurisprudence, the
proponents of the escape or avoidance approach have attempted to persuade
..9%), Peru (24.4%), Jordan (23.4%), Pakistan (23.2%), Burundi (22.2%), Burma (22.1 %), Uganda (20.6%),
(20.6%), and Mali (20.5%)
The Group 00 (G7), comprising the industrialized nations; United States of America, United Kingdom,
, France, Japan, Italy, and Canada, initiated this approach by agreeing to a two-thirds reduction of all
debts owed by the HIPC countries to the individual members. See HIPC Debt Initiative, World Bank, 2000,
.worldbank.org/hipc/aboutlhipcbr/hipcbr.htm
Current President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, is in the forefront as one ofthe most consistent and
:eous.thampions of total debt forgiveness. Nigeria, which is the largest black nation in the world, is burdened
whopping national debt of$30 billion. According 0 Obasanjo, no country can make meaningful development

,
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and cajole the creditor institutions to erase the entire national debts with more
liberal conditions or without any conditions.

While this approach appears to be gathering momentum in the arena of public
opinion, it is yet to translate into cOEcrete resu1ts. ] 34 :r~e_~e]?_~s~!ill hang
over the indebted countries like an ,albatross, while the weight continues
to
-crush the daylight out of the poor segments of the citizenry.

(,uA' .

cItc'l-l./l' ,-::--kl~
It
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On the contrary, while the developing nations must seek ways to escape or

[

•

avoid the burden of their current nati~nal debts, greater emphasis must be
made at preventing additional debt or re-accumulation
of debt after the
...,.,--

---------

L~¥Lf<-~

"•
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debt is forgiven. This approach is called the preventive approach.

\

,---.-

. approach focuses primarily on a soul-searching journey of
how these nations arrived at this embarrassing debt burden cross
The idea is that unless a critical analysis of how these debts were

, the weight of such huge national debt.
, ~::~kek~, C.N., supra, note ~o. Se~ .al.so, Obasan~o,. supra, note 22.
..
.
, ,ntly, ill the face ofmountmg cntIcisms over hIS mcessant overseas tnps m search of debt forgIveness,
President Olusegun Obasanjo admitted embarrassingly that his trips have yielded little or no concrete
solution perspectives were developed by the author. The idea arose from what the author perceived as a
eff<}rt to address the developing world debt burden from the limited perspective of 'how to escape' rather
to avoid.' In my humble view, escape is short- term remedy, while avoidance is long-term remedy, and
a perman~nt remedy.
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accumulated and mis-applied, these nations may never find long-lasting
solutions to the debt crises. I will elaborate on this further in the concluding
paragraph of this thesis.

VIII CONCLUSION
?

The developing countries are the products ,of the former colonies which the
colonial powers l?illaged for many decades. On the contrary, the developed
countries136 are the products ofth~former_ col()l1iaL.Rg_~~r~;J_hat exploited

th~r fQl!1l~I QQI~)llies. During the Second World War (1939-45), most of the
-developing countries served as political colonies of the developed countries.
<:---------------------

It was during this period that the colonial governments accumulated the
cinitial national debts for the colonies through the international financial
6

UU

U ..

-----

aUuns that were established under the Marshall Plan and Bretton
.-------

,oo~ system. As we have shown earlier, thes~fi~cial institutions were
"~Ul\,:;ally created to facilitate the re-habilitation of devastated Europe.
---.....-

, th1colonial governments borrowed from the financial
~UJ.11L;anons in order to sustain their limited social programs.
J

,
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Further, upon political independence, the emerging states and their young
and inexperienced leaders realized to

th~ir

chagrin_t1!:at they needed financial

and technical support from the international financial organizations in order
to maintain political credibility and respect. Lacking knowledge of how to
create these resource~}?~ally, they resorted to the jnternational financial
organizations-_._-with their stringent conditions. Political expediency demanded
that the new political leaders seek "quick fix" approaches through the
international financial institutions. Thus began the journey to the present debt
burden of the developing economies.
"i/t~!I~~\ '~J

l.:la2:<:::

•
--------------------------------------------------------------13 6

~he United States of America is the only developed country that did not have political colonies during the

Co1Olllal era.
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CHAPTER THREE

-('~

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTI;J;l!.llONfmDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW

I

INTRODUCTION

International financial institutions (IFIs)137 comprise of two major
components: the international organizations138 and the international
monetary system. 139 The critical question for us to address at this point is

'm,;&:ntl~~I~

'1.>09,;'1':

\""'I~;II"

the relationship between international law and the international financial

\jR~~)'11

institutions (IFIs). In other words, do these international financial
institutions qualify to be classified as recognizable subjects of international
law? By extension, do these institutions possess internationally recognizable
personalities? Can they, assuming they possess international personalities,

-------------------137 I~temational financial institutions (IFIs) are used in this work as the same as international financial
~;garuzation~ (IFOs). It is the author's preference to adopt the IFIs in the context of this work.

8 IntematlOnal organization in this context refers only to organizations which membership comprise of
~~~ernme.nts or g?vemmental agencies. .
.
.
..
..
'. h The llltematlOnal monetary system is the legal regime that compnses a group of mternatlOnal orgamzatlOns
W ose goals are aimed at monetary policy fonnulation and enforcement. It is dominated by the IMF and the Articles
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engage in such critical functions like treaty making? The determination of the
legal standing of these institutions under international law will go a long way
to assist us in the determination of other pertinent questions that
consequentially follow. For instance, do these international financial
institutions have the legal capacity to claim an international right and be
accountable for an international duty under international law? Can these
institutions subject their beneficiaries to international obligations that are
legally binding under international law? In a situation of dispute in the
relationship between an international institution and a beneficiary partner,
tllt:~I*"'~l! '

~~~~:~'~:::"'!

what legal recourse, under international law, is available to the aggrieved

mrt\i~V,~:t:'t

l""~lgA'''"'"''
,I~;.",~,

party? What enforcement tools are available, assuming one of the parties

\ \~~W:';~~

prevail? These and some other consequential questions follow from a
determination of the legal standing of international financial institutions,
indeed, any international institution, under international law.

•

------------------------------------------------------------which gave rise to modem day international monetary law.
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CLARIFICATION
i!n~......p

we proceed further on our inquiry into the relationship between

iilternationallaw and international financial institutions,140 it is pertinent to
pause and make a critical distinction or clarification. While the use of the
words, "international monetary system,"141 may not create illusions in
appreciation and understanding, the use of the words "international
organizations," cause some conceptual confusion. Why? This confusion arise
t',
I,

, -pecause a lot of people confuse international organizations with non-

Il';t

Uti\<,

MIl:",

llluc;utal organizations (NGOs). International organizations are those

.r.llI~

-,

~l

~,.,aU1LaLlUll"
\I.llUllC;Ul>S.

whose membership consists of sovereign nations or

"H.',1
~il

Non-governmental organizations or NGOs, as they are

c

called, are comprised of individual members who have joined
in pursuance of common public goals or objectives.
to better appreciate the place of international financial institutions
the context of international organizations in the sphere of international
. we shall apply the following four approaches: 142

approac~es

are based on Dr. Manuel Rama-Montaldo's article entitled, 'International Legal Personality
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III

~ODES

OF APPROACH

1. THE INDUCTIVE APPROACH
Under the Inductive Approach, an international organization possesses
some rights and duties, which are expressly conferred upon it. These
rights and duties derive from the constituent instrument of the
organization. And from the exercise of these rights and duties, the
I.;
I~'

organization asserts its international personality in the arena of

IQ;
~

international law. It is worthy of note that these rights and duties may be

III

•
•

IfJ

expressly conferred or implied from the constituent instrument. 143 The

'.

\

emphasis of this approach is the will of the States in forming the
international organization.
2.· THE OBJECTIVE APPROACH
the Objective Approach, the determining factor in analyzing the
onal personality of an international organization is the structural
Such analysis demands a critical review of its composition, voting
~owers of International Organizations,' British Yearbook ofInternational Law, 1970. See also Okeke,
expansion of new subjects of contemporary international law through their treaty-making capacity, 1973
The faw ofInternational Organizations (1964), p. 275. Also, Brownlie, Principles ofInternational
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procedure, functions, and the powers of the organization. According to
the proponents of this approach,

if an international organization lacks the

requisite structural content, then it may lack the credibility to claim
international personality. Contrary to the Inductive Approach, the
Objective Approach de-emphasizes the will of the States that formed the
international organization. Rather,

if the international organization

satisfies certain criteria, it will be conferred with international personality
by the international legal order. 144

l:i

~~

NO

3. THE FORMAL APPROACH

It

.1

Ilol

Under the Formal Approach, an international organization must enjoy

."Q
international personality if the organization is endowed with such rights

i

\1

and duties. Such determination can be made by reviewing the provisions
of the instrument setting up the organization. By implication, if the
constituent instrument expresses the desire that the organization should
. enjoy international personality, then such privilege must be accorded the
organization.

J
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4. THE MATERIAL APPROACH
Under the Material Approach, it is acknowledged that general and customary international
law determines the scope of the international personality of an international organization.
Regardless of the international personality of an organization, it may still be limited by its
constitution. For instance, the constitution of the organization may prevent the organization
from performing certain legal acts or the acts that the organization wishes to perform may
exceed the limit permitted by its constitution.145

The four approaches 146 have shed some light on how best to determine
~/
k~

,

iIII',·.

the intemationallegal personality of an international organization. While

IR:rulI

_,

-~I

they seem to help us chart the course of determining the status of

d:

till!

iilternational organizations under international law, there appears to be

\Qal

'I1Vll1~

lingering questions on the subject. For example, under the
Approach, what happens if the organization lacks the capacity

carry out the will of the States expressed in the constituent
.....u"'ut? In other words, does the mere expression of the will
~~"'-VUL

more) by the States sufficient to confer full international

Ss·eyerste<», Objective International Personality of International Organizations, 1963, p.46.
; ever~tAri id
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personality on an organization? What happens when the organization
fails to assert its rights and acknowledge its obligations under
intemationallaw?

While the Objective Approach appears, in my opinion, to be the most
practical approach, it still calls into question the distinction between
"structure" and "function". That an organization is properly structured
does not necessarily imply that the organization is functional. But we
must proceed on the assumption that structure under this approach is
synonymous with functionality. And hopefully, that the organization will
make effective use of the structures already put in place by the founders.

The Formal Approach also appears to emphasize the structure of the
organization and the provisions of the instrument. It asserts that the

•
Critical determinant of the status of an international organization is the
Constituent instrument. Thus, if the constituent instrument expressly
The four approaches are the Inductive, Objective, Formal, and Material Approaches.
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endowS the organization with international personality, then the
organization need not do more.

The Material Approach focuses upon the role of the general and
customary international law in determining the status of an international
organization under international law. It also recognizes the limitations
that could be placed by the constituent instrument of the organization.

Given the usefulness of the four approaches, I believe that an
international organization may be properly structured and endowed with
the general international personality. However, much depends on the
functionality of the organization in the international arena.

•
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IV

~TERNATIONAL LAW

International law is the law that confers rights and demands obligations from
subjects in international relationships. Subjects of international law, indeed,
like subjects of any given legal order, implies such entities that the norms of
the legal order in question apply to, as well as the regulation of their conduct,

by the imposition of duties and conferment of rights. 14 7

International law has been broken into two main components as follows:

~t'~li~ t' , .,~ J I

~1~~:i·~:~:.:

International private law and International public law.

~~i\t!\:".a

'~l~:f;,:

International private law involves international relationship between
individuals. International public law, on the contrary, involves international
relationship between agencies. For the purposes of our inquiry, we shall be
limiting our focus on international public law because of the international
agencies or organizations subject of our review.

-----------------~7 ~keke,

C.N., The Expansion of New Subjects of Contemporary International Law through Their Treaty-Making
paclty, Rotterdam University Press, 1973.
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V

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY

It is worthy of note that the earlier interpretation of international law and its
subjects deprived all other entities, except sovereign states, of legal
personality under international law. The assumption was that since nationstates have historically been recognized as subjects of international law, they
automatically enjoy the status of "international personality." Consequently,
nation-states are endowed with rights and duties directly supplied by
jil,

intemationallaw.148 This position, according to Okeke, was a direct
I!;,I<, .

consequence of the basic premise of the classical view of international law,

\1~;:,'

which denied almost all entities other than states personality in international
law.l49
Presently, a lot has changed since the classical view was the dominant theory
in intemationallaw. International organizations have grown in number and
influence, 150 so have other players in the international arena, making
enormous contributions to the world that the continued denial of their

------------------~:~ Kirgis, Frederic, L, Jr., International Organizations in Their Legal Setting, 2

nd

Ed, West Publishing Co, 1993.
ISO Okeke, ,supra, note 38.
A classIcal example is the United Nations, whose membership includes almost all the countries of the world and
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influence will amount to ignorance.15l

Given the rapid development of these organizations and their consequences
in the global arena, other non-sovereign entities have been recognized and
accorded legal personality under internationallaw.152 Specifically, the
International Law Commission noted in its commentary to the Draft Articles
on the Law of Treaties of 1969, that entities other than States might possess
international personality.153 These non-sovereign entities include, but are
IV.'

not limited to, organizations like the United Nations. 154 Also, included in
this non-state entities are colonies155, which are on their way to statehood,
and 'communities' which have been customarily described as States because
oftheir political cohesion, their internal autonomy and their historical
status.156

whose area of influence spans to all corners of the globe. At present, the UN membership stands at 192 member
states.
151 Ibid
152 id

~53. Yearbook ofInternational Law Commission (1962-11), p.37. See also Okeke, C.N., The Expansion of New
l~bJects of Contemporary International Law Through Their Treaty-Making Capacity, 1973, p.182 .

. D.4 See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the UN case, IC] Reports, 1949, p.185. Also, Whiteman,
,gest, 1963, Vol . 1,p. 548 .
l 55
Yearbook f International Law Commission (1965-11),1,17.
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Legal authorities157 and judicial decisions158 on the question of the legal
personality of international organizations lend credence to the fact that
international organizations, indeed, enjoy international legal personality.
Beginning with an assessment of the League of Nations to the United
Nations, there seems to exist credible evidence that international
organizations are recognizable subjects of international law, with requisite
legal personality.

'\~

,

"';.'

Writing on the status of the League of Nations, Oppenheim-McNair159
titin, "J'

~~~~:/':;

asserted as follows:
"The League appears to be a subject of international law and an international
person side by side with several States ........ not being a State, and neither
owning territories nor ruling over citizens, the League does not possess
sovereignty in the sense of state sovereignty. However, being an international
person sui generis, the League is the subj ect of many rights which as a rule
can be exercised by sovereign States."

-------------------------------------------------------------!56 Yearbook of International Law Commission (1953-11), p.95. The Holy See also falls under this category.
1~7 Okeke, supra note 150. See also, Oppenheim-McNair, International Law, Vol 1, 4th edition, 361
8 Reparations case, supra, note 151

78

•

With respect to the United Nations, and in furtherance of the proposition that
international organizations possess international personality, the International
Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion 160 in the matter of the Reparations

for Injuries Suffere_d in the Service of the United Nations, 161held that the
United Nations possessed international personality. Further, the court held
"'----------~

that since the United Nations possessed the requisite international
personality, it equally was entitled to bring suit for reparations under
r-----

ii,
~,;,

intemationallaw. The Reparations matter arose out of the assassination of
the United Nations staff, named Count Bernadotte, while working in
.Palestine. The Court's opinion was sought by the United Nations with a view
to bringing a claim of reparations against the Palestinians. In the Opinion, the
court held that the United Nations possessed international personality, as well
as the right and capacity to bring an international claim for reparations. Part
-,,----

of the Court's Opinion reads as follows:

•
---------------------------------------------------------~~9

See Oppenheim-McNair, supra, note 154.

b ~ Although Article 34( 1) of the ICJ Statute provides that" Only states may be parties in (contentious) cases
_fre ore the Court," the United Nations and its specialized agencies are entitled to apply and obtain advisory opinions
s om the ICJ pursuant to Article 96 of the United Nations Charter. It was in exercise of Article 96 that the UN
l~~ght the advisory opinion of the ICJ in the subject matter.
ICJReports (1949), p.174.
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"That it is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is
not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of
a State. Still less is the same thing as saying that it is a 'super state,'
whatever that expression may mean .......... what it does mean is that it is a
subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and
duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international
c1aims."162
~

VI

TREATY-MAKING CAPACITY

The capacity of an international organization to enter into a treaty constitutes
an important aspect of the international personality of the international
organization. Pursuant to this objective, the International Law Commission
has codified two comprehensive laws on the law of treaties. The 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties primarily deals with treaties entered into
between nation-states 163 On the contrary, the 1969 Vienna Convention on

-----------------~~2

Ibid. See also, Detter, Law-Making by International Organizations, Stockholm, 1965, pp 271-318, on the
.
VIenna ConventlOn on the Law of Treatles, May 23,1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331; entered mto force January 27,

~~rna~ional personal.ity of the European Eco.nomic Communities (ECC).

.
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.

the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or
Between International Organizations, 164 deals with treaties entered into
between nation-states and international organizations on the one hand, or
between international organizations, on the other hand.

Furthermore, Article 6 of the 1986 Vienna Convention states:
"The capacity of an international organization to conclude treaties is
governed by the rules of that organization."
,

~

['"

This provision of Article 6, we are told, 165 was a product of a compromise

l'j l,~:

';

>,'
•

li~;

Ht~:~·f

between differing approaches espoused by blocs of states during the drafting

f!J.! ~ :> ~

If-"ii"

process. One side argued that the capacity of an international organization to
~Hl:!."·

conclude treaties exists as a matter of customary international law, though the
authority to conclude any given treaties could be denied by the rules of the
particular organization. The other side argued that an organization's capacity
depended solely on its own rules.

•
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1980.
~4 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or Between
(lternational Organizations, March 21,1986, U.N. Doc. AlCONF. 129/15 (1986),25 Int'l Legal Materials 543
1:86), referenced in Kirgis, supra note 148.
5 See Hartman, The Capacity of International Organizations to Conclude Treaties, in Agreements of International
rganizations and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 127 (K. Zemanek ed 1971, referenced in Kirgis,

o
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As a result of these disagreements, some commentators have argued that the
capacity of an international organization to conclude treaties depended on the
following factors; the international personality of the organization, the
functional necessity for a given organization to conclude treaties if it is to
perform its tasks, or the familiar constitutional doctrine of implied
powers.l66

VII MEMBERSHIP
I,

f:.,

;;')iH

t~,i~(

'-<_"0
"j'

!~~:/:::!,

Each international organization has different conditions for membership.

~ii:'i!'.,i

igl,;;',,::

Some of the conditions can be time-consuming and cumbersome167, while
tAAf!'!,:~,

others can be relatively smooth. Generally, the constituent instrument of the
organization will stipulate the conditions for membership in the organization.
While the conditions may seem straightforward and uncomplicated, due to
the political implications of new membership, existing members may subj ect

•
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SUpra.

166 See Hartmann, supra note 162.
1,67 good example was in the early years of the United Nations, as well as at the height of the Cold War. The
Situation was so bad during the height of the Cold War that candidates favored by the Soviet Union could not get
~nough of~he Western votes to be admitted, and candidates favored by the West were vetoed in the Security Council
y the Soviet Union,

.t:
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potentially new members to undue scrutiny and opposition.

It is important to state that regardless of the characterization of an

organization's constituent instrument168, the universally acceptable mode of
becoming a member is by the process of accession. In other words, after a
potential member-state applies to the membership of the organization, the
onus will be on the new member-state to prove that it has satisfied all the
conditions of membership. After the member-state proves satisfactorily that it
I.

has satisfied all the conditions, the member will then accede to the

:,hH
Fli:,'"

l~ti:/'<I

constituent instrument of the organization. The process of accession differs

~ii?l~

"~i>f

,(

,,: i

If~,r ~_"t,~ ~,~

from one country to another, but the acceptability of membership depends on

l!tf: f." : ': ,( '" ~ I

whether the member-state has complied with its laws on accession to
international organizations.

•
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'. VIII INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

International organizations are organizations whose membership consists of
sovereign governments that come together in pursuance of mutual benefits
based on multilateral cooperation. 169
Modem 'universal' international organization can be traced to the Versailles
Treaty 170 at the end of World War 1. The treaty gave birth to the League of
Nations and the International Labor Organization. 171 From the ashes of the
'.',

League after World War II, came the United Nations. 172 The importance of

1!~tl. \; 0" ~

tflti; . ~~ J' '

~i;:/::~.;

. the United Nations, as well as other complementary institutions cannot be

~il;t~'

i(

,

_' I ~ ,:

£~'i:"'l;.,

over-emphasized in the world of business and in the orderly relationship of
!(.W'q'

the world. Given the tremendous changes that the world is constantly faced

with, particularly, in the twenty-first (21 st) century, the need for a more

---------------------------------------------------------------------168 The constituent instrument of an international organization may be characterized as a Charter, a Protocol, an
Agreement, , an Article, etc.
~69 This classification distinguishes International Organizations from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).
l;e latter comprises of individuals as members with a common societal objective or goal.
. 0 The Versailles Treaty of 1920 gave birth to the League of Nations. The League is known as the first multilateral
~emational political institution. It existed until the end of World War II, and was finally wound up on April 18,
46 on a simple resolution of the Assembly of the League.
.
17 1 Ibid
172 See the UNO at www.un.org
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orderly world becomes more paramount. The concept of globalization173
has, indeed, reduced the world to the fabled global village. As the world
continues to be more interconnected, the physical barriers' that separated one
part of the world from another are dismantled. As labor, goods, services,
information, technology, etc. are transported from one part of the world to
another, so are drugs, crimes, disease, terrorism, etc.174

,

----- .,

Consequently, these institutions have grown to supplement some of the
functions of the national governments. 175 They serve as sources of

r).11

t:l~ ;

information176 or sources of financing. 177 They also serve as a source of

~".

Itt;.;
!tn~

f:1·;

regulation178 or a source of jobs.179 Increasingly, they provide many
k:ll.'

services on behalf of the member states that mutually benefit the members as

well as non-members.
173 Although the term 'globalization' has been widely applied to include political, social, environmental, historical,
geographical, and cultural implications of globalization, however; we will limit the application in this work to
economic globalization. Thus, economic globalization is defined as the international integration of goods,
technology, labor, and capital, whereby firms implement global strategies that link and coordinate their international
~tivities on a worldwide basis. See Slaughter, M.1. and Swagel, P., Does Globalization Lower Wages and Export
obs? (Washington, DC: IMF, 1997), p.l. Contrast with Lubbers, R.F.M., "General Introduction," The Globalization
tEe.onomy and Society, December 30, 1996; Riggs, F.W., "Globalization Is a Fuzzy Term but It May Convey
P7eclai Meanings," The Theme of the IPSA World Congress 2000, July 1999.
I 4 Ibid

gs

Ball, D. A., et aI, International Business: The Challenge of Global Competition, 10th ed, 2006, p. 120
1 6 See the UNO, supra, note 169
77 See the UNO subsidiaries like the IMF, the World Bank, etc.
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The size and influence of these organizations differ as well as the areas of
their operations. While some are better known due to their political and
economic impact on the international arena, others are more confined to
specific and limited geographical areas.180
Regardless, these organizations qualify to be called 'international,' because
they meet the criteria of being comprised of two or more States in their
membership. They also qualify to be called 'organizations,' because they meet
the criteria of having specific and general goals and obj ectives.18I Some of
j ••

the well-known ones include the United Nations and its predecessor, the

111~\ :;"'

rli~i.

I,;::'

League of Nations, the European Union (EU), the World Bank (International

~Ii:t!

£!I;::',

Bank for Reconstruction and Development), the International Monetary Fund
~~}Ir'.,

(IMF), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Food and Agriculture
Organization (F AO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World
Trade Organization (WTO).

•
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

g8 Many agencies of the UN serve in the regulatory capacities.

18~ The United Nations as well as its agencies is reputed to be the world's largest employer. See note 169, supra
Ball, supra, note 172.
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IX

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM

The international monetary system is driven by the international monetary
law. International monetary law was essentially created by the Articles of
Agreement of the IMF. According to Sir Joseph Gold,182
"before the
---,
~----~--

---

-

Articles ofAgreement of the Fund came into existence, international
monetary law, whether customary or conventional, was negligible. "183
Thus, the Articles of Agreement of the Fund and the interpretation and
application of the Articles have principally shaped the development of

~,H ~

,-;

~i,;

,~:/::j

modem day international monetary law.184 The reason lies in the practice of

lll:-t!,'(

H/,,:.:

states prior to World War II. Before the war, "monetary affairs were matters
,iW":.r '~I

of domestic, not international concern ", thus, "the terms 'international
1---_ - - - ----__

~

________ _

~=...,

monetary relations' and 'international monetary law' were essentially
'-----

-~

181 According to McNamara Carter, an organization is a group of people intentionally organized to accomplish an
overall, commo~ goal or set of goals.
182 Sir Joseph Gold is an internationally recognized authority on the development of modem day international
monetary law. He served as a member of the Legal Department of the IMF from 1946 to 1960, as General Counsel
and Director of the Legal Department from 1960 to 1979, and as Senior Consultant to the Fund thereafter. In those
~~pacit~es: he played critical roles in the creation and development of international monetary law as a distinct branch
pubhc mternationallaw.
~283 GOld, J, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 2 IMF Pamphlet Series, No.
,1980.
184 Ibid.
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~ir"IU'unknown. "185 This situation was confirmed by Sir Gold when he stated as
..-------

.-------

~

follows: "in the past, states exercised an almost unrestrained
--- freedom to deal
~-~---------------

with their balances ofpayments, even though the policies of one state had an
i111pact on the balances ofp'pym~!lts of 00!!!s. "186

/-, )~ 'r '--(

-:J- 'l-~{I

~),

~?'Jd-J~t ' - -

The Catholic Church's prohibition of usury through their Canon Law was the~-}([/
(~;(.~.

closest example of a rule of international monetary law before the creation of
the Fund.I8? The application of the law within the mainly European Catholic
community as well as the violation of the law, limited the acceptability of the
law internationally. 188 Another significant attempt at creating an

~ill ~ "

fk;

international monetary law was the Latin Monetary Union of 1865. The

-----------"'\

-.;-

....,

.'

It:,"

~

lli'i!

,j

nj;:il'~

treaty creating the union was entered into byr--_
France,
Italy,
___
_ _ Belgium,

,::r-

Switzerland, a~~gTeece, pursuant to which the states agreed to accept the

-'---

'--,

-----

gold and silver coins of the members in settlement of financial

'~e~,",

t,[c;

i=)." ......., L

,-------~~

transactions.I89 Again, the limited scope of the union as well as the
------------------------------------~85 Zamora, Stephen, SIR JOSEPH GOLD AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
AW, 23 Int'l Law 1009,1989.
~86 Gold, J, Law and Change in International Monetary Relations, 31 REC.A.B. CITY N.Y. 223, 1976.
p87 Einzig, P., THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 109-10, 2 nd ed, 1970; SHUSTER, M.R., THE
InUBLI~ INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MONEY 11-14, 1973; Schwarzenberger, The Principles and Standards f
18tematlOnai Economic Law, 1966, 1 RECEUIL DES COURS 1,63.
I 8 Einzig, supra note 163
l'~ Nussbaum, A., MONEY IN THE LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL, 1950. See also, Mann, F.A.,
E LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 463, 4th ed., 1982
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violations robbed it of an international stature. 190
From the foregoing, one can appreciate the conclusions reached by Professor
Stephen Zamora19l when he wrote:
"In short, the IMF Agreement was preceded by a haphazard pattern of
international (mostly bilateral) agreements adopted by political rulers,
usually for the purpose of stabilizing foreign exchange markets. While
international monetary law was notexactly nonexistent, it was, as Sir Joseph
(Gold) has pointed, "negligible." The international agreements that were
adopted were usually short-lived. They did not provide for mechanisms of

III~ ~o'"

lin,'

'!j"

1";'1.

t~'i

international enforcement. "

jii:t r .(

: ~,

The international monetary system, therefore, is a group of organizations

m(!'~~:f ~

dealing specifically with monetary policy formulation and enforcement.
Some of these organizations, like typical international organizations, consist
of member states. On the contrary, while some are not specifically comprised
of member states, they, however, are financed and controlled by the
governments behind their formation. 192 The common characteristic

------------------------190 Ibid
. 191 Supra, footnote 161
192 See the Paris and London Clubs.
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underlying the organizations in the international monetary system is the fact
. that they are limited to solely monetary policy formulation and enforcement
in their respective environment.

For instance, the United Nations 193 is the umbrella of all international
organizations. It is comprised of member states. Its goals and objectives
cover every conceivable human concern and activity. It is one of the world's
largest employers, and it has offices and operations in virtually all parts of
the world. The United Nations is also classified as one of the major players in

~U;.:

I':lr~ \ '

~~l;:~:

theintemational monetary system, making rules and regulations that

iH\\~"

'9fi·r·

uf~I;I\

tremendously impact the world's economy, while providing critical

If"',·:

enforcement tools and agencies.194 By contrast, the European Union195 has
developed into another major player in the international monetary system.
Unlike the United Nations, the EU is made up of sovereign nations in Europe
that have come together to form a supra-national state or the United States of

-------------------------

193 See the United Nations website at www.un.org
194 Ibid
195 ID-vw.eu.org
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CONCLUSION

Intemationallaw serves as the critical regulatory tool of the activities of .
intemational organizations and international monetary systems as
subjects of internationallaw.198 Without the vibrant regulation and
monitoring of international law , international organizations and
international monetary systems would be confronted, on a daily basis,
with issues that would make their operations sluggish.
~n·,l;..!"~

As the activities of these institutions expand, so is the emergence of new

I~i':! \ .,fJ ~ '\
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and more challenging issues. Some of the issues were not anticipated by

~r.;;tl~,~~

b~I~'l~t;:~

the founding fathers of these institutions probably as a result of the
limitations of that era.
While appreciating the new and more challenging issues confronting
these institutions, it must be borne in mind that not all institutions can

•
legally claim to be called international organizations under international

law. The reason lies in the fact that every international organization must
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first pass the litmus test of international personality. 199 If such an
organization meets the criteria for recognition as an international
organization, then it can assert itself on the international arena by
claiming rights and observing duties in internationallaw.200 Further,
such an organization may avail itself of the capacity to enter into legally
binding treaties with sovereign States or with other international
organizations under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.20 1 But in order to exercise this right, the rules of the
,H·l;,."~

organization must empower the organization to enter into a treaty.202

~,n':J'"
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However, as Kirgis203 reminded us, "the subjects of law in any legal

ht;:!!~~,,~
Itt',:'w i ,

system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of
their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community."
But such subjects must meet the minimum criteria under the community
,standard of membership.

•
£1l98 Okeke, supra, note 144
Supra, notes 157, 158, 159, 160, 161 and 162.
Ibid
Supra, note 164.
Ibid
Kirgis, F.L., Jr., supra, note 148.
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CHAPTER FOUR

BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM AND COMPANY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM

I

INTRODUCTION

During the end of the World War II (1939-1945)204, the major players205
sought to create an economic and financial system that would facilitate

H:l:.~"'.

tit l :"!Jl.. ',

,

international trade on a multilateral and nondiscriminatory basis. The fouryear war had taken great to1l206 on all the major players in Europe207,
~tri \;~ ': ~ii:N:

America and Asia, as well as on the minor participants in Africa208.

-t

04 The term, "Second World War" is more commonplace in the United Kingdom and Canada, while the tenn
:World War II" is preferred by American publishers. For example, the Oxford University Press uses The Oxford
CO'!'panion to the Second World War in the United Kingdom, and The Oxford Companion to World War II in the
ted States. For further reading visit http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World War II, last visited on February 23,2007
.05 The World War II was fought between the Allied Powers and the Axis Powers. The conflict involved anned
t~ ~om.oveI:.seventy.natio~s and r~sulted in the death. of ove~ sixty.million people ..The m~jor playe~s on the
.bhhed sId~ mcluded SovIet Umon, Umted States of Amenca, Umted Kingdom, and Chma, whIle the major players
the AxIS side included Gennany, Japan, and Italy. The Allied Powers emerged victorious.
The economies of Europe, China and Japan were completely destroyed by the war. Both sides in the conflict
enormous casualties, for example, it is estimated that the Allied Powers lost over seventeen million of their
and OVer thirty three million civilians. The Axis Powers lost an estimated eight million military personnel
Over twelve million civilians. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/world War II, last visited February 23, 2007.
Footnote 164, supra.
The minor participants of the war on the Allied side included Philippines, India, New Zealand, South Africa,
etc., while those on the Axis side included Hungary, Romania, Finland, Croatia, Slovakia, Thailand, etc.

:ru
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A series of conferences209 were held to fashion these institutions21 0 and
agreements. The most important was held in 1944 at Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire, in the United States of America, where the institutions and
agreements on the regulation of the financial and economic relations were
developed211. The main achievement of the Bretton Woods Conference was
the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International

Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD-the World Bank).
As conceived by the Conference, the term "Bretton Woods System",

II',;.,"

;' ,/1

comprise the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for

, ';t ~

Reconstruction and Development (IBRD-the World Bank), and the General

'{I':,:,(, :~I' f"j

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, however, was developed in another series of conferences, which

209 Some of the international conferences that preceded the Bretton Woods conference include: The Atlantic
Charter of 1941, The United Nations Declaration of26 Nations on January 1, 1942 (It is noteworthy that the UNO
was not formed until 1945); The Moscow Declaration of 1943; The Dumbarton Oaks Conference of 1944; The Yalta
gonference of 1945; and The San Francisco Conference of 1945 which finally gave birth to the United Nations
rganization (UNO).
~10 These institutions include the 'original' Bretton Woods institutions like the IMF, The World Bank and the
1ATT. Although the WTO took over from the GATT, it was created later in 1994 but became operative on January
~99~. ~owever, for the purposes of this work, we have grouped them all under the title of the international
. nClalmstitutions (IFls).
~ll Although the preceding conferences to the Bretton Woods conference focused primarily on the developments
m the Second World War, it is important to emphasize that the political leaders were also aiming not just on a
. tegy to win the war, but also on a strategy to maintain lasting peace after the war.

s:a
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spanned from the fall of 1946 to mid-1948 .212 The GATT was designed as a
Jl1ultilateral agreement that will succeed the originally conceived Havana
Charter and the International Trade Organization (ITO )213, while embodying
commercial policy provisions essentially similar to the Havana Charter
chapter on commercial policy. The ITO failed to materialize because some of
the governments failed to ratify the ITO charter, consequently; the ITO was

not ratified as a de jure organization, and GATT became a de facto
'international trade organization.214
\:;.'

i

While the IMF was intended to repair the disintegration that had befallen the

;',

"
'I

,.;
:!' ~

,t

international monetary system prior to the W ar215, and the W orId Bank was
1(1'.,:t"

designed to stimulate and support foreign investment which had declined to
. insignificant amounts,216 the GATT was intended to reverse the

~2 Horsefield, Keith J., The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965, 3 vols, 1969; Mason, Edward S. & Asher,
2 bert E., IMF, The International Monetary Fund, 1966-1971 (1984).
B T.he Hava~a Conference of 1948 succeeded in drawing up a charter for the fonnation of the International Trade
Orgaruzation (ITO).
~~4 Curzon G, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy, New York, Praeger, 1965.
S 5 As a result of the discriminatory and retaliatory trade practices that responded to the US enactment of the
, lIlooth-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, the international monetary system was adversely affected in the uncontrolled and
\lnregulated trade war. Infact, the international monetary system as it was then known lost control of the system and
~~entual1y lost credibility.
19~ The decline of foreign investment and trade was so drastic that world trade plummeted from $5.7 billion in
'''rh9 to $.1.9 billion in 1932 while unemployment increased sharply within the same period. For further reading see
e FruIts of Free Trade: Protection's Price," 2002 Annual Report - Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,
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protectionist and discriminatory trade practices that had multiplied during the
pre-war depression years.217 The Fund and GATT were to collaborate on
exchange policies and trade policies. In combination, the Fund, the World
Bank, and GATT, were designed to help the advanced industrial countries
achieve the multiple objectives of full employment, freer and expanding
trade, and stable exchange rates.218 The framers of these institutions had
hoped that GATT will serve "the ideal of an international organization that

would function in the trade areas much as it was hoped the UN would
function in the political and peacekeeping areas."219 However, the GATT

I;"

did not live up to the expectations of the framers. According to Jackson, J.H.,

:: ~

etal, the "birth defects" that GATT had suffered from inception prevented it
from fully living up to the ideal of the founding fathers.220 The framers of
GATT never intended it to be an organization, but rather an agreement to
~.dallasfed.org/fed/annua1!2002/ar02f.html, (June 30, 2004). This data was cited by Ball, D et aI, International

Business: The Challenge of Global Competition, 10 th ed, p.95, 2006.
217 Some COmmentators have traced the origin of the pre-war depression years to the enactment of the SmoothHaWley Tariff Act, 1930, by the US Congress and the subsequent signing of the bill by President Herbert Hoover.
According to the commentators, the bill was enacted as a result of the lobby of the us farmers who wanted to ensure
SOUle level of protection from foreign competition by the imposition of heavy tariffs on imported agricultural
pro~ucts. Consequently, the bill sparked a trade war "characterized by tit-for-tat tariffs and protectionism between
~lllgnations, which soon engulfed most of the world's economies." Ibid
Meier, G.M., The Bretton Woods Agreement - 25 Years After, 39 Stanford Law Rev. 235, 237, 245-246
~ 71); reprinted in 1.H. Jackson, W.J. Davey, A.O. Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems ofInternational Economic Relations,
2 ed., West Publishing Co., 279 (1995).
19 Donald Ball et aI, International Business: The Challenge of Global Competition, 2006, McGraw-Hill, p.123.

I;
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embody the results of the tariff negotiations as well as some general
protective clauses, which would prevent evasion of the tariff commitments.
Whilst GATT was originally planed to embody the results of the tariff
negotiations, the International Trade Organization (ITO), was planned to be
the organizational framework for the implementation of the GATT
provisions.221

Like the IMF and the W orId Bank, the initiatives for the formation of an ITO

and a GATT came chiefly from the United States of America, during the end
of World War II. The motivation for this initiative can be traced to two main
, ~.i,

sources in the American economic policy222 at the end of the war. The first
source was the general "Reciprocal Trade Agreements" program that
originated with the 1934 Act,223 which enabled the United States President

220 Jackson, J.H., Davey, W.J., Sykes, A.O., Jr., supra, note 41.
221 Ibid
222 Noting that the "tariff wars" that greeted the Smooth-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 was one of the major economic
causes of the World War II, the American economic policy after the war was aimed chiefly at preventing a re~ccurrence of the events that gave rise to the war. Thus the government began the process of enacting the Reciprocal
fade Agreements program as well as the formation of the ITO and GATT as major regulators of the international
economic affairs
22
.
If 3 See the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RT AA), 1934. The RT AA was an amendment to the 1930 SmoothaWley Tariff Act. The RT AA granted the president the power to make foreign trade agreements with other nations
on the basis of a mutual reduction of duties, contrary to the prevailing practice whereby Congress set import duties,
~~lyat high protectionist levels. It may be worthy of note that between 1934 and 1947 (GATT formation), U.S.
s Were reduced from an average of 48 percent to an average of 25 percent. The RT AA was also regularly
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to negotiate mutual reductions of tariffs. The second source was the
realization by the United States224 of the important role played by
international economic affairs in the genesis of W orId War II. The ITO and

GATT were thus conceived to achieve the dual objective of providing a
multilateral medium for negotiating mutual tariffs reduction and a viable
regulator of international economic affairs.225

In addition to the core Bretton Woods institutions like the IMF, the W orId
Bank and the ITO/GATT, other organizations were formed to facilitate the
re-activation and coordination of international trade. Hence, at the inception
~('

iii

of the United Nations in 1945, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
was also established226. During the Council's first meeting in February
1946, the United States introduced a resolution calling for the convening of a
"United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment." The resolution was
adopted with the principal goal of drafting a charter for an international trade

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~neWed by the Congress until it was replaced in 1962 by the Trade Expansion Act, which was granted to President
o~ F. Kennedy to empower him to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements with the European Common Market
~hiCh Was formed in 1957.
24 Supra footnote 181 and 182
225 Ibid
226 The United Nations Charter was signed at San Francisco on June 26, 1945. It entered into force on October 24,
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organization. 22 7

In the fall of 1946, a committee met in London to consider a "Suggested
Charter for an International Trade Organization", drafted by the United States
govemment.228 In early 1947, a drafting subcommittee met at Lake Success,
New York, while beginning in April to October of 1947, the full preparatory
conference convened again in Geneva.229 It was at this Geneva conference
that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was drafted, and
some progress was made with the tariff negotiations and the ITO charter.
t

It is worthy of note that the tariff agreements were being negotiated under the

~ J' '

't'"

r,
1~',

,{
~ ','

extended authority of the 1945 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.230 The
1':':\

United States Congress had hoped that the ITO Charter would be submitted
to them for approva1.231 Thus, when early drafts of the General Agreement
included some provisional semblance of an organization, the provisions were

-

1945. The latest amendments can be found at 24 U.S.T. 2225, T.LA.S. 7739.
Press Release, Dec 16,1945, reproduced in 13 Dept. State Bulletin 970 (1945); 1 U.N.
2COSOC Res. 13, U.N. Doc. E/22 (1946)
228 London Report, First Session of the Preparatory Committee (1946); U.N. Doc. EPCTICIIII-66 (1946)
E29 New York Report, U.N. Doc. EPCT/34 (1947); U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.6!W.58 (1947); Also U.N. Docs.
2~CTIA!SR/I-43; EPCTIBISR/I-33 (1947); U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/SR. 1-28 (1947).
l' 0 Supra footnote 182. The RTAA 1945 was a product of the renewal of the original 1934 Act. President Harry
,~an used the power of the 1945 Act to authorize the US to join the other countries engaged in tariff negotiations
W ch later culminated in the formation of the GATT on October 30, 1947.

~27U.S. State Dept.
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intensely criticized by the Congress on the grounds that the President lacked
authority to accept international organization membership for the United
States without congressional approva1.232 Congress had expected that the
GATT would be a subsidiary.agreement under the ITO charter, depending
upon the ITO secretariat for servicing and enforcement. This expectation was
based upon the recognition by Congress that most of the general clauses in
the GATT were drawn from comparable clauses drafted for the ITO.233

Due to the foregoing reasons and more234, neither the ITO Charter, nor the
GATT was able to pass the litmus test of becoming effective before the
expiration of the United States extended Trade Agreement Act in 1948. The
GATT for instance, needed parliamentary approval by some of the other
countries235 in order to accept many of its general clauses.236 However, in

231 The ITO was a product of the RTAA 1945. The US Congress reasonably expected that the ITO will be
presented to them for approval.
232 Hearings on the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed ITO Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 80 th
C~ng. 1st Sess. (1947); Hearings on Operation of the Trade Agreements Act and Proposed ITO Before the Senate
Fmance Comm., 80 th Congo 1st Sess. (1947)
233 Supra footnotes 189, 190 and 191.
234 The political enthusiasm for the ITQ and GATT had waned by the expiration ofthe extended Trade Agreement
Act 1948. The victory of the Republican Party in the 1946 mid-term elections for Congress frustrated all the political
~nthusiasm that the Democratic Party had brought in pushing for the ITO and GATT.
~ The other countries that were signatories to the GATT in 1947 include the Commonwealth of Australia, the
C .gdom of Belgium, the United States of Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, the Republic of Chile, the Republic of
hina, the Republic of Cuba, the Czechoslovak Republic, the French Republic, India, Lebanon, the Grand-Duchy of
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order to avert a complete loss of the entire effort, the 23 original members of

GATT signed in late 1947, a "Protocol of Provisional Application" (PPA),
which became effective on January 1, 1948.237 Since then, the GATT has
been applied only through this protocol with hopes that at the inception of the

ITO Charter, the Protocol of Provisional Application would give way to a
definite application of the GATT.

Unfortunately, this expectation never came through. Although the Havana
conference completed the draft charter of the ITO in early 1948, the United
States Congress had by then gone through a lot of changes that prevented the
President from convincing them to approve their hitherto wanted baby238,
and thus the ITO became a still-born baby239. At the demise of the ITO,

Luxemburg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Kingdom of Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia,
Syria, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
236 Some ofthe GATT general clauses include Article I (General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment), Article II
(Schedules of Concessions), Article III (National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation), Article V
{Freedom of Transit), etc.
237 Protocol of Provisional Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. Pts.
~6: TIAS No.1700, 55 UNTS 308. The Protocol was signed by the original 23 members of the GATT, including the
mted States of America.
38 Upon the death in 1945 of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his Vice President, Harry Truman took over. In
. 946, the Republican Party won the mid-term elections in the US Congress. Consequently, the new Democratic
Harry Truman, had to deal with a rather uncooperative Congress from 1946 until 1948 when he was
President with a Democratic Congress. Truman was so frustrated with the Republican Congress that he
them the "do nothing" Congress ostensibly in reference to their inability to pass the bills on his nationalized
~"I1UI1lCflr'" program, the ITO Charter, etc. See www.friesian.com/presiden.htm. last visited March 6, 2007.
Ibid

i
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GATT therefore became by default, the central organization for coordinating
national policies on international trade.240 With the addition of new
members, it became apparent that GATT was not fashioned to undertake the
onerous responsibility of coordinating the GATT trade policies, again reigniting the search for a more effective coordinating organization.

At the ninth session of the Contracting Parties of GATT, held from October
1954 to May 1955, a number of amendments were proposed to GATT and a
draft charter for the proposed Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC) was
-'j'

completed.241 The United States Congress again rejected the OTC charter,
"

'

like its predecessor the ITO charter. However, the amendments to the GATT
..

were accepted under the authority of the then existing USTrade Agreements
Act. The inability to form a coordinating organization for the GATT
consequently gave rise to the situation whereby the nation participants in
GATT are not called "members", but rather are called "contracting

•

-----------------240 Ibid
.,.'

~:lS G~TT, 3rd SUpp. BISD (1955); Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation, GATT Doc. Final Act,
eSSlOn.
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parties.242

According to Jackson, J.H., et aI, at the commencement of the Uruguay
Round of TaIks243 in 1986, the" birth defects" that hindered the efficiency of
GATT can be summarized as follows:244

1) GATT application was controversial, flawed and still "provisional, "
although the GATT rules did apply as binding international treaty
obligations. Grandfather rights still existed, even though they were
originally intended to be temporary. A number of other institutional
problems stemmed from this basic treaty structure, including the
difficulty of the amendment process, its uncertain relationship to
242 GATT Article XXV(1) provides that "Representatives of the contracting parties shall meet from time to time
for the purpose of giving effect to those provisions of this Agreement which involve joint action and, generally, with
a ~iew to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement. Wherever reference is made in
this Agreement to the contracting parties acting jointly they are designated as the CONTRACTING PARTIES."
Article XXV (3) provides that each contracting party shall be entitled to have one vote at all meetings of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. Further, Article XXV (4) provides that decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES
be taken by a majority of the votes cast, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement. See also Article
on Acceptance, Entry into Force and Registration.
The GATT operated by organizing and coordinating a series of multilateral negotiations known as "trade
Until the Kennedy Round in 1964, the previous GATT trade rounds concentrated on tariffs reduction. The
Round produced an agreement on anti-dumping and development. The Tokyo Round of 1973 followed suit
producing agreement on non-tariff barriers. A comprehensive list of the GATT Round of Talks is as follows: (1)
-'~\'-'UlJ<L - 1947 (2) Annecy(France) - 1949 (3) Torquay(UK) - 1951 (4) Geneva - 1956 (5) Dillon Round965 (6) Kennedy Round - 196411967 (7) Tokyo Round - 197311979 (8) Uruguay Round - 198611994 (9)
Round - 200112005
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domestic laws, and the lack of a unified dispute settlement procedure,
questions of membership, and the ill-defined powers of the contracting
parties.

. 2) The amending provisions of the General Agreement were such that it
was considered nearly impossible to amend it. The delay required by
the treaty acceptance process, the difficulty of obtaining the required
number of acceptances, the shift in bargaining power involved under
the amending procedure in the context of a large membership and the

l>

I'
p

fact that even when an amendment is effective it will not apply to

"
t·
I'

!I,

countries which do not accept it, are all the reasons why the amending
I~

procedure had fallen into disuse. This caused a certain rigidity and
inability to develop rules to accommodate the many new developments
in international trade and other economic interdependence subjects.
One result was the development of an elaborate system of "side
agreements or codes, " which created additional problems.

J

Jackson, J.H., Davey, W.J., Sykes, A.G., Jr, supra, 296.
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A key problem was the relationship to GATT of these many side
agreements, which in most cases were stand-alone treaties, but which
were intimately linked to the GATT treaty structure itself. It was
unclear in some circumstances what this relationship was and whether
an obligation contained in a side agreement would prevail over one
contained in the General Agreement or vice versa. In any event, since
the side agreements tended to have a series of separate procedures for
various matters including dispute settlement, there was certain
inefficiency in the potential 'forum shopping. " Side agreements bound

l.:';;

l1;'J"'1
~.) ~~

only governments, which accepted them, and the opportunity for

I"":
f;)!~;i;i

u~~~,!::!

countries to pick and choose led to "GATT a la carte. "

I~~':I~

4) The relationship of the GATT treaty system to domestic law in a variety
a/GATT member countries was very murky. This might have existed in
any event, regardless of the basic treaty structure, since national legal
systems differ so widely. Nevertheless, it seemed that some more
attention could be given to the possibility of certain international treaty
J

obligations
, with respect to how the trade and economic rules should be
106
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implemented domestically. More attention has been given to this
question in recent years, sometimes under the rubric "transparency. "
It should be noted that the General Agreement itselfhas several clauses
(e.g. Article A) that are related to transparency, dealing with
publication and administration of trade regulations.

5) There were a number of troublesome problems with respect to
membership, or "contracting party status, " in the GATT system. There
were various ways by which a nation could become a "member" of

;.... ',

I' ~ ~
1."':1

GATT or one of the side agreements. In some cases, a territory that did

;..}(

I·'
lIH

not have full independent international sovereignty could obtain
j\;:(

membership. In certain cases, former colonies could be sponsored for
membership and enter GATT with very little substantive commitment,
reducing the "terrain of reciprocity, " and leading to criticisms of
unfairness. The General Agreement had an "opt out" clause (Article

XX\V) by which individual GATT contracting parties could opt out of
a GATT relationship with other parties, at one time only (when one of
J

them originally enters GATT). Furthermore, there were a number of

,

107

•

instances where there was an effective "opt out" at a later time, with
murky legal results. Article XXI with an exception for "national
security" purposes is related to this issue.

··.6) The powers of the Contracting Parties defined in the General
Agreement were very ambiguous. Indeed, they were so broad that they
could be the subjects of abuse (although they have not been so abused).
There were a number of unsettled and disquieting issues, such as the
power of the contracting parties to interpret the General Agreement

"':'-

I"'~.

~~:.

and the relationship of actions of the contracting parties to some of the

'10,',

:;:.~

~~:l

"I

side agreements. Furthermore, the decision making process left much

~~

to be desired. The so-called "consensus approach, " which had evolved
to ameliorate some of the problems of a one-nation, one-vote structure,
had slowed the decision making process and made it hard to confront
difficult issues. The GATT Council had been created out of whole cloth
by resolution of the Contracting Parties, and had been delegated
almost all of their powers, but had no treaty status.
J

,
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7) The dispute settlement processes of GATT were one of the more
intriguing institutional developments of the institution. The treaty
language was very sparse indeed, but many decades of the practice had
resulted in a considerable amount of exegesis. A Tokyo Round
"understanding" elaborated and formalized many of the dispute
settlement procedures that had developed in the early decades of GATT
practice.

8) Finally, there was a long festering problem with respect to the

~";

·.,~t

relationship of GATT to the other Bretton Woods institutions,

;.,;t,

particularly, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

1),f':HHi

At the end of the eight-year Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of trade
negotiations, there had emerged what had eluded all previous efforts - a
and better-defined international organization and treaty structure in
name of a World Trade Organization (WTO). The Uruguay Round did
only succeed in the formation of the WTO, but also made substantial
i

,
109

'I

,,:1

•

revisions in the dispute settlement procedures.245 Furthermore, while the
GATT dealt almost entirely with trade in products, the Uruguay Round
added a treaty for trade in services (GATS), and another for the protection
of intellectual property (TRIPS). The WTO, is thus, charged with the
responsibility of administering these three treaties with a view to a better
regulation of international trade and services.246

It must be clarified that the formation of WTO during the Uruguay

Round247 was not planned and was not anticipated. The agenda and
negotiating structure prepared by the ministers at Punta del Este, Uruguay,

iJ/('

in September 1986, did not include the drafting of any organizational
charter. Moreover, the planners did not want to incur the opposition of the
United States Congress, which had earlier struck down two attempts at
forming such organization.248 However, a group was formed to consider

The Uruguay Round created the unique Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) as the main WTO agreement
settling disputes. Also, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) was created to handle all the cases arising under the
The DSB is made up of all member governments, usually represented by an official at the level of an
or its equivalent. The DSB also creates a permanent seven-member committee called the Appellate
. The members of the AB serve four-year terms and are individuals that are not affiliated with any government.
~.wto.org/englishltratop e/dispu e/dispu e.htm, last visited June 27, 2006
Ibid
See the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (1994), Pub. L. No 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809.
SUpra, footnote 197
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the "Future of the GATT system", conveniently called the FOGS group.
The FOGS group focused on the GATT's relationship to the monetary
part of the Bretton Woods system and on designing the new Trade Policy
Review Mechanism (TPRM).

In May of 1990, the government of Canada was the first to formally
propose the formation of a W orId Trade Organization. The European
Union was in support of this proposal, but suggested a Multilateral Trade
Organization (MTO). The Ministerial Meeting held in Brussels in

,",

;tjl.1,
~;j

December of 1990 ended in an impasse. Afterwards, the then GATT

II;":"

;:!",;:

H.\.~:

Director-General, Arthur Dunkel, intervened and encouraged the

G~r:1

negotiators to go ahead and produce a complete rough draft of the
UULlVll

results. The draft that was presented contained a draft charter

a new organization to be called MTO.

•
that time until December of 1993, the negotiators worked out their
es and the oppositions of the draft charter, especially, the name. This lasted until December 1993, when the negotiators agreed to a
111

charter proposal with a change of name back to WTO. In April 1994, the
proposal was finally formalized at the Morocc0249 summit and ready to
be submitted to the respective governments for ratification250.
reviewed the historical background of the Bretton Woods institutions

~!which form the bulk of the IFIs, it is equally important that we review the
11nstitutional framework of these IFIs, starting with the IMF.
'~'>c:

•
The Uruguay Round Final Act was signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, on April 15, 1994. It subsequently came into
~n Jall)lary 1, 1995, thus giving birth to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
at December 11, 2005, the WTO has 149 members. See

112

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF)

'INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The Articles of Agreement25l of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
sets out the institutional framework of the Fund. The Articles provide for

the following:

i) A Board of Governors,

ii) An Executive Board,
.iii) A Managing Director, and
Jv) A staff of international civil servants.

highest authority of the IMF is the Board of Governors.252 The
consists of one Governor and one Alternate Governor, appointed by
of the IMF's member countries. The Governors are usually ministers
~YV.":Lo.org/engl1Sh/thewto

e/whatls e/whatls e.htrn, last visited June 19,2006.
~ Arilcles of Agreement of the IMF which is the legal document that created and empowered the Fund,
Into force in December 1945. For a complete reading of the Articles, visit
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finance or heads of central banks in their own countries. The Articles
provide that the Board of Governors may establish a Council as a
permanent body of the IMF at the ministerial or comparable level to
supervise the management and functioning of the international monetary
system and to consider any proposals to amend the Articles of Agreement.
However, the Board has not established the Council. Rather, an Interim
Committee was established at the 1974 Annual Meetings .

. The Interim Committee is composed of 24 IMF Governors. The
I~j'

. Committee meets twice a year to fashion out how best to provide

'."t

,:.:

,l~
I~,

ministerial guidance to the Executive Board. It reports to the IMF's Board

;J(~

of Governors on the management and functioning of the international
system and on proposals to amend the Articles of Agreement.

1974, there was also established a Joint Ministerial Committee of the
of Governors of the Bank and the IMF on the Transfer of Real
to Developing Countries (the Development Committee). The
~mt.org/extemal/pubs/ft!aaJindex.htm, last visited August 15,2005.
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Committee, which has 24 members, also advises and reports

the two Boards of Governors on development issues.

Board of Governors normally meets once a year,253 but it may meet
vote by mail. Over the years, the Board has delegated many of its
"'~'TTa.." to the Executive Board.254 Thus, while the Board of Governors is

into the permanent decision-making organ of the IMF.255 The
has its headquarters in Washington, D.C. The Executive Board
y consists of 24 Executive Directors, who are appointed or elected
member countries.

Executive Board deals with a wide variety of policy, operational, and
tive matters. These matters include surveillance of members'
rate policies, provision of IMF financial assistance to member

•
XII (2) of the Articles of Agreement, 1945.
90
, supra.
XII (3) of the Articles of Agreement, 1945.
delegation of permanent decision making authority arose by default. Since the Board of Governors which
ranking authority meets once a year, the Executive Board consequently makes the daily decisions
for the effective management of the Fund.

c,,·nnt...~te
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countries, consultations with members, and comprehensive studies on
issues of importance to the membership.

The Executive Board also selects the Managing Director of the IMF, who
serves as Chairman of the Board and as the head of the IMF's staff. The
Managing Director conducts the day-to-day business of the IMF .256

The next IFI to be reviewed, the IBRD, commonly called the World Bank, is
another Bretton Woods creation.
~J t •

.,

~: "
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III

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND

-

DEVELOPMENT (WORLD BANK)

lli'STITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The institutional framework of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank), is contained in Article V of the Bank's
constitution which is otherwise called the "Organization and Management
Article."257 This Article V is very similar to the Fund's Articles XII and

XIII.

The Board of Governor of the Bank, like that of the Fund, consists of one
governor and one alternate, appointed by each member country. The two
boards meet in joint session once a year. Also, like the Fund, the daily
operation of the Bank is delegated to the executive directors.
The Board of Governor is, however, the highest authority of the Bank. The
Article XII (4) of the Articles of Agreement, 1945.The current IMF Managing Director is Rodrigo de Rato, who
formerly the Minister of Finance of Spain. His five year term began on June 7, 2004.
The Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1944 (hereinafter
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powers include the admission of new members, increase or decrease of the
capital sto'ck of the Bank, suspension of a member, determination of the
remuneration of directors, and other reserved functions.258

The Articles of Agreement of the Bank provided for twelve executive
directors of whom:
(i)

Five shall be appointed, one by each of the five members having the
largest number of shares;

(ii)

Seven shall be elected ........ by all the Governors other than those
JI.'

,

appointed by the five members ...... 259
~

'"

I

r'l l

In accord with the agreement at Bretton Woods, the member countries having
, the largest number of shares were, in order, the United States, the United
Kilgdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France. The Soviet Union, however,
failed to ratify the Articles of Agreement, thus, India moved up to the fifth

to as IBRD Articles of Agreement),
IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 2.
IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 4(b).
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position.260

Executive directors and their alternates were to be appointed or elected for
two-year terms. Article V, section 4(e) of the Articles of Agreement, provides
that the Executive Directors shall function in continuous session at the
principal office of the Bank and shall meet as often as the business of the
Bank may require.

The president of the Bank is the chief executive officer, "responsible for the
organization, appointment and dismissal of the officers and staff, subject to
the general control of the Executive Directors."261 In the recruitment of
!

staff, the president must be influenced primarily by the "paramount
importance of securing the highest standards of efficiency and have technical

260 Mason, E.S. & Asher, R.E., The World Bank since Bretton Woods, (1973), 29. Several explanations have been
o~ered for the failure of the Soviet Union to ratify the Articles of Agreement of the Bank and the Fund. By their
faIlure to ratify the Articles, the Fund quota relegated the Soviet Union to third place in number of votes in both the
~und and the Bank, after the United States and the United Kingdom. No veto power was given to any member while
frund membership required making available a substantial amount of information hitherto undivulged, and borrowing
~m the Bank involved exacting investigations. Further, a general purpose of the Bank and the Fund to promote
~nvate trade within freer markets was of little interest to the Soviet Union. At a meeting of the General Assembly of
"be United Nations in 1947, the Soviet representative charged that the Bretton Woods institutions were merely
/anches of the Wall Street" and that the Bank was "subordinated to political purposes which make it the instrument
~ one great power." See also, Knorr, K, "The Bretton Woods Institution in Transition," International Organization,
01. 2,1948,35-36.
261 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 5(b).
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competence" and also "pay due regards to the importance of recruiting
personnel on as wide a geographical basis as possible."262

Notwithstanding the similarity in the provisions of the Fund and the Bank

with respect to organization and management, there exists, however, certain
differences between the two. Article V, section 6, provides for an advisory
council "selected by the Board of Governors, including representatives of
banking, commercial, industrial, labor and agricultural interests .... " The
charter provides that "the Council shall meet annually and on such other
occasions as the Bank may request." It is noteworthy that although a
distinguished group was appointed initially, the Council quickly fell into
disuse and has never been revived.

Article V, section 9, also authorizes the Bank to "establish agencies or branch
offices in the territories of any member of the Bank." Section 10 of the same
Article V, authorizes the establishment of regional offices, which "shall be
adVised by a regional council representative of the entire area and selected in

-----------------!Ban
262

Articles of Agreement, Article V, section S(d),
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such manner as the Bank may decide." This ideal has also been abandoned
and the Bank has developed as a highly centralized institution, with all
fundamental decisions being made in Washington.

The GATT, we stated earlier, was designed to be the tripartite component of
the other Bretton Woods institutions, namely; the IMF and the World Bank.
However, due to some bureaucratic complications263, the GATT became
formalized in another series of conferences, which spanned from the fall of

1946 to mid-1948. Consequently, although started at the Bretton Woods
conference, the GATT was completed in the extended conference that ended
in 1948.

'"'
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IV

GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT)

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF GATT

The "General Articles" of the General Agreement comprise the basic trade
policy commitments of the contracting parties. The thirty-eight articles
contain detailed rules and obligations designed generally to prevent nations
from pursuing "beggar-thy neighbor" trade policies, which would be selfdefeating if emulated, by other nations.

It is important to emphasize that GATT is not a single agreement, but is a

series of over two hundred agreements, protocols, process-verbaux, etc.264
Some of these protocols are amendments to the text of the general articles,
while many are corrections or revisions (in light of the re-negotiations) of the
tariff schedules. Special "side agreements" have been completed in the
Context of GATT, which fill out details of the obligations on certain subjects,

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------~:!

See Meier, G.M., supra.
Jackson, Davey & Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems ofIntemational Economic Relations, 1995.
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but these apply only to the signatories of the side agreements.265

The central core of the GATT system of international obligations is contained

in Article II. This Article embodies the tariff schedules and expresses the
detailed commitments by each country to limit tariffs on particular items by
the amount negotiated and specified in its tariff schedule. Another important
GATT obligation is contained in Article I, which deals with the "Most
Favored Nation" (MFN) clause. This clause represents a central feature of the
GATT obligation system, based on the non-discrimination principle. Under
the MFN clause, each member of GATT is obligated to treat other GATT
members at least as well as it treats any other country with regard to imports
or exports. A third important GATT obligation is contained in Article III,
which deals with the national treatment obligation. While the MFN clause
provides a non-discriminatory principle for the treatment of imports from
foreign nations, the national treatment obligation specifies that imports shall
be treated no worse than domestically produced goods, under internal
taxation or regulatory measures.

------------------------265 Jackson, Davey & Sykes, Jr., supra, 298.
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Although the General Agreement is central to international trade regulation,
it has never itself been applied. It is rather applied by the "Protocol of
Provisional Application" (PPA), which was signed on October 30, 1947.266
The birth of the World Trade Organization (WTO), during the eight-year
Uruguay Round was, therefore, a welcome development in international
trade267. More important, the WTO was charged with the administration of
three treaties, namely; the GATT treaty on trade in products, the treaty on
trade in services (GATS), and the treaty for the protection of intellectual
property (TRIPS). It is equally pertinent to clarify that although the WTO
was charged with the administration of the GATT treaty, it is not a creation

,.

of the Bretton Woods system. First, the WTO was created from the Uruguay
Round of Talks and was endowed with the legal authority to administer not
only the GATT treaty, but the other two treaties on trade in services and the
protection of intellectual property.

•

-----------------------~666 ;rotocol of Provisional Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,1947,61 Stat. Pts.
267

i

AS No. 1700,55 UNTS 308. See also Jackson, etc, supra.
he Uruguay Round of Talks spanned from 1986 to 1994, and culminated in the formation of the WTO.
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V

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO)

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF WTO

Unlike the GATT Charter, the WTO Charter clearly established an
international organization. The WTO Charter endows the WTO with legal
personality, supports it with the traditional treaty organizational clauses
regarding "privileges and immunities," secretariat, director-general,
budgetary measures, and explicit authority to develop relations with other
inter-government organizations and non-government organizations. The
Charter prohibits staff of the Secretariat from seeking or accepting
instructions from any government "or any other authority external to the

WTO."268

As we indicated earlier, the WTO was formed as an effort to remedy most, if
not all of the "birth defects" of the GATT, since inception. Thus, the WTO
eXpressly provided for the continuity of the GATT. The WTO Charter
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provided, among others, that except as otherwise provided, the WTO and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements shall "be guided by the decisions, procedures
and customary practices followed by (GATT 1947)." Also, the Charter
provided that the secretariat of the GATT 1947 would become the WTO
secretariat. The legal framework of the WTO is very similar to that of GATT

1947, with some major changes. At the apex of the authority is the
"Ministerial Conference." The Conference is followed iIi hierarchy by the
"General Council," which has overall supervisory authority, including
responsibility for carrying out many of the functions of the Ministerial
Conference between the conference sessions. Other Councils include the
Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services, and the
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights .

. Also established by the Charter was a "Dispute Settlement Body" (DSB). The

DSB is charged with the responsibility of supervising and implementing the
dispute settlement rules in Annex 2. The General Council performs these
functions. Further, the Charter created a "Trade Policy Review Mechanism".

-----------------------------------------------------------268 Jackson, Davey & Sykes, Jr, supra, 303, 304
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VI

CONCLUSION

We have so far traced the origin of the Bretton Woods System as well as the
off-shoot institutions. The sole goal of establishing these institutions, from
the perspective of the founders, was to collaborate to ameliorate and prevent
the re-occurrence of the economic and financial conditions before W orId War
II. The difficult economic and financial conditions that existed then,
contributed immensely to the outbreak of that war. The Bretton Woods
System269, as well as the off-shoot institutions270, were conceived as and
remain the premiere institutions that greatly impact the economic, monetary,
and financial forces of the twentieth and twenty-first century. Their

.

llnportance and pre-eminence, therefore, can not be over-emphasized.

"
~---------------------

: . A~ We have explained earlier, the Bretton Woods system created the bulk of the international financial
:. titutlons (IFIs) which includes the IMF, the World Bank, and later the WTO.
These include all the complementary institutions to the IFIs like the other international organizations formed
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However, these institutions were not created, we believe, to serve equally the
economic, monetary, and financial needs of all the countries271. Certainly,
the founders were the political leaders of the Allied Forces during the Second
World War. Their goal, apparently, was to create the institutions that will in
the general scheme of things, provide the tools to forestall a re-occurrence of
pre-war economic and financial environment. But, particularly, they intended
to establish institutions that will serve as catalysts and managers in the
speedy reconstruction and rehabilitation of the devastated parts of the
countries where the Allied Forces were drawn from, particularly, in
Europe272.

To buttress this point, General George Marshall,273 then U.S. Secretary of
State, and chief architect of the famous Marshall Plan, while delivering a
speech at Harvard University, said:
un~er the auspices of the United Nations as well as the regional organizations like the African Union, the European •
Drnon, the ASEAN etc
~ It appears that 'this ·anomaly was taken into consideration in the formation of the Wodd Trade Organization
. TO). The second preamble to the WTO Agreement provides as follows: "RecognizingJurther that there is need
for Positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them,
~ecure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs oJtheir economic development,"
2;rnphasis added), see The Uruguay Round Agreement Act (1994), ibid.
.
M2 A good case in point is the careful and elaborate plans that went into the formulation and implementation of the
arshall Plan, otherwise known officially as the European Recovery Plan (ERP).
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"It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed

much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the
European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement
among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the
part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to
whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither
fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up .
unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically.
This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from
Europe. The role of this country should consist offriendly aid in the drafting
of a European program and of later support ofsuch program so far as it may

be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by
a number, ifnot all, European nations." (emphasis added) 274

. The consequence, we shall later see, was that the founders created these
Institutions from their political, economic, and financial prisms. In the

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

~"S<'~ the speech delivered by General George Marshall at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, at
~2i7·4
.f~Jdham.edu!HALSALLIMODI1947 marshallplan.htmI (last visited on June 6, 2006).
... ibid
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process, they allotted to themselves all the controlling powers and positions,
and established goals and objectives that were so carefully tailored to serve
their own interests. And the consequences are becoming more and more
apparent as the world in the latter part of the twentieth century and the
twenty-first century is completely different from the world in the early and
mid-twentieth century when the IFIs were established. In view of the fact that
the original purpose of the founding fathers of the BWS, was to ameliorate
the harsh economic conditions that resulted in World War II, one would
expect that in developing the legal framework for the operation of the BWS,
that the poor economic conditions of the developing countries would be
taken into consideration and accorded some measure of priority.

In order to better appreciate how much power the founders of the IFIs
allocated to themselves as well as the goals and objectives established for the
IFIs, we shall undertake a review of the organizational structures of the IFIs
in the next chapter. Hopefully, the review will expose the discriminatory
allocation of powers and privileges to the founders which has greatly
inflUenced the goals and objectives of the IFIs and the allocation of the
130
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resources of these institutions. In the exercise of their powers, particularly, in
the allocation of the resources of the IFIs, the founders have over the years
formulated terms and conditionalities for the allocation of the resources.

•
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CHAPTER FIVE

LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OFTHE BRETTON
WOODS INSTITUTIONS

I

INTRODUCTION

In order to understand the current roles of the IFIs in the de'~loping
countries, it is pertinent, indeed essential, that we begin with a review of the
"original"275 roles that these institutions set out to accomplish. I use the
term, "original," to distinguish what was intended in the beginning, and what
IS

currently the case in light of the challenges internally confronting these

institutions as well as those spanning from the twentieth century into the
twenty-first century. Consequently, our effort cannot be exhaustive until and

-------------------------------

~5 ~he "original" roles for the purposes of this work are those roles aimed at satisfying the primary objectives of
. eSe tnstitutions which include a better regulated international monetary system, the expansion of foreign trade and
lllyVestrnent and the prevention of the discriminatory trade practices that contributed towards the pre-war depression
ears,,,
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unless we look at these "original" roles, as well as the "current"276 roles as
spelt out in the constitutive instruments of the respective institution as well as
the interpretative authorities on those provisions. This inquiry will attempt to
cover the two major prongs of this research, beginning with the law 236
governing the Bretton Woods System whichforms the core of the group of
IFIs, as well as the practice 277 of these institutions since creation. In this
chapter, we shall focus primarily on the law governing these institutions,
while saving their practice for the next chapter.

In order to determine the "original" roles established for these IFIs, we must
begin the search from the constituent documents278 that established these
institutions as well as their analysis by learned scholars and publicists. The
approach I will undertake in this chapter, therefore, will be to critically
review and analyze the constituent documents that gave rise to these

-----------------------------------~6 The "current" roles, on the contrary, are those that these institutions have developed and created in response to
£ e ever-changing challenges of the 20 th and 21 5t century, such as the three main strategies employed by the Fund as

2~l1ows: Surveillance strategy, Technical assistance strategy, and the Lending strategy.

7 Such practice includes those exhibited by the institutions over the years and which have become widely

~Cepted by member states.
w~ By constituent documents, we mean the multilateral treaties that the founding member states signed and ratified
ch gave birth to these IFls.
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institutions279 in light of the authoritative interpretation of the learned
scholars and publicists. Such a review will, hopefully, highlight my
contention that these constituent documents were originally framed to reflect
a Euro-American centric approach, contrary to a universal approach. By so
doing, we can re-visit what the organizers intended to accomplish, as wen as
how the roles that these institutions were created to serve have been greatly
impacted by the changes within the institutions280 as well as in the
world.281 In the concluding chapters, we shall draw from some of our
observations in this chapter to proffer some suggestions on how to tinker
with the roles with a view to enhancing the performance of these institutions

,.

in the international community in general and the developing countries in

L)
I'iri~i

particular.

279 The constituent document of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), otherwise
known as the World Bank is the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. (http://web.worldbank.orgIWBSITE/EXTERNALlEXTABOUTUS/O) last visited August 17,2005.
The constituent document of the IMF is the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund
~:II~.imf.org/external/pubs/ftlaa/index.htm) last visited August 15,2005; the constituent document of the
AATT is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (http://www.ciesin.orgiTGIPI/TRADE/gatt.htrnl) last visited
;gus~ 17.' 2005, while the constituent document of the WTO is the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
28 garuzatlOn (http://www.wto.org) last visited June 9, 2006.
~ The expansion of the membership of these institutions from the few original member nations to almost all the
0ns, as well as the increased demand for fairness and equality from the developing countries have continued to
~ llenge the viability of the institutional and, legal framework of these institutions. Notable in this regard was the
.o~tion of such regional organizations like the OAU, the Non-aligned movement, UNCTAD, etc, and their
~:stent ~emands for fairness and equality in these institutions policies and practices.
e The impact of globalization, diseases, terrorism, etc., has immensely changed the landscape of the world
cOnomically, politically and socially.

U:
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It is trite knowledge that the world after World War II is completely different

in all shapes and forms from the world we currently live in. The
consequences of the war on the economies of the international community
were far-reaching and devastating.282 The need for the creation of the IF Is
was apparent and urgent, not just to facilitate recovery, but to ensure that the
pre-war discriminatory trade practices do not re-occur. The impact of
globalization283 - economic, political, scientific, and technological- and the
consequential development of a truly global village cannot be overemphasized. All these factors justify the creation of the international financial
institutions (IFIs). And since the IFIs were created to serve the international
:1;',

community, they must, in order to remain relevant, be subject to such
changes as are necessary in the accomplishment of their goals and objectives.

--------------------282 See the toll of the war on both the Allied and Axis Powers, supra. Footnotes 165 and 166.
283 Globalization has been used to imply economic, political, scientific, and technical liberalization of trade. Whilst
the goals of all the Multilateral Financial Institutions are to "open" all the economies that were hitherto "closed", the
:sulting implications are becoming overwhelming for these institutions to contain. A closed economy encourages
flow of investments and trade, while a closed economy discourages or regulates the inflow of investments and
e. The argument in favor of open economy is that it is more conducive to the efficient allocation and use of
:s~urces: which in tum contributes to "an increase in production and incomes." See Stefan P. Schleicher, "Borders
(P ~ade III a Borderless World", in OECD Proceedings, Globalization and Environment: Preliminary Perspectives
arts: OECD, 1997), at 173.

u:
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II

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF)

The IMF was created at the Bretton Woods Conference284 as an integral part
of the reconstruction efforts after World War II285. Specifically, the Fund
was created as a system that will facilitate the speedy repair of the
international monetary system after the war. Most of the damage arising from
the war occurred in Europe and certain parts of the world that actively
participated in the war.286 Since most of the world's presently grouped
developing countries did not play active roles in the prosecution of the war, a
"";0,

r.·." •.• •

literal interpretation of the goal of the Fund appears to exclude them. In other

:;~:;~
~I'il;

H!~'~'~'<4'

words, the original goal of creating the IMF ad the sister institutions was far

I/lii, ..

from the idea of facilitating the speedy repair of the economies of the
developing countries287. Such roles, as will be discussed later; have evolved

2~4 The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund was adopted at the United Nations Monetary and
Fmancial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 22, 1944. Entered into force December 27, 1945.
Amended effective July 28, 1969, by the modifications approved by the Board of Governors in Resolution No. 23-5,
~dopted May 31, 1968; amended effective April 1, 1978, by the modifications approved by the Board of Governors
mResolution No. 31-4, adopted April 30, 1976; and amended effective November 11,1992, by the modifications
;pproved by the Board of Governors in Resolution No. 45-3, adopted June 28, 1990.
85 The War was waged between the Axis Powers led by Nazi Germany and the Allied Powers led by Great Britain,
~ndspanned from 1939 to 1945.
2~6 Supra, footnotes 165 and 166.
7 The "original" roles/purposes of the IMF can be seen from Article 1 of the Articles of Agreement which states
~ fOllows: promoting international monetary cooperation; facilitating the expansion and balanced growth of
mternational trade; promoting exchange stability; assisting in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments;
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over the years during the existence of the IMF. Although the roles established
for the IMF can be glossed from Article 1 of its Articles of Agreement288, it
is a different ball-game when those roles are subjected to authoritative
interpretation by the staff and legal department of the institution, or indeed
any other commentator.289
It is comforting to note that the Articles of the IMF "justify, indeed direct,

observance of a teleological technique"290 to its interpretation when it stated
thus:
"The Fund shall be guided in all its policies and decisions by the purposes
,

set forth in this Article. "291

.~

',~:·t :~
:, ~.

The dilemma arises when those seemingly apparent purposes set forth in the

1m.,·

Fund's Articles are subjected to varying interPretations and nuances that are

and making its resources available (under adequate safeguards) to members experiencing balance of payments
difficulties. See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.htm. last visited August 15,2005.
288 Ibid
289 There is a persuasive opinion that the organs of the IMF and the W orId Bank are better fitted to apply the
teleological technique than external entities. See Gold, Joseph, Interpretation: The IMF and International Law, 1996,
P·18 & 19. According to Mr. Gold, the organs are better fitted to apply the technique given their "effectiveness and
expert knowledge, and in the analogy of U.S. administrative agencies." Sir Joseph Gold is an internationally
~Ognized authority on the IMF and the development of international monetary law. He served as a member of the
1 gal Department of the IMF from 1946 to 1960, as General Counsel and Director of the Legal Department from
2~60 to 1979, and as Senior Consultant to the Fund.
o See Gold, Joseph, ibid.
The original Articles of the Fund referred only to the "decisions" of the Fund, however; the First Amendment of
e ft,-rticles inserted "policies" to Article I. The First Amendment became effective on July 28, 1969, after the
~Odlfications were approved by the Board of Governors in Resolution No. 23-5, adopted May 31, 1968. See
lOOtn t
'
o e 241, supra.
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aimed at justifying the prevalent policies and decisions of the Fund.
According to Sir Joseph Gold292, the dilemma is understandable, because "a
teleological approach to interpretation in the adoption ofpolicies and
decisions calls for an expert knowledge of the history and development of the
organization's purposes as expressed in its Articles and its subordinate law
and as capable of response to changing circumstances. "
Unfortunately, the organs of the organizations that should be better fitted to
apply the teleological interpretative technique to the Articles lack the
requisite knowledge and expertise for a number of reasons. First, the
Executive Directors and staff may lack the historical knowledge about the
organization after sometime because most of the EDs serve for a limited time
in the organization. Also, the rate of turnover in the staff pool may
significantly affect the ability to retain the "institutional memory" of the
organization.293 Consequently, the technique will imply "that sometimes
one and sometimes another purpose must be given ascendancy over other
purposes without establishing a legal fixed hierarchy among them. "294 It is

---------------------292 See Gold, supra, p. 19
293 ibid
294 ibid
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interesting to note that the main inspiration for the original Articles of IMF,
B.D. White, forewarned this development in his memorandum for a
stabilization fund dated July 10, 1943, when he stated as follows:
"The various purposes enumerated in the outline are to a considerable extent
interdependent and overlapping and in some instances may even represent
apparently conflicting tendencies. Yet, progress in the attainment of almost
anyone of them facilitates progress toward the attainment of many of the
others. Each of them represents a different phase of international monetary
arrangements and calls in the main for different procedure, different powers,
.~ . :-<

and in some cases, different kinds of resources. The fact that some of the

~ ..:~

objectives may be at times harmonious and at other times conflicting,
indicates that the management of an international stabilization fund cannot
be reduced to a matter ofsimple rules. The successful operation of the Fund
calls for constant examination of a large variety ofpertinent factors and the
Continual evaluation of various effects which might be expected to follow any
particular action or failure to act. "295
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It may be in reaction to the above constraints in strictly applying the
teleological approach to interpretation that the IMF has creatively interpreted
its Articles based on the different stages of its development.296
The earliest stages focused on the Fund's regulatory authority.297 Two main
motives reinforced this approach. First, was the reinforcement of the
international monetary system that had been created.298 Second, was the
desire to protect the Fund's resources against misuse at a time when the
major tasks were focused upon reconstruction and development after the
devastation of war.299
The next stage was immediately after the Second Amendment which
abrogated the par value system of the Fund. Consequently, the Fund's
interpretation focused more on justifying growth and less on balance of
payments. 300

•
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------;95 Horsefield, History 1945 -1965, Vol. 3, p. 46, cited in Gold, supra.
/6 Gold, Joseph, supra, p. 564 & 565
97 ibid, p. 564
298 ibid
299 ibid
300 Ibid, p. 565
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The interpretation and application of the law of the IMF falls squarely upon
the IMF team consisting of the Board of Governors, the Executive Board, the
Managing Director and the Staff. This team is also conveniently referred to
as the organs of the Fund.

GOVERNING STRUCTURE

In order of priority, the Articles of Agreement30 1 provide for the following
"

organs:
'"',:

:'. ~

,,',.:'.,'

Fi "~";
'I

~~, :~"" ',~4

t)

1) The Board of Governors

Itl,' .'j

The Board of Governors 302 is the highest authority of the IMF. It consists
of one Governor and one alternate Governor appointed by each of the
IMF's member countries303. The Governors are usually Ministers of

------------------------~~~ Art~cle XII, section 1, of the IMF Articles of Agreement deals with the Organization and Management issues.
303 ArtIcle XII, section 2
htt.../~urren~ly there are 184 member countries; consequently, there are 184 members ofthe Board of Governors. See
~.lmf.org/externa1/np/exr/facts/glance.htm. last visited August 15,2005.
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Finance or Heads of Central Banks in their own countries.304
The Articles also provide that each Governor and each Alternate shall
serve until a new appointment is made. Further, that no Alternate may vote
except in the absence of his principal. The Chairman of the Board shall be
selected from one of the Governors.305

The Articles also empower the Board of Governors to delegate to the
Executive Board authority to exercise any powers of the Board of
Governors, except those powers conferred directly by this Agreement on
",:,<

the Board of Governors.306 Although all members have equal

:.:~' ~'

,

representation on the Board of Governors, yet, their respective votes vary

I ;~i '.

according to the number of votes allotted to each member country.
Consequently, the Articles make it explicitly clear that, "Each Governor

shall be entitled to cast the number of votes allotted under Section 5 of

--------------------------------304 As of March 2007, the current Nigerian Minister of Finance, Mrs Nenadi Esther Usman serves as a member of
~e Board of Governors, while the current Central Bank Governor, Prof Charles Soludo, serves as the alternate
Governor. The current representatives of Ghana on the Board of Governors are Paul Acquah as Governor, and
~ge Gyan-Baffuor as alternate Governor. The Brazilian representatives are Guido Mantega as Governor, and
s· que de Campos Meirelles as alternate. The representatives of Korea are Duck-Soo Han as Governor, and
eoutae Lee as alternate.
305 Art·
30
~cle XII, section 2 (a), supra.
6 Article XII, section 2 (b), supra.
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this Article to the member appointing him" (emphasis mine)307. In this
caveat lies the fundamental difference in the powers of the developed
countries and those of the developing countries. Although each member
country enj oys equal numerical representation on the Board of Governors,
yet each member country's representative enjoy differential voting powers
within the same Board. The obvious result, no doubt, is that by their
superior voting powers, the developed countries dictate and enforce
policies and practices within the Fund that ultimately serve their best
interests.
::.~

The Articles provide that the Governors and Alternates shall serve on the
,.
",~, 'f~l

Board without compensation from the Fund, but they are entitled to

I ih·~, ;''''~

reasonable expenses incurred in attending meetings.308 The Articles also
empower both the Board of Governors and the Executive Board to appoint
such committees as they deem advisable for the more efficient
administration of the Fund. Such committee membership should not be

-------------------------

307 Article XII, section 2 (e), supra. Section 5 (a) states as follows: "Each member shall have two hundred fifty
~~~es Pl~s one additional vote for each part of its quota equivalent to one hundred thousand special drawing rights."
ArtIcle XII, section 2 (h), supra.
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limited to Governors or Executive Directors or their Alternates. 309 In
line with the foregoing provision, the Board of Governors on July 26,
1972, adopted a resolution establishing a Committee on Reform of the
International Monetary System,31 0 known as the Committee of 20.
Further, an Interim Committee was established at the 1974 Annual
Meetings.311 The Interim Committee is composed of 24 IMF Governors.
The Committee meets twice a year to fashion out how best to provide
ministerial guidance to the Executive Board. It reports to the IMF's Board
of Governors on the management and functioning of the international
monetary system and on proposals to amend the Articles of
Agreement.312

In 1974, there was also established a Joint Ministerial Committee of the '
Boards of Governors of the Bank and the IMF on the Transfer of Real
Resources to Developing Countries (the Development Committee). The
--------------------------------;09 Article XII, section 2, 0), supra
10 The Committee of 20, as it was popularly called concluded their work on June 12-13, 1974.
311 Ibid
312 On June 12-13, 1974, the Conunittee of 20 concluded their work and reconunended that there was need to
establish an inunediate program to help monetary system evolve. On January 7-8, 1976, the Interim Conunittee also
reconunended that there was need to embark upon "interim reform" of the monetary system, including the
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Development Committee, which has 24 members, also advises and reports
to the two Boards of Governors on development issues.

The Board of Governors normally meets once a year, but it may meet or
vote by mail. Over the years, however, the Board has delegated many of
its powers to the Executive Board and the Managing Director of the
Fund.313

2) The Executive Board
,<. ~

;.;t::.

Although the Board of Governors is the highest authority of the IMF, in

!i':

practical terms, the Executive Board314 is the permanent decision-making
organ of the Fund. The Executive Board consists of Executive Directors,
who are appointed or elected by the member countries. The five members
having the largest quotas are entitled to appoint five members of the
Executive Board, while the remaining fifteen members of the Board shall

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------~endment of Article IV and other issues.

31 3 See IMF By-laws, section 15 which is similar to the World Bank's By-laws, section 15.
4 Article XII, section 3 (a), supra
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be elected by the rest of the membership (emphasis mine )315. Here again,
one can see how the composition of the EB is so arranged to be dominated
by the five members with the largest quotas. In this case, the five members
are entitled to appoint five members of the EB, while the rest of the
membership of the Fund votes to elect the remaining fifteen members.

Unlike the Board of Governors, the Articles empower the Executive
Directors to appoint their Alternates. Such Alternate enjoys the full power
to act for the Executive Director when the Executive Director is absent.
But when the Executive Director is present, Alternates are entitled to
""

attend meetings, but may not vote. 316 An Executive Director shall

:,

continue in office until the successor is appointed or elected.317 Similar to
the provision on the voting privileges of the Board of Governors, each
appointed Executive Director shall be entitled to cast the number of votes
allotted under Section 5 to the member appointing him (emphasis mine)

----------------------315 Article XII, section 3 (b) (i) (ii), supra.
316 Article XII, section 3 ( e), supra.
317 Article XII, section 3 (f), supra.
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318. On the contrary, each elected Executive Director shall be entitled to

cast the number of votes which counted towards his election (emphasis
mine) 319. The disparity within the EB becomes more apparent in the
voting structure of the EB. Whilst the five members appointed can
individually cast the number of votes allotted under Section 5 to the
member appointing him/her, the remaining fifteen members are limited to
cast the number of votes which aggregated to his/her election on the
EB.320 By this arrangement, the votes of the fifteen members are
marginalized into the number of votes that elected each of them, whilst the
votes of the five mernbers depend on the huge allocation of votes and
quotas under Section 5.

The Executive Board deals with a wide variety of policy, operational, and
administrative matters. These matters include surveillance of members'
exchange rate policies, provision of IMF financial assistance to member
countries, consultations with members, and comprehensive studies on

-----------------------318 Article XII, section 3 (i) (i), supra.
319 Article XII section 3 (i) (iii), supra.
320 Ibid
'
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issues of importance to the membership.

3) The Managing Director

The Managing Director of the IMF is selected by the Executive Board.32.l
However, such selection shall be made of a person who is not a Governor
or an Executive Director of the Fund322. The Managing Director, when
selected323, serves as the Chairman of the Executive Board and as the
head of the IMF' s staff. In that capacity also, the Managing Director
conducts the day-to-day business of the IMF.324
"

•
------------------------~~1 Given the dominance of the five members with the highest number of quotas and votes in the Executive Board,
. It 18 of no surprise that the appointment of the Managing Director of the Fund has been dictated by those powerful

Article XII, section 4 (a).
.
The first person to be appointed the Managing Director of the IMF was Camille Gutt, from Belgium, who
from May 6,1946 to May 5,1951. The current Managing Director of the Fund is Rodrigo de Rato, from
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4) The Staff

The IMF staff typically comprises of international civil servants325. The
pool is drawn from the member countries with a view to having
widespread representation in the staff. The staff works under the direction
and supervision of the Managing Director, who has the power (subject to
the control of the Executive Board), for the organization, appointment,
and dismissal of the staff of the Fund326. They implement the day-to-day
decisions and policy directives of the Fund. The fact that most of them are
international civil servants provides the Fund with a rich variety of
expertise to harness within the system.327

•
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------s.
3~~U1, whose five year tenn began on June 7, 2004.
325 Footnote 114 and 115, supra; IMF SURVEY, September, 1995, supra.
As of2005, the IMF staff is comprised of approximately 2,700 members drawn from 141 countries.
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Q!LOTA SYSTEM

Central in the organizational structure of the Fund is the quota system. 328
Article III, section 1, of the IMF Articles of Agreement provides as follows:
"Each member shall be assigned a quota expressed in special
drawing rights. The quotas of the members represented at the
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference which accept
membership before December 31, 1945, shall be those set forth in
Schedule A. The quotas of other members shall be determined by
the Board of Governors. The subscription of each member shall
be equal to its quota and shall be paid in full to the Fund at the
appropriate depository."

Under the system, each member of the IMF is assigned a quota, expressed
in SDRs, which is equal to its subscription in the IMF. The quota is
intended to reflect the size of the member's economy relative to the

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------~;6 Art~cle XII, section 4 (b).

3/ ArtlCle XII, section 4, © and (d).
8 On December 27, 1945, the Articles of Agreement of the Fund entered into force upon signature by 29
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economy of other members. The quota is a good reflection of a member's
maximum financial commitment to the Fund329, its voting power330, as
well as its access to the Fund's resources.331 The voting strength is
calculated based upon I vote for each SDR 100, 000 of its quota, plus the
250 basic votes to which each member is entitled. Further, the quota also
determines a member's maximum access to the financial resources of the
IMF, as well as its share in allocations ofSDRs by the IMF. A member is
generally required to pay up to 25 percent of its quota in SDRs or in
currencies of other members specified by the IMF, with the concurrence
of the issuers; it pays the remainder in its own currency.

Until the early 1960s, the initial quotas of the original members of the IMF
were based upon what was generally termed the Bretton Woods formula.332
This formula was a combination of some basic variables as an average of
governments, representing 80 percent of original quotas.
329 As of June, 2006, Nigeria had a total quota of 1,753.2(Millions) SDRs corresponding to a total number of votes
of~7,782; Brazil had a total quota of3,036.1(Millions) SDRs corresponding to a total number of votes of30,6l1;
while Korea had a total quota of 1,633.6(Millions) SDRs corresponding to a total number of votes of 16,586. For
~o~e details on the quotas and voting powers, see http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/memdir/members.htm. last
VIsIted June 12,2006.
330 ibid

~~1

By the end of March 2006, the total quotas of the IMF were SDR 213 billion, which translates to about u.s.
08 billion.
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annual import and export flows, gold holdings and dollar balances, and
national income. In 1963, the Bretton Woods formula was revised and a
number of other quota formulas wereintroduced.333 These formulas
employed the economic data of the Bretton Woods formula, but included
parallel calculations that employed current account transactions and the
variability of current receipts in place of data on exports and imports.

In 1980, the quota formulas were further revised with hopes of simplifying
the procedure for calculating quotas and improving the quality of the
economic data used in the formulas. Consequently, GDP replaced national
income; a broader measure of official reserves was employed; and
calculations used data on current account transactions, rather than trade data
on imports and exports.334

•
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~32 Article III, section 1 of the IMF Articles of Agreement.
3~ It is noteworthy to emphasize that the exercise of quota review is undertaken by the Executive Board after

;3hich
they make their recommendations to the Board of Governors.
4 Ibid
152

Today, when a country applies for IMF membership,335 the IMF staff
calculates a quota for the new member and compares it with the quotas of
existing members of similar economic size and characteristics. The staff then
suggests an initial quota or quota range in a paper prepared for the
consideration of a committee of the Executive Board. If the country agrees to
the terms and conditions of membership - including the amount of the initial
quota - proposed by the committee, the full Executive Board considers the
committee's recommendations. If the Board approves the recommendations,
the Board forwards a proposed membership resolution to the IMF's Board of
Governors. After the membership resolution is approved by the Board of
Governors, and appropriate domestic legal and procedural steps are
completed, a representative of the country signs the Articles of Agreement, at
which time the country becomes a member.

From the foregoing, we can appreciate the vital role that the quota system
plays in the Fund as both a determinant of the power structure as well as in
---------------------------------

335 Article II of the Articles of Agreement covers membership status. While section 1 deals with the "original
members", i.e. those members represented at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference and who
accepted membership before December 31, 1945, section 2, deals with "other members." See also Article III, section
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the accessibility to the resources of the Fund. The voting structure of the
Fund is weighted by the quota system, and consequently, the voting power of
the members, particularly, the developing countries, rests on their quota
system in the Fund. Furthermore, the amount of resources a member can
draw from the Fund is predicated upon the size of the member's quota.
Consequently, the voting power as well as the amount of resources available
to the members, particularly, the developing countries, are determined by
their limited share of the quota system. Yet, the formula that the Fund applies
in the creation and management of the quota system takes little recognition of
theexport instability, structural imbalance or dependence on imported inputs
which is the bane of many developing countries.

In light of the foregoing policies and practices, it is no wonder that the
developing countries tend to blame the Fund, to a large extent, for
aggravating their adjustment problems.336 In addition to the point earlier
made that the Fund has treated the balance of payments objective as
overriding and thus has shown insensitivity to other government objectives,

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

;' Whic~ empowers the Board of Governors to allocate the quotas of other inembers in line with Article II, section 2.
b36 Thls may explain the unpopularity ofthe Fund and the World Bank in the developing countries where they are
oth perceived as agents of oppression rather than partners in development.
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thethrust of the Fund's adju stment programs has been to focus more on
reducing demand than on stimulating supply.337

Developing countries, we have shown, lack the voting powers under the
Fund's quota system. They also lack the accessibility to the resources of the
. Fund commensurate to their pressing economic and financial needs. In order
to access additional financial resources within the Fund, they must agree to
very burdensome terms and conditions which are imposed by the Executive
Board. In light of the fact that developing countries have little or no
alternatives in the face of pressing financial and economic difficulties, they
reluctantly accept such burdensome terms and conditions. According to one
commentator, in so doing, developing countries do not just borrow money

from the Fund (and other IFIs); they effectively mortgage the future of their
.citizens. 33 8

•
---------------------------

337 This practice, no doubt, contravenes one of the principal objectives of the Fund which is the facilitation of the
:pansion of international trade (italics mine). One wonders how the Fund intends to expand international trade by
Iscouraging demand.
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Q!lQ.TA REVIEWS

On August 1, 1995, membership of the Fund comprised of 179 countries,
with a total quota of SDR 144.9 billion. Currently,339 the Fund's
membership stands at 184 countries, with total quotas of SDR 213 billion.
Why the demand for a continuous review of the quota formula?

The importance of a continuous review of the quota formula is very critical

for the following reasons:
1.

A general quota review provides the opportunity for the Fund to
assess the adequacy of the total quota package with regard to the
members' balance of payments financing needs, as well as the
Fund's ability to meet those needs.

2.

A general review provides the Fund the opportunity to reflect any
changes in a member's new position in the world economy. 340

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------:~8

See Susan George, A Fate Worse than Debt (New York: Grove Press, 1988), at 155, where she posited that,

3~ebted countries h~ve not just borrowed money - they have mort~~ged the future. Nature puts up the collateral."
.

See h!!p://www.lmf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm. last vIsIted June 12,2006
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Although the Board of Governors approves the recommendations of the
Executive Board on a quota review, such approval must receive the final
approval of 85 percent majority of the membership. In the approval of a
quota review by the Board of Governors, such approval must pass two litmus
tests: the size of an overall increase and the distribution of the increase
among the members.341 The Board has authorized thus far, Thirteen General
Review of the quota formula.342 Such review exercise is carried out in
regular intervals of five years, except the review that was carried out between
1958 and 1959. Not all the reviews have resulted in quota increases.343
The size of a member's quota within the Fund is very critical for a number of
reasons. According to Sir Gold,344 "both the absolute and the relative size of
a quota are of central importance in a member's relations with the IMF. For
example, a member's subscription to the IMF's general resources is equal to
its quota; voting power is based largely on quota; the rate of allocations of
3~O Outside a general review, the Fund can embark upon ad-hoc quota review. In 2001, the Fund granted China a

~gher qu?ta after it resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong.

41 The Importance of these two criteria is ostensibly to first ensure that the increase meets the present financial
~eeds of the members, and secondly, to ensure equitable distribution in line with pre-existing formula.
042 After the conclusion of the Twelfth General Review on January 30,2003, the Board authorized the Thirteenth
3;neral Review which is expected to be completed by January 30, 2008.
3 Apart from the exceptional review of 1958/59, of all Twelve reviews already concluded, increases have been
~~proved on seven occasions. Those increases occurred during the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and
eventh General Reviews.
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SDRs is proportionate to quotas; and access to the general resources is
usually defined in terms of quota."

SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS (SDRs)

The Fund created the Special Drawing Right (SDR), to serve as an
international reserve asset, as well as to supplement the existing official
reserves of member countries.345 At the time of SDR creation, the two key
reserve assets for international transactions were gold and theU.S. dollar.
However, those two proved inadequate to meet the increasing needs arising
from the expansion of world trade and financial developments. Consequently,
the IMF intended to fulfill the need by creating another international reserve
asset in the SDR. Upon creation, the Fund allocated SDRs to member
countries in proportion to their already established IMF quotas. Each
member's SDR corresponded to the member's quota ratio. Another important
feature of the SDR was that it became the unit of account of the IMF and

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------~~

See Gold, supra, note 289, p. xxviii
5 The IMF Board of Govemors approved the plan to establish special drawing rights (SDRs), on September 29,
1967.
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some other international organizations. From the creation of the SDR in 1967
until the early 1970s, the Fund applied the SDRs as its unit for calculating
transactions.

Sometime in the early 1970s, the Bretton Woods system collapsed346,
occasioning the ineffectiveness of the SDR. Although the Fund has been
working hard to restore the viability of the SDR as a credible reserve asset,
presently, the SDR maintains limited use as a reserve asset. What is left intact
of the SDR is the use as the unit of account of the IMF and some other
international organizations.

Under the IMF system, however, a member may be allocated SDRs in
proportion to their IMF quotas. There are two kinds of-allocations:

1. The General Allocations, which are based on a long-term global need to
Supplement existing reserve assets. Generally, such allocations are considered

i-------------------------

46 As a result of the collapse, on August 15, 1971, the United States government informed the IMF that it will no
Onger freely buy and sell gold to settle international transactions, thus signaling the beginning of the floating
ex.change regime. For further reading see, Wilson E Schmidt, "The Night We Floated," International Institute for
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every five years, but not automatically approved every five years.
2. The Special One-time Allocation, which is based on the need to correct or
remedy an anomalous situation or emergency.347

III

CURRENT TELEOLOGICAL APPLICATION OF THE FUND'S

ARTICLES

The Articles of the Fund, like other constitutive instruments, are products of
constitutive treaties.348 Such treaties deserve special interpretative approach
quite dissimilar to the constitutional interpretation applied to national
constitutions.349 This position, which has gained currency, was articulated

by Judge Spencer in his separate opinion in the advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice in Certain expenses of the United Nations,
1962. According to Judge Spencer,350
"In the interpretation of a multilateral treaty such as the Charter which

•
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

~onOmic Research, Original Paper 9, October 1977 .
.;7 The IMF's Board of Govemors approved a special one-time allocation ofSDRs in September 1997 to correct
34e fact that countries that joined the IMF subsequent to 1981, have not received an SDR allocation.
8 GOld, Supra, note 337, p. 407
349 Ibid

See Certain expenses o/the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, o/the Charter), Advisory Opinion 0/20
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establishes a permanent international mechanism or organization to
accomplish certain stated purposes there are particular considerations to
which regard should, I think, be had. Its provisions were of necessity
expressed in broad and general terms. It attempts to provide against the
unknown, the unforeseen and, indeed, the unforeseeable. Its text reveals that
it was intended - subject to such amendments as might from time to time be
made to it - to endure, at least it was hoped it would endure, for all time. It
was intended to apply to varying conditions in a changing and evolving
world community and to a multiplicity of unpredictable situations and events.

Its provisions were intended to adjust themselves to the ever changing pattern
of international existence. It established international machinery to
accomplish its stated purposes.
It may with confidence be asserted that its particular provisions should
receive a broad and liberal interpretation unless the context of any particular
provision requires, or there is to be found elsewhere in the Charter,
something to compel a narrower and restricted interpretation. The stated
PUrposes of the Charter should be the prime considerations in interpreting its

---------------------------------------------jUly 1962, Ie] Reports 1962, p. 151, at p. 185
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text."

From the above statement, the learned Judge encourages the interpreters of
any constitutive treaties to be solely guided in the process by the stated
purposes of the Charter while applying "a broad' and liberal interpretation"
unless mandated to apply "a narrower and restricted interpretation."3 51
. Earlier in this chapter,352 we noted that the Fund appears to be guided in the
interpretation of its Articles according to its different stages of
dvdopment. 353 Pursuant to that objective, the Fund employs three main
strategies that serve it well both in terms of creativity as well as flexibility.
The strategies are commonly characterized as follows:354
1. RegulatoryIS urveillance
According to Sir Gold, regulatory powers are those exercised by the Fund to
approve or disapprove certain measures applied or contemplated by member

•
------------------------------------351 Ibid

;52 SUpra, footnote 253.
3;3 Supra, footnotes 254 - 257.
~ The ~lassification of the modus operandi of the Fund as strategies is my own creation and does not reflect the
ternunology. Neither are these strategies listed in the order of importance. The Fund may apply one of the
S:tegies at a time or a combination of the three pursuant to their goal. Infact, Sir Joseph Gold classified these
S tegies as the three main areas that the Fund exercises its jurisdiction. See Gold, supra
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countries.355Under the regulatory/surveillance strategy, the Fund provides
member-countries regular policy advice. In the same process, the Fund
conducts, once a year, a comprehensive assessment of each country's
economic situation.356 From these assessments, the Fund publishes twice a
year the comprehensive report in the WorId Economic Outlook and the
Global Financial Stability Report.
2. Technical!Advisory Assistance
Under the technical or advisory assistance and training strategy, the Fund
offers these services to member countries free of charge. Such assistance and
training are offered in a variety of fields like fiscal policy, monetary and
exchange rate policies, banking and financial system supervision and
regulation, statistics, etc.357
3. Financial/Lending
Under the lending or financial strategy, the Fund offers member-countries the
financial lifeline to facilitate their recovery from adverse economic and
financial situations. In the same process, the Fund imposes the terms and

-----------------------355 Gold, supra.
356 Ibid.
357 IMF Articles, Article V section 2 (b), see also Gold, supra, pp 422-423.
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conditions for such use.358A pre-condition for the Fund's loan is that the
affected country will obligate itself to a specified policy program designed
and monitored by the Fund.359 The IMF lending activities are generally
conducted under two principal programs: (1) the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF) program, (2) and the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries Initiative (HIP e) program.360

Although a literal reading of the Fund's Articles of Agreement will indicate
an emphasis on the promotion of international monetary cooperation,
facilitation of the expansion of international trade, promotion of exchange
stability, etc., through such operational strategies as surveillance, technical
assistance, and lending; however, from the Fund's current teleological
approach to the interpretation of its Articles, it would seem that the Fund is
relegating these listed objectives to the background in preference to the
restoration of payments equilibrium objective. In the opinion of one

•
--------------------------------358 The popular term in the context of the Fund's activities is the conditionalities.
359 Such policy programs may take a variety offorms including the austerity measures, structural adjustment
~rograms, devaluation of currencies, severe compression of real wages, privatization, higher interest rates, etc.
60 There are currently 18 countries in this category of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), owing
approximately US 50 billion dollars. Most of those countries are in Africa.
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commentator,36l "the Fund would appear to have treated these objectives as
secondary to the restoration of payments equilibrium and has tended to
neglect the potentially negative impact of its programs on the "primary
objective" set out in the Articles of Agreement." But given the current stage
of the Fund's development as an institution, coupled with the increased and
more demanding roles on its limited human and material resources, the Fund
may be reacting to the more pressing global challenge of payments
disequilibrium. And in so doing, the Fund may have unwittingly relegated the
"original primary objectives" to the background and replaced them with the
current and more pressing objective of restoration of payments equilibrium.
In the same vein, the Fund has also relegated to the background another
primary objective, which is, the provision of balance-of-payments finance for
members experiencing temporary financial and budgetary constraints. Such
finance was anticipated to reduce the risk that imports would be cut in
circumstances where they need not and should not be cut, and would thus
Contribute to the maintenance of both domestic and global employment and
Income. However, the conditions stipulated by the Fund before members can

--------------------------

361 Sanusi, 1.0., "African Economic Disequilibria and the International Monetary System, "papers presented at a

165

•

access the financing facility have negated the interventionist role that the
Fund was intended to serve. Again, the Fund has attempted to justify its new
attitude by pointing out that its financing resources are limited while the
droand for them is in the increase.

IV

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND

DEVELOPMENT (WORLD BANK)

The World Bank, we stated earlier, was one of the tripartite creations of the
Bretton Woods Conference362. Article I of the Articles of Agreement,
363specifically states that the primary purpose for the creation of the Bank
was to assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members

by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes as well as the
restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war. 364(italics mine)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------;YmPOsiumheld in Nairobi, Kenya, May l3-15, 1985.
6~ See the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, 1945, supra. Also, see Article II, section l(a)
;hiCh st~tes as follows: "The original members ofthe Bank. shall be those members of the International Monetary
3und WhICh accept membership in the Bank. before the date specified in Article XI, section 2(e)."
U63 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank. for Reconstruction and Development, December 27, 1945,2
.N.T.S. 134, hereinafter referred to as IBRD Articles of Agreement. It is noteworthy that of all 45 original member
~ountries signatories to the Articles, only 4 were from Africa, namely, Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and then Union of
Outh Africa
364 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article I (i).
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Contrary to the position of Sir Joseph Gold that "the original Articles were
drafted without express differentiation between developed and developing
,countries, and without acceptance of the idea that the promotion of
development was a purpose of the IMF,"365 a careful reading of Article I of
the Bank's Articles would suggest that the Article charges the Bank with the
responsibility of accomplishing two major objectives. The first component of
the responsibility consists of the 'facilitation of investment of capital for
productive purposes" in the territories of members. The second component,

however, limits the Bank to the narrower pool of "restoration of the
economies destroyed or disrupted by war. " Thus, a literal interpretation of

the mandate of the Article would imply that while the Bank is charged with
the responsibility of serving the entire members under the first component of
Article 1, the second component limits the Bank to the service of only
member countries "destroyed or disrupted by war." Thus, from a literal
Interpretation and application of Article 1, one can argue that developing

•
Countries were included in the first component of the Article, while the
-------------------------------------

~s ,Se,e Gold, supra, Although Sir Gold was writing specifically about the Articles of the Fund in this context, given
Fe SlllUlarity of both the Articles of the Fund and the Bank, one can safely apply that comment in this context.
Urther, the similarity extends to membership, whereby a condition for membership in the World Bank is
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second component excluded most of the developing countries. The
justification for this assertion may be anchored on the fact that many
developing countries were not principal actors in World War II, and
consequently, were minimally impacted by the war.366 Since the second
component of Article 1 specifically covers only member countries "destroyed
or disrupted by war", it could be argued that developing countries lack any
legal basis to claim for assistance under this component of the Article.367
Because they were not in the consideration of the framers of thatsecond
component of the provision, they were thus excluded from the benefits of that
purpose.368 But such a narrow interpretation will deprive, as it has been
depriving developing countries, the opportunity to jump start their
development with the active support and encouragement of the IFIs,
particularly, the World Bank. Moreso, since the Bank and indeed the West
created extra-ordinary interventionist policies and measures369 to jump start

membership in the IMF. (IBRD Article II, section 1).
366 See footnotes 165, 166 and 241, supra.
367 Ibid.

•

~68 A good example of the extra efforts to boost private investment to the war-devastated Europe after World War
11, the U.S. government included in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, ch.169, paragraph 111 (b) (3), 62 Stat.
th44 (1948),. a system for guaranteeing U.S. private investments in Western European countries against restrictions on
3 e conversIOn of currencies. See Shihata Ibrahim, MIGA and Foreign Investment, 1988, p.SS.
69 Ibid, refer also to the Marshall Plan and other extra-ordinary policies geared towards accelerating the economic
reCOvery of Europe after the war.
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the economies of the European countries destroyed by war, one would expect
such treatment for the developing countries in light of their present situation
which is as bad as any war situation.370
Furthermore, central to the Bank's mandate was for the Bank to stimulate and
support foreign investment, which had declined significantly prior to and
after WorId War II371. The idea of foreign investment from the narrow
perspective of the founders of the W orId Bank covers primarily investment
flowing from developed countries to developing countries for the sole
purpose of profit maximization by the investing developed country firms. It
may also include investment from the economies of former colonial masters
to that of the former colonies.
On the contrary, the anticipated flow of investment did not envisage flow of
investment from the developing country firms to the developed country
firms. Neither did it envisage flow of investment from the economies of the
former colonies to that of the former colonial masters. Indeed, the proposed

-----------------------------------370 Unfortunately, the West has not responded enthusiastically to the calls for a formulation of an African Marshall
Plan or developing countries recovery plan. Other related calls for total and unconditional debt relief or forgiveness
have not yielded tangible results.
371 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article I (ii).
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flow of investment, based on the classical theory372 on foreign investment,
reflects the Euro-American centric view of foreign direct investment. The
opposing view, however, based on the dependency theory373, highlights the
concerns of this author as well as most developing countries that the central
idea behind foreign direct investment is a system that creates permanent
dependency on the part of the host country in a foreign direct investment
relationship, notably, the developing countries.374 These objectives, no
doubt, lend credence to my contention that the Bank was created, ipso facto,
to serve the limited interests of the founding states, which were Euro-

372 The classical economic theory on foreign investment is premised on the assumption that it mostly benefits the
host state, typically, the developing country. This assumption is based on the following factors: (a) the foreign capital
brought into the host state guarantees that domestic capital that could otherwise be applied for that use is applied to
other public use (b) foreign investment brings technology into the host state (c) employment is also created by the
foreign investor (d) skills employed by the foreign investor will be transferred to the nationals employed in the
enterprise (e) infrastructural facilities built either by the foreign investor or the host government benefits the general
public. See Sornarajah, M, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 1994, pp 38 & 39.
373 The dependency theory, on the contrary, is totally opposed to the classical theory and asserts that foreign
investni~nt does not ensure sustained economic development in the host state. The argument is based on the
contention that most foreign investments are driven by multinational corporations based in the developed countries.
The multinationals, therefore, embark upon foreign investments driven by a global policy intended to primarily
benefit the parent company and its shareholders in the home country. Consequently, the home countries become the
central economies of the world, while the host states (developing countries) become subservient or peripheral
e~onornies serving the interests of the central economies of the home states of the multinationals. Under the
CIrcumstances, the host countries can not develop unless they break the link with the home countries that design the
foreign investment agenda. For further reading, see Sornarajah, M, supra, p. 43. See also R. Peet, Global Capitalism:
Theories of Social Development (1991) pp. 43-51; B. Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds (1988) pp.
12-14; P. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil (1979);
TJ. Biersteker, Multinationals, the State and the Control of the Nigerian Economy (1987). See also Samir Amin,
Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formation of Peripheral Capitalism (1976) as well as D. Bennett
andK, Sharpe, Transnational Corporations versus the State (1985). For a contrasting view on how communist states
~ff~ctivelY control the activities of the multinationals, see M.M. Pearson, Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of
hma: The Control of Foreign Direct Investment under Socialism, 1991, pp 14-19.
374 ibid
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American states. The Bank ,has over the years insisted that it serves equally
both the developed and the developing member states by a strict application
ofthe teleological approach to the interpretation of its Articles.

The Articles of the W orId Bank, just like that of the Fund, encourage a
teleological technique in its interpretation.375 Accordingly, Article 1 of the
Bank's charter376 provides as follows:

"The Bank shall be guided in all its decisions by the purposes set forth

abave. "
However, the same dilemma faced by the interpreters of the Articles of the
Fund confronts the interpreters of the Articles of the Bank. 3 77 The reason
lies in the major components of a teleological technique which includes the
demand for expert knowledge of the history and development of the
organization's purposes, its subordinate law, as well as the capability to
respond to changing circumstances.378 We shall coverthese challenges in
Olore details later; however, in the meantime let us review the
-------------~---------

375 See footnotes 246 & 248, supra.
376 See footnote 298, supra.
377 Footnote 301, supra
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organizational/institutional framework of the World Bank.

-

GOVERNING STRUCTURE

The institutional framework of the Bank is contained in Article V of the
Bank's constitution, which is otherwise called the "Organization and
Management Article." 379This Article V is similar to the Fund's Articles XII
and XIII. 380

In order of priority, the Articles provide for the following organs:

1) The Board of Governors

The Board of Governors,3 81 like that of the Fund, consists of one
Governor and one alternate Governor appointed by each member country.
The two Boards meet in joint session once a year.

------------------------------------------------378 ibid
379 lBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 1.
380 IMF Articles of Agreement, supra.
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The Board of Governors is the highest authority of the Bank.382 Its
powers include the admission of new members, increase or decrease of the
capital stock of the Bank, suspension of a member, determination of the
remuneration of directors, and other reserved functions.383

2) The Executive Directors

Like the Fund, the Board of Governors delegates the daily operatiol). of the
Bank to the Executive Directors. 384 However, the Board may not
delegate to the Executive Directors the powers specifically enumerated in
Article V Section 2 (b) (i) - (vii). 385The Articles of the Bank provided
for twelve Executive Directors in the following categories:

381
382
383
384

IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 2 (a).
Ibid.
IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 2(b).
Supra, footnotes 154 and 155.
38~ Such reserved powers of the Board include the power to admit new members and determine the conditions of
!herr admission; increase or decrease the capital stock; suspend a member; decide appeals from interpretations of the
Agreement given by the Executive Directors; arrangements to cooperate with other international organizations;
~~~ne~t suspension of the operation of the Bank and the distribution of its assets; and determination of the
stributlOn of the net income of the Bank.
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i)

five shall be appointed, one by each of the five members
having the largest number of shares;

ii)

seven shall be elected ........... by all the Governors other than
those appointed by the five members ........ 386

The Board of Governors may, by a four-fifths majority of the total voting
power, increase the total number of directors by increasing the number of
directors to be elected. 387The Executive Directors and their alternates are
appointed or elected for two-year terms. Further, they shall function in
continuous session at the principal office of the Bank and shall meet as often
as the business of the Bank may require.388 They are also empowered to
appoint such committees as they deem advisable. Such committee
membership need not be limited to governors, directors or their
altemates.389

•
--------------------------------386 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 4(b).
387 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, Section 4, (b) (i) and (ii), see particularly the interpretation paragraph
at the end of sub section (b) (ii).
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3) The President

The President of the Bank shall be the chief executive officer,
"responsible for the organization, appointment and dismissal of the
officers and staff, subject to the general control of the Executive
Directors."390 In the recruitment of staff, the President must be
influenced chiefly by the "paramount importance of securing the highest
standards of efficiency and of technical competence" and also, "pay due
regard to the importance of recruiting personnel on as wide a
geographical basis as possible. "391

4) The Staff

The President is the "chief of the operating staff of the Bank and shall
conduct, under the direction of the Executive Directors, the ordinary

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------388
389
390
391

IBRD Articles
IBRD Articles
IBRD Articles
IBRD Articles

of Agreement,
of Agreement,
of Agreement,
of Agreement,

Article V,
Article V,
Article V,
Article V,

section 4(e).
section 4 (i).
section 5(b) ..
section 5(d).
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business of the Bank." 392This power extends to the organization,
appointment and dismissal of the officers and staff of the Bank, subject to
the general control of the Executive Directors. 393 In staff selection and
recruitment, thePresident's goal is to "secure the highest standards of
efficiency and of technical competence," while at the same time aiming to
hire from a pool that covers "as wide a geographical basis as
possible."394

Further, the President and the staff enjoy international duty status in the
discharge of their official duties to the Bank. While they are expected to
owe their duty entirely to the Bank and to no other authority, each member
of the Bank is expected to "refrain from all attempts to influence any of
them in the discharge of their duties."395 .

The World Bank Group is comprised of five organizations as follows: the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the

------------------------

~~2 Currently, the World Bank staff strength is around 9,300 working out ofW~~hington and other country offices.
3 e lmp://web. worldbank.org/WB SITE/EXTERNAL/EXT ABOUTUS/O, last VIsIted August 17, 2005.
93 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article Y, section 5 (b), supra
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International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance
Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),
and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
The World Bank Group can be further classified into the implementation
. group and the service group. The implementation group consists of the IBRD
and the IDA, while the service group consists of the IFC, the MIGA, and the
ICSID. While the IBRD focuses on middle income and creditworthy poor
countries, the IDA focuses primarily on the poorest countries in the world.
Both organizations, however, are serviced by the combined efforts of the
IFC, the MIGA, and the ICSID.396

•
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------394 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 5 (d).
95 IBRD, Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 5(c).
96 For further reading on the World Bank Group and the relationship of each organization to one another, refer to

i
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V

CURRENT TELEOLOGICAL APPLICATION OF THE BANK'S

-ARTICLES
Under the section covering the IMF above, we enumerated the generally
accepted approach to a teleological interpretation of the Articles of any
organization. Such approach, we stated, "calls for an expert knowledge of the
history and development of the organization's purposes as expressed in its
Articles and its subordinate law and as capable of response to changing
circumstances."397 Indeed, the Articles of the Bank, just like that of the
Fund, not only justify but direct observance of a teleological approach to the
interpretation of the Articles.398
Consequently, Article I of the Bank's charter399 provides that:
"The Bank shall be guided in all its decisions by the purposes set forth
above."
However, as in the analysis under the Fund above, the application of the

•
teleological approach to interpretation within the Bank is hampered by such

--------------------------------------------------------------------------~~: II web.worldbank.orgIWBSITE/EXTERNALlEXTABOUTUS/O, last visited July 3,2006.

7 See Gold, supra
398 Ibid.
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challenges as the lack of expert knowledge in the history and development of
the Bank. The high turnover rate of the staff and the Executive Directors
hinder the accumulation and preservation of institutional memory for easy
access and application by other employees who may be relatively new in the
Bank. Compounding this situation is the conflicting provisions of the Bank's
Articles of Agreement400 in some respects. For instance, the Articles created
an ambiguous situation by assigning to the Board the responsibility for "the
general operations" of the BankAO 1 In the same vein, the Articles mandate
the President to conduct its "ordinary business" under the "general control"

of the BoardA02 The Bank has, however, attempted to clarify these roles in
the First Annual Report of the Bank which was issued in September 1946. In
that report, the Bank clarified the roles as follows:
"Matters of policy determination are the responsibility of the Executive
Directors, while operational, administrative and organizational questions are

399 Footnote 311, supra. The Articles of the World Bank or IBRD is also referred to as the Bank's charter or
Constituent instrument.
400 See IBRD Articles of Agreement at arts. V (4) (a) and 5(b). See also IFC Articles of Agreement, May 25,1955,
264 U.N.T.S. 117, at arts IV(4)(a) and 5(b); IDA Articles of Agreement, January 26,1960,439 U.N.T.S. 249, at
arts. IV (4) (a) and 5(b).
401 Ibid
402. Ibid. Although Article V(5)(b) of the IBRD Articles of Agreement mandates the President to conduct the
~rdlUary business of the Bank "under the general direction of the Executive Directors", it is important to note that
oth "direction" and "control" were used interchangeably in the section.
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the responsibility of the President, subject to the general direction and control
of the Executive Directors."403
According to Dr. Shihata, notwithstanding the effort of the Bank to clarify
the ambiguity in roles, the Bank's first President resigned in December 1946
after six months in office.404 In another attempt to further clarify the roles,
the Bank's Board in 1947 adopted a "Memorandum with Regard to
Organization and Loan Procedure"405. By the time the Memorandum was
last revised in 1956, the Board was specifically charged as being "responsible
for the decision of all matters of policy" which is inclusive of loan
approvals.406 On the contrary, the management was charged as being
"responsible for developing recommendations on all matters of policy
requiring decisions by the Executive Directors."407

From the foregoing, one can appreciate the difficulty within the Bank in its
attempt to teleologically interpret the Articles of Agreement with respect to
the roles designed for each office within the Bank. As a result, roles have
-----------------------------------403 IBRD, First Annual Report by the Executive Directors (1946)
404 See Mason and Asher, The World Bank since Bretton Woods, p. 41-42, 46-48 (1973).
405 IBRD Doc. R-106, June 4,1947.
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clashed or overlapped as a result of mis-interpretation by the officers
involved. This challenge becomes more apparent in the on-going efforts of
the Bank to apply a teleological approach to the interpretation of the various
provisions of its Articles. Notwithstanding these challenges, the Bank must
continue to strive to interpret its Articles teleologically whether in respect to
the different roles of the various offices or in respect to the various policies
and practices that it embarks upon pursuant to its responsibilities.

VI

GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARRIFS AND TRADE (GATT)

GATT is not a single agreement, but is comprised of over two hundred

agreements, protocols, process-verbaux, etcA08 The protocols are products
of amendments to the text of the general articles, as well as corrections or
revisions of the tariff schedules. In addition, special "side agreements" were
completed, dealing with obligations on certain subjects, but applicable only
to the signatories of the side agreements.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------406 lBRD Doc. R-106!8, September 14,1956.
407 Ibid
408 Jackson, J.H., Jean-Victor Louis & Mitsuo Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo Round: National Constitutions
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The basic trade policy commitments of the contracting parties of GATT are
contained in the "General Articles" of the General Agreement. 409And the
General Agreement, which includes the detailed commitments on tariffs that
comprise the "Tariff Schedules," fills many volumes of treaty text. The
General Articles, which is thirty-eight in number, also covers seventy pages
of text. They contain a number of detailed rules and obligations, which
admonish nations not to pursue "beggar-thy-neighbor", trade policies, which

will be counter-productive if practiced by all the contracting nations.
From the previous chapters, we have shown that GATT was a product of
badly compromised diplomacy. Consequently, GATT suffered what has been
rightly characterized as "birth defects."41 0 The result was a cumbersome
system that lacked the organizational structure to be efficient in the arena of
international trade and commerce. 411 As a matter of fact, intemationallaw
did not recognize GATT as an organization. The implication is reflected in
the fact that signatories to GATT are not identified as "members" as is the

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------and Intemational Economic Rules 1-2, (1984).
09 See the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1947. The Agreement was signed on 30 October
,,947 by 23 contracting parties. The tariff concessions, however, came into effect on 30 June 1948 through a
4Protocol of Provisional Application".
10 Footnote 179, supra.
411 As we noted earlier, the ITO was designed to serve as the organizational structure that will implement the

1
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, case in other international organizations, but are called "contracting
parties" 412

GOVERNING STRUCTURE

As a consequence of the demise of the ITO, 413 the GATT lacked the
complementary institution for implernentation. Further, since the GATT was
never intended to serve as an organization, it also lacked the requisite
institutional framework for its self implementation. But the GATT had made
a provision for the convening of its first meeting. Under this provision, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations is mandated to convene the first
meeting of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, no later than March 1, 1948.414
Apart from the convening of the first meeting by the UN Secretary General,
the GATT apparently created the office of an Executive Secretary. The

GATT obligations. However, when in 1950 the United States government announced that it would not seek
Congressional ratification of the Havana Charter (which created the ITO); it signaled the demise of the ITO.
412 See http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/whatis-e/whatis-e.htm. last visited June 19,2006. For comparison, see
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994 at
lltmJL~.wto.org/englishidocs e/legal e/ursum e.htm, last visited June 20, 2006.
413 Footnote 170
:14 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XXV (2). See also
~WWw.wto.org/englishidocse/legale/gatt4701e.htm. last visited June 20, 2006.
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Executive Secretary was to serve as the head of the GATT secretariat. 415
Under Article XXVI, 416 each contracting party accepting the Agreement

was expected to deposit an instrument of acceptance with the Executive
Secretary. The Executive Secretary will, thereafter, inform all the parties of
the date of deposit and of the day on which the Agreement enters into force
under paragraph 6 of this Article. 417

GATT OBLIGATIONS

At the heart of the GATT obligations is the Article II, dealing with tariff
schedules. The Article comprises detailed commitments by each country to
limit tariffs418 on particular items by the amount negotiated and specified in
its tariff schedule. The other GATT obligations, however, are designed to act
415 FOllowing the tradition of continuity from GATT to WTO, the secretariat still remains in Geneva, Switzerland.
416 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XXVI, (4). See also,
http:www.wto.org/Eng1ishidocs_e/1egate/gatt47_02_e.htm. last visited June 20, 2006.
417 It is important to note that by the decision of the 23 Contracting Parties on March 1965, the title of the head of
the GATT secretariat was changed from "Executive Secretary" to "Director-General". The first GATT DirectorGeneral was Eric Wyndham-White (1948-1968) from UK, while the current Director-General is Pascal Lamy (2005present), from France.
.
:18 Tariffs are taxes on imported goods. The logic is that by the imposition of such taxes, the imported goods will
e~ome more expensive than the locally manufactured goods; c0l!sequently, it will serve as a deterrent to importers
. while protecting domestic producers. Such taxes can be applied ad valorem, specific, or by compound formula. Ad
valorem duty is levied as a percentage of the invoice value of imported goods. Specific duty is levied as a fixed sum
On a physical unit of an imported good, while Compound duty is levied as a combination of specific and ad valorem
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as a counter-balance to the basic tariff obligation by ensuring that nations do
not evade tariff obligations by the use of other non-tariff barriers419 that
would negatively affect imports. These obligations, nevertheless, provide an
exception in Article I, which comprise the "Most Favored Nation" clause

(MFN). The MFN clause is the principal clause, and it provides in part as
follows: "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting
parties)l20

Another important GATT obligation is the national treatment obligation,
which is contained in Article III. Sub paragraph 2 of that Article states as
follows: "The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or

•
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------duties. See also Ball, McCulloch, Jr, Frantz, Geringer & Minor, International Business: The Challenge of Global
Competition, 10th ed, 96.
419 Other non-tariff barriers may not involve monetary measures, but may include other bureaucratic bottlenecks
that are classified as quantitative and nonquantitative barriers. Such quantitative barriers include quotas, voluntary
eXpOrt restraints (VERS), and orderly marketing arrangements. Nonquantitative barriers include direct government
partiCipation in trade, customs and other administrative procedures and standards. Again, the logic is that such
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indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products."421
It is worthy of note that in addition to the obligations, the General Agreement

contains several exceptions.

GATT EXCEPTIONS

Some of GATT exceptions include the following:

1. Article XII, which provides for Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance
of Payments, creates an exception when a contracting party intends to
safeguard its external financial position and balance of payments.422
2. XIII, which provides for Non-discriminatory Administration of
Quantitative Restrictions, creates an exception in the application of
prohibition or restriction on imports.423
3. XIV, which provides for Exceptions to the Rule of Non-discrimination,

--------------------------------------------bottlenecks will discourage imports without imposing any monetary fines.

:20 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article I (1).
/1 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article III (2).
22 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XII (1, 2, (a)).
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creates many exceptions to the non-discrimination rule.424
4. Article XIX, which provides for Emergency Action on Imports of
Particular Products, creates an exception where imports are causing or
threatening serious injury to domestic producers.425
5. Article XX, which provides for General Exceptions, creates many
exceptions ranging from the protection of the public morals to the
acquisition or distribution of products in local supply.426
6. XXI, which provides for Security Exceptions, create exceptions for the
protection of a contracting party's "essential security interests", as well
as "its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the
maintenance ofintemational peace and security."427
7. Article XXIV, which provides for Territorial Application - Frontier
Traffic - Customs Unions and Free-trade Areas, creates exceptions to
the strict interpretation of the Article.428
8. Article XXV, which provides for Joint Action by the Contracting

•
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------423 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XIII (1).
424 The General Agreement on Tariffs ad Trade (GATT 1947), Article XIV (1 - 5).
425 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XIX (1, a & b).
:26 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XX (a - j).

427 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XXI (a - c).
28 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XXIV (3 a & b).
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Parties, creates an exception in exceptional circumstances.429
Ironically, the General Agreement, which is central to international trade
regulation, has never itself been applied. It is, however, applied by the
"Protocol of Provisional Application" (PP A), which was signed October
30, 1947.430
From the foregoing shortcomings of the GATT, it became imperative that
a properly constituted organization must be formed in order to fully
complement the functions of the Fund and the World Bank as originally
envisioned at the Bretton Woods conference. Thus, when the World Trade
Organization was formed, it completed the dreams of the founding fathers
of the Bretton Woods conference.

•
------------------------------------:29 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XXV (5). The sub-paragraph 5 reads as
ollows: "In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement, the CONTRACTING
:~~IES may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party by this Agreement; Provided that any such
~clslon shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more than
If of the contracting parties."
430 Protocol of Provisional Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61
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VII

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO)

As we stated earlier, the formation of the WTO was a result of mere
happenstance.431 Although GATT suffered from many birth defects432 which
inhibited its maximum performance, there was no indication that the Uruguay
Round433 would produce an organization that will take over from GATT known as
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO, however, differs substantially

from the ITO (the 1948 International Trade Organization). While the ITO Charter
included five sizeable chapters filled with substantive rules regulating international
economic behavior, plus a chapter with an elaborate set of institutional clauses, the
WIO on the contrary is a "mini-charter," with no substantive rules or institutional

measures. The WTO is a very flexible institution, which allows for texts to be
added or subtracted with time and for the evolution of institutions necessary for
implementation of the rules.434

-

Stat.pts.5, 6, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS 308.
431 Chapter 1, supra.
432 Footnote 179, supra
433 Uruguay Round negotiations, spanned from 1986-94. It was signed at the Marrakesh ministerial meeting in
April 1994.
~34 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization in Final Act Embodyi~g the Results of the Uruguay
Eoun~ of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1994) 33 I.L.M. 1125. For further readmg, see the Agreement
J stabhshing the World Trade Organization at http://www.wto.org/englishldocse/legale/legale.htm. last visited
line 26, 2006.
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The WTO Charter explicitly established an international organization. The
Charter endowed the organization with legal personality, clauses on
"privileges and immunities," secretariat, director general, budgetary
measures, and explicit authority to develop relations with other intergovernment organizations, as well as non-government organizations. Further,
the Charter prohibits staff of the Secretariat from seeking or accepting
instructions from any government "or any other authority external to the

WTO."435 The World Trade Organization is essentially comprised of six
major parts. The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
serves as the umbrella agreement, with other five major parts, identified as
Annexes. The other five parts are the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (1994), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU), and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.

436
--------------------------------435 See Footnote 192.

4i6.In addition to the big six components of the WTO family, it is worthy to note that other components like the
P IInlateral agreements, schedules of commitments, etc, also form part of the WTO family.
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Annex 1 is broken into sub paragraphs covering different subject matters.437
The Annex 1 texts include the following:

Annex lA consists of the Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods. The
principal document in this Annex is the GATT 1994, which must be read
with GATT 1947.

There are a number of "side agreements," some originating from the Tokyo
Round results. 438 These include the following: Agriculture, Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, Textiles and Clothing, Technical Barriers to Trade,
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), Anti-dumping (Article VI of
GATT 1994), Customs valuation (Article VII of GATT 1994), Preshipment

Inspection, Rules of Origin, Import Licensing, Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, and Safeguards.
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Annex lB consists of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),
which was aimed at specifically providing the rules for trade in services. This
was in cognizance of the tremendous growth in trade in services since the end
of World War II.439
The GATS aims to regulate a very wide spectrum of service sectors,
including legal, medical, banking, insurance, transportation, tourism,
communications, etc. The drafters' intention was apparently motivated by the
recognition of the vital role that trade in services had acquired, as well as the
desire to checkmate governments that may attempt to limit competition with
restrictions and protectionist measures. Similar to GATT, there are exception
clauses, as well as transparency clauses that obligate members to disclose
trade information.

Annex 1C consists of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS).440

•

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------437
438
439
440

The
The
The
The

WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 1 (lA).
Tokyo Round spanned from 1973 - 1979.
WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 1 (lB).
WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 1 (l C).
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The TRIPS comprises some of the major intellectual property treaties.441
The primary goal of TRIPS was to further trade by providing some measure
of protection for those intangible, yet critical, components of trade identified
as intellectual property rights. These rights include, but not limited to,
copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, patents, business secrets, etc.
Similar to the GATT, the TRIPS also contains exception clauses.

Annex 2 consists of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, whichobligates

all members to explore the dispute settlement options provided under the
Agreement. 442

Annex 3 consists of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), which
empowers the WTO to conduct a periodic review of the overall trade policies
of each member to ensure compliance with the spirit and letter of the
------------------------------------

~l The Berne Convention on Copyrights 1886 is formally known as the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works. It was revised in Paris in 1896 and in Berlin in 1908, completed in Berne in 1914,
revised in Rome in 1928, in Brussels in 1948, in Stockholm in 1967 and in Paris in 1971, and was amended in 1979.
The Paris Convention on Patents 1883 was the fore-runner to the Berne Convention. Both the Berne and Paris
~onVe~tions set up separate bureaux to handle the administrative tasks. In 1893, both bureaux merged and became
the Ullited International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI). In 1967 BIRPI became WIPO,
h e World Intellectual Property Organization, currently a separate organization within the United Nations. See
~2
:llen.wikipedia.org/wikilBerne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis, last visited June 27,
006.
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Agre ement.443

Annex 4 consists of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements. These Agreements are
four and include the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft,444 the Agreement
on Government Procurement,445 the International Dairy Agreement,446 and
the International Bovine Meat Agreement. 44 7

There is a very conscious effort to harmonize the operations of WTO and
GATT. The WTO Charter stipulated that the secretariat of GATT 1947 shall

become the WTO secretariat. Further, the Charter stated that the WTO and
the Multilateral Trade Agreements shall "be guided by the decisions,
procedures and customary practices followed by (GATT 1947)."448

Having reviewed the general provisions of the WTO as well as its historical

442 The WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 2.
443 The WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 3.
444 The WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 4 (a).
445 The WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 4 (b).
446 The WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 4 ©. This Agreement was terminated in 1997. For further reading, visit
.l!ttIwwww.wto.org/englishidocse/legale/legale.htm. last visited June 27, 2006.
447 The WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 4 (d). This Agreement was also terminated in 1997. For further reading
refer to footnote 203.
448 The WTO Agreement 1994, supra.
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background, let us now tum our attention to the governing or institutional
strUcture of the WTO.

GOVERNING STRUCTURE

(1) The Ministerial Conference

The highest hierarchy in the WTO is the "Ministerial Conference," which
meets every two years. The Ministerial Conference is comprised of Ministers
from member nations. In their capacity as the supreme body of the WTO,
they make decisions regarding any of the multilateral trade agreements. In
addition to the General Council, the Ministerial Conference enjoys exclusive
authority in the interpretation of GATT 1994 by the approval of threequarters majority of the members.449 Unlike theother Bretton Woods
Institutions (the IMF and the World Bank), the ultimate decision-making
power is not delegated to a board of directors or the institution's head, but

-----------------------449 See Article IX: 2 and Article 19:2 of the WTO Agreement. See also Articles 3(2) of the DSU.
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lies with the Ministerial Conference.450
Although the powers of the Ministerial Conference are not expressly
delegated to the General Council, the latter meets more regularly and in the
process acts in three capacities. According to one commentator, as the
General Council strives to act in these different capacities, they adopt
different sets of rules in each meeting all in an effort to make decisions by
':
"

consensus.451 The process of decision-making in the WTO is generally by
consensus.452 However, in situations where members can not reach
consensus, voting is permitted. In voting, each member commands one vote
and the outcome are determined by simple majority of the total votes cast.453

(2) The General Council

The next in hierarchy is the General Council which is charged with the
450 Ibid
~51 Baldwin, Robert E., "Pragmatism Versus Principle in GATT Decision-Making: A Brief Historical Perspective"
~ WTO Secretariat, From GATT to the WTO: The Multilateral Trading System in the New Millennium, Kluwer Law
ternational, 2000 at p. 38.
452 This is one of the major inheritances of the WTO from GATT. Decision making by consensus also drives the
:ro's claim that it is 'member-driven'. Notwithstanding that practice, the WTO Agreement does recognize that
ere are occasions where consensus may not be practicable and voting may be applied, e.g. in the interpretation of
any of the multilateral trade agreements, in a decision to amend the provisions of any of the multilateral trade
agreements, in a decision to admit a new member, etc.
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responsibility for carrying out the day-to-day work in between Ministerial
Conference sessions. It is comprised of ambassador level representatives
from all member governments. In addition to the Ministerial Conference, the
Council enjoys exclusive authority in interpreting GATT 1994 which is the
constituent authority of the WT0.454 The General Council also functions as
the Dispute Settlement Body455 and the Trade Policy Review Body.456
Although the composition of the General Council is the same while
functioning as the DSB and the TPRB, nonetheless, their terms of reference
differ while functioning in their different capacities.

453 Footnote 207
454 Footnote 393, supra
455 The WTO General Council is governed by different rules while acting as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
The current chairperson is H.E. Mr. Muhamad Noor Yacob from Malaysia. For further reading, see
!umJLWWw.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispue.htm. last visited June 28, 2006.
456 The WTO General Council functions under different rules while acting as the Trade Policy Review Body. As
the TPRB, they conduct periodic reviews of trade policy of members in order to ensure compliance with the WTO
~greement. A Chairperson for the year is elected at the first meeting of the year. Currently, the chairperson is H.E.
s. Claudia Uribe from Colombia. See http://www.wto.org/english/tratopeltpre/tprbdye.htm. last visited June 28,
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(3) The Councils

The next hierarchy is the Councils. These are the Councils set up pursuant to
the three annexes under the GATT Annex 1. The Councils are as follows:
Council for Trade in Goods, Council for Trade in Services; and Council for
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. These Councils are
comprised of all member nations.

(4) The Subsidiary Groups

The fourth hierarchy is the Subsidiary Groups. These groups are created from
the Councils to handle very specific areas of the general coverage of the
Councils. There are many such subsidiary groups. For instance, the Goods
Council has 11 committees dealing with specific subjects like agriculture,
market access, subsidies, anti-dumping measures, etc.
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(5) The Secretariat

Finally, the WTO is run by a secretariat located in Geneva. The head of the
secretariat is the Director-Genera1.457 The DG is assisted by four Deputy
Director-Generals, in charge of specific areas of operation and management.

VIII CURRENT TELEOLOGICAL APPLICATION OF THE WTO'S

CHARTER

The World Trade Organization was the most recently created458 of the three
organizations that were intended under the Bretton Woods conference.
459Although it was created at a different forum, yet the forum was a creation
of one of the products of the Bretton Woods conference.460
Under the WTO, the GATT 1994 expressly confers the exclusive authority of
Interpretation of the charter on the Ministerial Conference and the General

•

-

457 The current Director-General is Pascal Lamy, assisted by the following Deputy Director-Generals: Alejandro
Jara, Valentine Rugwabiza, Harsha Varhana Singh, and Rufus Yerxa. For further reading, visit
!mn.iLWWw.wto.org/englishJthewtoe/whatise/tife/org4e.htm. last visited June 30,2006.
458 The WTO came into force in 1995.
459 See the Bretton Woods conference of 1945, supra.
460 The Uruguay Round of Talks under the GATT 1947 was a creation of GATT which emerged from the Bretton

199

Counci1.461 Thus, only the Ministerial Conference and the General Council
can adopt interpretations of the GATT 1994, after securing the majority
decisions of three-quarters of the members.
Again, any attempt to apply the teleological approach to the interpretation of
the charter of the WTO must take into cognizance the requirements of such
an approach. Such considerations call "for an expert knowledge of the history
and development of the organization's purposes as expressed in its Articles
and its subordinate law and as capable of response to changing
circumstances."462 Unfortunately, the WTO has only been in existence for
twelve years463 and by comparison to both the IMF and the W orId Bank,
lacks the lengthy history that the other two can draw upon.464 Further, due to
its limited number of years, the WTO lacks the experience of organizational
development with respect to its purposes as well as enough experience in
responding to changing circumstances.465 Yet, the WTO, as a bona fide
member of the Bretton Woods family, and indeed the international financial
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------WOods conference.
461 Supra, footnotes 393 and 398.
462 See Gold, supra.
463 See the WTO, supra. It was created in 1995 after the Uruguay Round of Talks finalized the arrangements for its
establishment
4
.
64 Both the IMF and the World Bank were established at the Bretton Woods conference of 1945.
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institutions must ensure that it applies the teleological approach in its
interpretation of its charter with a view to achieving uniformity in the long

run.

IX

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have focused primarily on the --=------_.
law govemingJhe Bretton
--Woods institutions as well as the off-shoots like the GATT and the WTO,
which form the core of the IFIs. In order to better understand the laws
governing mostIf~s-,-_~ good appreciation of the laws governing the Bretton
Woods institutions will serve as a good appetizer. Whilst our search is to
---~

-------~

-._--

--~---~--~----

\

appraise the roles of thec -IFIs
in the context of some select developing
--I

countries, such a search, in order to become meaningful, must begin from the
constituent documents that established these institutions. However, a mere
literal analysis of the constituent documents will not suffice. More is needed

•
III order

to comprehensively carry out the search. Consequently, we have not

Just looked at the constituent documents, but have gone deeper in search of
--~---465 Ibid
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the authoritative interpretation of the learned commentators, scholars and
publicists.

Our thesis has been that the roles that the Bretton Woods System play, and
indeed, all the c01nplementary_~fonoIllic--,_!!l0E~taty, and fina®~Jj!1:~!!tujj~s,
were roles that were carefully scripted for them by the founding powers.
Such roles were the roles that the founding powers articulated in the
- ------------,

aftermath of World War II. Thus, the roles were framed to
.....oL..-_________ • _ _ _ _

._~_________

reJle<;L~Euro'

~-----~

American centric approach, contrary to a universal approach.
The roles were limited to the political, economic and financial exigencies of
the post-war era from the prism of the founding fathers. The area of service
was also limited to the geographical map covering the key members of the
Allied Forces during the war. With the benefit of hindsight, these institutions
Were able to serve those interests fairly successfully. A case in point was the
Marshall Plan of 1947.466

•

"'
------------------------------------466 The Marshall Plan was named after United States Secretary of State George Marshall. It is officially known as
the EUropean Recovery Program (ERP), a plan by the United States for rebuilding the allied countries of Europe
a~r World War II. The plan was in operation for four fiscal years beginning in July 1947. During that period, an
~st~ated $13 billion of economic and technical assistance, equivalent to around $130 billion in 2006, when adjusted
;rmfla~ion, was given to help the recovery of the European countries which had joined in the Organization for
cononuc Co-operation and Development. For more details, visit http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilMarshall Plan (last
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But when we look at the tremendous changes taking place in the international
community as well as the ever-expanding roles expected of these institutions
as a result of their internal expansion, there will be little doubt that these
international financial institutions are not pulling their weight in the scheme
of things. Admittedly, some of the challenges of the latter part of the
twentieth century as well as the twenty-first century were not foreseeable in
the twentieth century. But most of the economic and financial challenges
were foreseeable and preventable. As a matter of fact, with regard to Africa
and other developing parts of the world that were victims of colonialism, the
economic and financial challenges were foreseen, but intentionally
ignored.467
Consequently, with all the efforts of these institutions in those parts of the
World called developing, the situation still looks bleak and hopeless. Why?

visited June 6, 2006.)
467 It is reasonable to expect that during the period of colonialism, these developing countries presented first hand
experiences to their colonial powers of the enormous challenges faced by these economies. Further, as the colonial
rulers of these colonies, the former can not claim to be oblivious to the enormous challenges that they were daily
confronted with during the period of their colonial rule. Thus, it is justifiable to assert, as I have done, that these
challenges were known (or should have been anticipated), but were ignored for obvious reasons. This position was
re-inforced by Dr. Kingsley Moghalu when he stated: 'Colonialism, of course, was a cardinal means of the expansion
?fWestem-dominated international society for thoroughly self-interested reasons, mainly economic. And it was not
lIlfrequently accompanied by mass atrocities against the colonized peoples. The Belgian King Leopold, who ruled
Belgian Congo (today's Democratic Republic of Congo) in the late 19 th century as his private rubber plantation,
ordered the massacres of nearly 10 million Congolese to quell resistance to forced labor in the colony .... .' See Is
there an international community? by Kingsley Moghalu in the Nigerian Guardian Newspapers, August 15,2005.
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Because, we venture to state, the problems have been left unattended for such
a long period of time that "band- aid therapy" now appears ineffective.
Take for instance the IMF, despite the amendment of the Articles, neither the
structure nor the operational philosophy havtbeen impacted to reflect and
incorporate the contemporary realities of the situation in the developing
world.468 In all the institutions that we reviewed under this chapter, there is
a remarkable imbalance in the composition of the membership of the highest
authorities. Same applies in the voting structures and arrangements, such that
developing countries lack adequate voting powers to impact the policies and
practices of these institutions. Flowing from these inequities is the inability
of the developing countries to impact the terms and conditions for accessing
the resources of these institutions. Developing countries thu~ beat'Jhe full
weight of!l1_~_pol!cy_de~isionB_orthese institutions through the various ways
that these institutions_exexcise their jurisdiction. Yet, the
developing
- ----~-

-_.--

-

-

--

-

~--...,

cOuntries cQnstitute the numerical majority of the membership of these
institutions
.
.
~-----

-------------------------------------468 Footnote 210, supra.
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CHAPTER SIX
ROLES OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN
NIGERIA, SOUTH KOREA AND BRAZIL

I

INTRODUCTION

THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
The lack of concrete evidence to prove that the IFIs have had any positive
impact on the economies of developing countries is troubling, to say the
least. Among the group classified as developing countries, it appears that
Africa's fate is worse. As one commentator vividly stated, "Africa's
~

----.--~-

economic situation, already

seri~ll~x isg~teriQrating.

Ip fa.ct, unless effective

measures are taken now, the already fragile fabric of the economic, social,
and political systems in many parts of Africa will break down."469

•

--------------------------------

~69 Ndegwa, P., The Economic Crisis in Africa, published by the IMF from papers presented at a symposium held
l!lNairobi, Kenya, May 13-15,1985, edited by Helleiner, O.K., in 1986.
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II

THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

It is pertinent at this juncture, to analyze the economic climate or
macroeconomic environment in which this debate on the impact, if any, of
the IFIs on the African economies is conducted. The statistics is alarming.
According to the World Bank's "Berg Report," only few African states had
fairly good rates of economic growth until 1979. Since then, there has not
been any report of economic growth in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.

Further, the available data indicates that 15 of the 45 sub-Saharan African
___. ___ 7:~-··-------

countries experienced declining per capita income between 1970 and 1979.
The other 19 countries experienced per capita income growth of less than 1
per cent per year during this period. According to the World Bank, per capita
income in Africa declined by 0.4 per cen.! p~year in the 1970s. Agricultural
exports, which were then the major source of foreign exchange earnings,
20 per cent. The situation was exacerbated by a
declined over the decade .by
---------,-combination of factors, which included governmental inefficiency, pervasive
mismanagement, unstable political structures and wanton corrupt practices in
both the public and private sectors. The resultant shock on the fragile
206
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economies was so severe that most African economies could not and has not
been able to recover economically. The second oil price shock (1979-80), no
doubt dealt the "last straw" on the

economies~f African sta~.

In addition, the terms-of-trade shock, which has continued unabatedly in subSaharan Africa, has been aptly described by the IMF itself as "brutal." This
deficit in terms-of-trade has been attributed mainly to the decline in prices of
primary commodities which over a long period of time constituted the main
source of foreign exchange earnings in sub-Saharan Africa. The cumulative
impact was a continuous decline in the terms of trade of African countries
exporting primary products. It has been canvassed that the decline is so
unprecedented that it was even worse than it has ever been since
independence, or since the Second W orId War, or even since the Great
Depression."470

•
Unfortunately, African countries are already burdened by heavy surcharges
unposed upon them for failure to pay back on capital borrowed from foreign
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banks and suppliers, including the IMF and the W orId Bank. African
countries also suffer from surcharges imposed on goods sold to them by
foreign suppliers on credit. During the period in review, organizational
development assistance was cut by the maj or donors. For instance in 1981
alone, development assistance to Africa fell by 4 per cent in real terms
overall. The International Development Association, which directs about 30
per cent of its credit to Africa, was been forced by the United States cutbacks
in contributions to reduce its activities significantly.

5

/D,4

The cumulative effects of the scarcity, consequently, resulted in a massive
cutback in the volume of imports by African countries. According to the
IMF, import values over this period fell on average by 7 per gentin Afri§. In
r-

Madagascar, for instance, they ~ll by 40 per cent, in Sierra Leone they fell
----------~-------

by 36 per cent, in Ghana by 29 per cent, in (:Zambia by 20 per cent, and in
-----~-------------~--~-,-----

Tanzania by 12 per cent A 71 These figures continued to worsen as the 1980s
progressed.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------470 Helleiner, G.K., Essays in International Finance, No. 152, July, 1983.
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Unfortunately, the governments were unable to cut expenditure as quickly as
their revenues have fallen, leading inevitably, to unplanned and excessive
monetary expansion. Monetary expansion in combination with scarcities,
inevitably breeds, inflation. In an effort to curb inflation, African
governments have adopted a number of economic and political measures.
Among these measures, is an effort to deal with price increases by means of
price controls, which is typically reinforced by severe consequences. The
result is a spread of black markets and corruption, a retreat from legal
activities, a concomitant depressing effect on morale. Further, the delays in
required adjustments of exchange rates have led to further tightening of
import and foreign exchange controls and to the growth of smuggling.
According to the IMF report, real (inflation-adjusted) exchange rates in
Africa have appreciated enormously in the past three years which amounted
to the opposite of what was probably required for adjustment over the longer
run.472

•
The longer the necessary exchange-rate changes are delayed, the greater the
"shocks" eventually required to bring them back in line.

--------471 IMF, 1982a, p.97.
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In 1974, the IMF reported only 3 countries in arrears on external payments.
However, by the end of 1981, the number had increased to 32, of which 20
were AfricanA 73 As more and more African countries fell behind in their
debt repayment plans, the need to seek external credit became imperative.
Unfortunately, when suppliers are forced to extend credit, they charge high
,1,\.

interest rates. And the next time, they demand payment in cash.

I·

::.1
~ I

,

,

In a desperate effort to keep afloat the ship of state, African countries
resorted to debt rescheduling. Consequently, in the past few years, African
countries have taken over as the most numerous customers of the "Paris
Club" of official creditors. By 1979, African countries accounted for 3 out of

4 official reschedulings (Togo, Sudan, Zaire); in 1980, 2 out of 3 (Sierra
Leone and Liberia); and in 1981,6 out of7 (Madagascar, Togo, Zaire,
Uganda, Senegal, Liberia). Subsequently, there have been 6 more African

•
meetings of the Club, rescheduling the official debts of Senegal, Uganda,
Malawi, Sudan, Togo, and Zambia. The report further indicates that foreign-

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------472 IMF, supra, p.122; 1982b, p.54
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exchange reserves in Africa fell in 1982 to unprecedented levels, averaging

7.4 per cent of annual imports, or twenty-seven days worth of imports.
Reserves were less than half their 1973 -74 levels and less than half the
estimated 1982 average for all oil-importing developing countries.474

III

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA'S EXPERIENCE

INTRODUCTION

Modem day Nigeria has been an amalgamation of different peoples and
culture that had been under the dominance of the British government,
through their Royal Niger Company. In 1885, the British received
international recognition for their formal claim of influence over Nigeria. In
-~---."------,

1914, the separate areas were formally united as the "Colony and Protectorate
of Nigeria." Under this unification, the area was still administered separately
under the Northern province, the Southern province, and Lagos colony. After
World War II, in response to increasing nationalism and demands for

----~~----473 IMF, 1982c, p. 28.
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independence, the British

gran~ed Nigeria imicpendence on October 1,

1

1960.475.
----_.----

Under independence, the country was designed to be governed as a
Parliamentary government with three regions forming the federation states.
The three regions were the northern region476, the western region477 and
the eastern region478. Each region was endowed with' substantial powers for
self-governance, while the federal government had exclusive powers over
defense and security, foreign relations, commercial and fiscal policies. Three
years later on October 1963, the government changed its political structure
and became a federal republic with a new constitution. At the same period, a
new and the fourth regional government were created as the Midwestern
regIOn.
The newly established nation did not last long. On January 15, 1966, the
military embarked upon a coup which ended the First republic under Prime

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------474
475
476
477
478

IMF, 1982a, p.169
Upon independence, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa became the first Prime Minister of Nigeria.
The capital city of the Northern region was located in Kaduna.
The capital city ofthe Western region was located in Ibadan.
The capital city of Eastern region was located in Enugu.
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Minister Tafawa Balewa.4 79 In July of the same year, a segment of the
military staged a counter-coup.480 The fall-out of the two coups and the total
breakdown of law and order, as well as the massive killings of civilians,
resulted in the civil war that lasted from 1967 to 1970.481

Since then, the country has been ruled by one military government or another
until 1979, when another civilian government was elected under Alhaji
Shehu Shagari. President Shagari's government lasted fronh979

to 1983,

when the military overthrew the government. The military continued to rule
the country from 1983 until 1999, when former military general Olusegun
Obasanjo was elected civilian president for four years, and re-elected in 2003

for another four year term.

479 It is worthy of note that the Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, the Premiers of Northern region and
Western region, as well as other high ranking officials were killed in the bloody coup.
480 It is also worthy of note that the counter-coup culminated in the death of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Military Government that succeeded the Tafawa Balewa region, General lTY Aguiyi Ironsi. Although Ironsi was not
directly involved in the plot to overthrow the Balewa government, he assumed the position of C-in-C as the highest
tanking military officer during the coup.
481 The Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) was fought between the Nigerian military and the Biafran military. Then
GOvernor of Eastern region, Colonel Odumegwu Emeka Ojukwu, declared the State of Biafra, in reaction to the
genocide that was been perpetrated against the Ibos in the Northern region of the country. The war, essentially, was
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Although generally known as Nigeria, the country is officially addressed as
the federal republic of Nigeria. With an estimated population of 137 million
people, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, and also accounts for
20 percent of the entire population of West African countries. A country with
. a rich diversity, there are approximately 250 ethnic groups that constitute the
population segments. The dominant ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani in the
,;~,

north which are predominantly Muslims, the Y orubas in the west which are

"
~q

evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, and the Igbos in the east
which are predominantly Christians.

The country enjoys a land area estimated at<923,
768 square kilometers or
- - _ .._.. - 356,700 square miles. The capital city is Abuja with an estimated population
0[100,000. Other popular cities include Lagos with estimated population of

12 million, Ibadan with estimated population of,------_
5 million, Kano_.-.-.
with
.. _ .

.

.

estimated population of 1 million, and Enugu with estimated population of
,; 500,000 people.

~--------------------------------------~----------------------------------------an attempt by the Nigerian government to prevent the secession of Biafra (with its rich oil reserves) from Nigeria.
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Nigeria currently runs a democratic government under a federal system of
representation. The operational constitution is the 1999 constitution, which is
based largely on the 1979 constitution that had been suspended by the
military after the overthrow of the civilian government in 1983.482
Currently, the country is administered as a federation with 36 states and a
Federal Capital Territory (FCT), called Abuja. The federal government
currently led by President Olusegun Obasanjo and his Cabinet constitute the
Executive branch. The Legislative branch is comprised of the bicameral
legislature. The National Assembly consists of the Senate (Upper House)
with its 109 members. Each state is represented by three senators, while the

FCT is represented by one senator. Also, the National Assembly consists of
the House of Representatives (Lower House) with its 360 members. The
tripartite component of the federal government is the Judicial branch, headed

by the Chief Justice of the Federation. The states are governed by the
Governors and their cabinet. The states are further sub-divided into a total of

•
774 local governments, headed by Local Council Chairpersons.

--------------------------

482 The 1999 constitution which was based largely on the 1979 constitution was promulgated by decree on May 5,
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With an estimated Gross Domestic Product of $90.9 billion and per capita
Gross Domestic Product of $694, Nigeria has been a classical case study of
missed opportunities and under-utilization of human and natural resources.
The country is blessed with abundant natural resources like petroleum,
natural gas, tin, columbite, iron ore, coal, limestone, lead, zinc. It has been a
world leader in the production of agricultural products like cocoa, palm oil,
,

yams, cassava, sorghum, millet, com, rice, livestock, groundnuts, cotton, etc.

~:j
~ l,

The industrial products that are produced in the country include textiles,
cement, food products, footwear, metal products, lumber, beer, detergents,
car assembly, etc. Total export receipts in 2005 are estimated at $52.16
billion, while petroleum products aloneaccounts for 950/0 of the total
revenue.

The discovery of oil in Nigeria and the sudden oil boom in the 1970s caused

.j,.

the government to focus all economic attention on the oil sector to the total
neglect of the other sectors of the economy. The consequence is evident in
the fact that in 2002, for instance, oil and gas exports accounted for more

--------------------------------------------------------------------------1999. It came into force on May 29, 1999.
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than 98% of export earnings and about 83% of the government revenue.483

The neglect of other areas of economic activities like agriculture has been
most devastating. Nigeria used to be Africa's biggest poultry producer with
an estimated 40 million birds annually. Currently, the number of birds
~-----

•.. ,-

--

produced annually is al1®t 18

millionJ2i~s.

Same consequence applies to the

cocoa production, groundnuts (peanuts), rubber, and palm oil, which all used
to be major sources of revenue for the country pre- and post-independence.
Cognizant of the dangers inherent in a 'one-product economy', the
government of President Obasanjo has embarked upon a number of policy
initiatives aimed at diversifying the economy and providing incentives for
investment in other areas of the economy.

With the aggressive efforts directed at privatization of the government owned
banks, cement plants, fuel distribution companies, the government is geared
towards a more market-oriented economy. A huge success story in this effort
Was the introduction of the GSM telecommunications system, which has
-------------------------------483 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, July 2006. See http://www.state.gov/r/paieilbgn/2836.htm.
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greatly increased private investment in the industry, as well as created new
employment opportunities. Further, with the creation of the much dreaded
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the government has
shown that it is committed to curbing the embarrassing stigma of public and
private corruption in the system. But more needs to be done in order to
reverse the downward trend in economic development under the many years
of poor military rulership. The country's infrastructure is in urgent need of
attention and repairs after many years of neglect and non-maintenance under
the mi Iitary.

Nigeria currently has oil reserves that are estimated to be 25 billion barrels. It
c----_ _ _ .__...__ ----..,

~

also has gas reserves that are estimated to be 100 trillion cubic feet. It is also
becoming a more respected member of the international community by the
leadership roles it has been playing in West Africa, Africa, and as a member
of the United Nations. Its national economic profile is equally on the rise

•
Which was evident in the IMF's approval of its first ever Policy Support
~----

Instrument for Nigeria in October 2005. Further, the Paris Club recently

-_.-----------

------------------------------------------------------------last visited August 16, 2006.
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signed debt reduction agreements with Nigeria under which the country was
given an $18 billion debt reduction in exchange for the payment of the
remaining $12 billion. The country did not only meet the Paris Club deadline,
but is currently working to also exit the London Club as a debtor.

NIGERIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
,
"

First, I must concede that the scope of this work can not accommodate a most
comprehensive review of the totality of the relationship between Nigeria and
the major international financial institutions (IFIs). The underlying reason
includes the fact that this exercise is not principally aimed at dissecting the
entire relationship between Nigeria and the IFIs. Rather, the effort here is to
highlight the major aspects of the relationship with a view to using it as a
mirror of what constitutes the relationship. Consequently, although Nigeria
has, from inception, been involved with the IFIs, I will locate the critical
aspect of its relationship with the IFIs within the limited period from 19831993. This ten-year period is very illustrative because it covers the
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administration of one civilian government and two military governments.484

I.

THE SHAGARI GOVERNMENT (1979-1983)

After thirteen years of military rule,485 Nigeria conducted another general
election aimed at enshrining a multi-party democracy. The National Party
of Nigeria (NPN) won the Presidency and a slim majority in the National
Assembly. On October 1, 1979, Alhaji Shehu Shagari ofNPN was sworn
in as the President and C-in-C. The out-going military government had
fashioned a new constitution modeled after the US Presidential system of
government, otherwise known as the 1979 constitution. President Shagari
also inherited a relatively stable economy from the out-going military
government headed by General Olusegun Obasanjo. Although the country
had some external debt, it was easily manageable at 1.5 percent debt
service ratio.486 The oil revenue from crude oil was also significant since

•
-----------------------------------484 The Shagari government was elected in 1979 and won re-election in 1983. Shortly thereafter, the government
Was overthrown by the military. In the wake of the coup d'etat, General Muhammadu Buhari became the C-in-C and
lfead of the Military government. Two years later, General Ibrahim Babangida, his Army Chief, overthrew the
government in a palace coup.
485 Footnote 248, supra
486 See Yusufu Bangura, "The Politics of Nigeria's Debt Crisis" in Okello Oculi, ed. Nigerian Alternatives, Zaria,
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a barrel sold for $44.4 in 1980/81.487 The out-going Obasanjo
government had pursued what a commentator called "low profile"
deflationary policies which were aimed at tackling the 1977178 balance of
payments challenges.488

However, in the first budget announced by the new civilian government in
March 1980, the government reversed the out-going government's "low~ I

profile" economic policy. Rather, the government adopted what I consider
to be a "lavish and extravagant" economic policy. For instance, the
government expanded the allocation for public expenditure from N13.291
billion in 1979 to N23.695 billion in 1980, resulting in almost 200 percent
increase in its first year.489 Simultaneously, both the federal and state
governments borrowed unrestrictedly in the international capital markets

-

Nigeria, Dept. of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University, p.99-100. Cited in M.O. Okome, "A Sapped
Democracy", University Press of America, 1998.
487 See Adebayo 01ukoshi, "The Management of Nigeria's External Debt: Issues & Problems" in Olukoshi, ed.
lkNigerian External Debt Crisis: Its Management, Lagos, Nigeria, Malthouse, 1990, p.28. Also cited in M.O.
~kome, supra.
488 M.O. Okome, supra, p. 88; see also Olukoshi, supra, pp 25-26.
~9 .Yu~ufu Bangura, RaufMustapha and Saidu Adamu, "The Deepening Economic Crisis and its Political
~hcatlOns." In Siddique Mohammed and Tony Edoh, Nigeria: A Republic in Ruins, Ahmadu Bello University,
~"partment of Political Science, 1983, p.59.
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thereby draining the external reserve of the country.490 The import
license scheme which was in place before the new government took power
was used as a vehicle for party patronage, and consequently contributed to
the huge drain on the foreign exchange. Cumulatively, by allowing
massive capital flight in a short period of time, the over-invoicing of
imports, under-invoicing of exports, and fraudulent accounting practices,
the Shagari government caused a sudden economic crisis.491 By 1981, the
country's foreign exchange reserves were depleted from over $10 billion
in 1980 to $4.2 billion.

By early 1982, the international price for crude oil fell drastically, thus
compounding Nigeria's economic problems. As a result, Nigeria's oil
revenue fell from $10 billion in 1979 to $5.161 billion in 1982.492 At the
same time, Nigeria's gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 2 percent and
4.4 percent in 1982 and 1983, respectively. Nigeria's current account

•
---------------------------------490 Olukoshi & Herbst, "Nigeria: Economic and Political Reforms at Cross Purposes" in Stephen Haggard &
Steven B. Webb, eds. Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment, New
York, Oxford University Press, 1994. (Published for the World Bank).
491 See Olukoshi, supra, footnote 256.
~2 Olukoshi, "The Role of the IMF and World Bank in Nigeria's ...... " in The Nigerian External Debt Crisis: Its
~, supra, footnote 256
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deficit grew to N4.9 billion in 1982 and was N2.9 billion in 1983.493 By
the end of the administration's first term in office in 1983, the budget
deficit ofN6.231 billion was more than 50 percent of the total
expenditure.494

By adopting the "lavish and extravagant" economic policy, the Shagari
government effectively plunged the country into a serious economic crisis
within the four-year period that it was in office. The consequences for
both the country and the citizens were dire. The economy began to
experience massive retrenchment, unemployment increase~ irregular
payment of salaries became popular, while most employers froze
employment. Basic food became scarce and expensive, while public
services became more expensive. Crime and violence immediately
increased as a result of higher numbers of the citizens without
employment.495

"
-------------------------------------493 Ibid
494 Ibid
495 See Yusufu Bala Usman, Nigeria Against the IMF: The Home Market Strategy, Kaduna, Nigeria, Vanguard,
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In realization of the collateral consequences of its economic policy, the
Shagari government began to introduce an austerity package in 1981. The
goal of the package was for the government to cut public expenditure by
$1.6 billion. The 1982 budget also targeted a further cut of $3 billion. But,
apparently the damage had been irredeemably done. As we can see, the
efforts by the government to stem the tide of economic erosion were too
late and too little. In fact, the situation had become so critical that while
the government was implementing the austerity package, it was compelled
to draw upon the country's reserves with the IMF.496

Dr. Okome succinctly summarized the three strategies that were applied
by the Shagari government as follows: 1) Stabilization of the economy
strategy; 2) The appointment of a committee of experts to make
recommendations on policy reforms strategyand 3) The solicitation of
external assistance strategy.497

•

~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1986.

496 Thomas Biersteker, "Reaching Agreement with the IMF: The Nigerian Negotiations, 1983-86." Pew Program in
~eaching and Writing in International Affairs, Case #205. University of Southern California Press, 1988, pp.
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A. The Economic Stabilization Strategy:
In recognition of the dire economic situation facing the administration, the
Shagari government introduced the Economic Stabilization Act, 1982,498
while pledging to cut government expenditure by 40 percent.499 The
provisions of the Act were aimed at increasing customs and excise duties, as
well as comprehensive import regulation. Consequently, the government
recalled all import licenses that were unused; suspended the issuance of
import licenses for motor vehicle importation; suspended all capital projects
not yet started; reducecbasic travel allowances 500 from N800 to N500 and

from N3,000 to N2,000 for individuals and businesses, respectively; advance
deposits were imposed on all imports while interest rates were increased by 2
percent. Further, the government imposed more stringent monetary and credit
policy for industries, development finance institutions and general
commerce.50l
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

29-30.
497 M.O. Okome, supra, p.88
498 The Economic Stabilization Act was enacted on April 19, 1982, as an act of the legislature of Nigeria.
499 See Olukoshi, "Role of the IMF & World Bank in Nigeria's Foreign Debt", supra, footnotes 256 & 261.
500 These were amounts of money that the government authorized individuals and businesses to have while
travelng overseas.
501 See Okome, "A Sapped Democracy", supra, p. 90. See also Yusufu Bangura et al 'The Deepening Economic
Crisis ... " supra, and Olukoshi, "The Nigerian External Debt Crisis. Further, see Tom Forrest, Politics and Economic
~opment in Nigeria, Boulder, Westview, 1993, p.183.
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As I indicated earlier, by the time the Shagari government introduced the
Economic Stabilization Act, the proverbial horse had bolted out. The Act,
unfortunately, failed to remedy the economic situation of the government.
Compounded by the steady decline in crude oil export, the chief source of
foreign exchange revenue, the Act could not control imports; regulate the
monetary system and curtail government expenditure to a commensurate
level with declining income. By the end of 1982, Nigeria's debt service ratio
had skyrocketed to 19.2 percent, while the government's trade debt to foreign
creditors was three months overdue.502 The government reacted by seeking
the assistance of a team of economic and financial experts, thus the
appointment of the Odama Committee.

B. The Committee Appointment Strategy:
The economic situation continued unabated into 1983. Thus, in January 1983,
In order to curtail the drain on the scarce national resources, the government

embarked upon a massive deportation exercise of over one million "illegal"
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aliens resident in the country at the time.503 In the same January 1983, the
government through its National Economic Council appointed a committee

of experts under the chairmanship of Dr. J.S. Odama.504 Other members of
the committee include the special advisers on economic affairs to the
respective state governors, as well as a representative of the Central Bank of
Nigeria.
To underscore the urgency of the situation, the committee submitted its report
one month after its inauguration.505 The report, among other
recommendations, called for "radical departures ...... in a number of crucial
sectors and policies if the economy is to survive the onslaught, particularly
from exogenous outside factors."506 Further, the committee proposed a longterm solution that calls for "fundamental structural adjustments in all sectors

of the economy."507

;02 For a fuller account of the economic situation of Nigeria under the Shagari government, see Biersteker,
'Reaching Agreement .... " supra.
50~ Unregistered aliens are commonly referred to as illegal aliens. These aliens comprisd mainly citizens of
neIghboring countries who had sought political and economic refuge in Nigeria.
504 At the time of his appointment, Dr. Odama was a special adviser to the President on economic affairs.
~05 S~e the Report of the Odama Committee on the State of the Nigerian Economy by the National Economic
~l.(NEC) Experts Committee, (The Odama Report) Lagos, Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Planning, February,
598 3. CIted in Okome, supra, p.91. The Odama Report was submitted on February, 1983.
06 The Odama Report, supra, footnote 274.
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Again, the report was another effort by the government that fell short of the
expected reaction to the increasingly worsening economic situation facing the
country. I will like to argue that while the Odama report was aimed at longterm recommendations, the government was looking for short-term measures
that will allow them to plan for the long-term. Thus, the goal of the experts in
making the recommendations was divergent to the goal of the recipients and
became impracticable. Evidence of this position was that in the same month
that the report was submitted, the government negotiated and received a $1
billion Eurocredit loan for the payment of the country's debt arrears.

Although the National Economic Council made recommendations to the
government from the Odama report,508 based upon which the government
issued a white paper, the prevailing mood within the government circle was
that external help must be sought. Without devoting further thought to the
Odama report, the Shagari government sought a formal help from the
International financial institutions, particularly, the IMF.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------507 The Odama Report, supra, footnotes 274 & 275.

iO~ See "The Green Paper on the State of the Nigerian Economy," Africa Development, Vol., 9, #3,1984, p.136.
his was a critique of the Odama report.
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C. The External Assistance Strategy:
As I indicated earlier, after receiving the Odama report and without further
thought on it, the government began formal negotiations with the IMF in
April, 1983. Nigeria sought from the IMF a $2-3 billion loan in under to
support its balance of payments deficits and an additional $500 million in
order to support the deficit from oil sales. Both loans were made under the
IMF's Extended Fund Facility (EFT) and the Compensatory Financing
Facility (CFF) programs, respectively. Additionally, the government sought
more help from the World Bank in the amount of $300 million under the
Bank's Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) program.

In order to approve the loan, the IMF demanded that Nigeria meet the
following conditionalities: 509

1.

•

reduction in aggregate public expenditure, particularly in the size of the
budget deficits;
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2.

introduction of greater budgetary discipline;

3.

reduction of grants, subventions and loans to parastatals;

4.

cessation of non-statutory transfers to state governments;

5.

simplification and rationalization of the Customs Tariff Structure;

6.

review of industrial incentives and policies;

7.

strengthening of the operational efficiency of revenue collection
agenCIes;

8.

upward review of interest rates and a reduction in the sectoral
allocation of credit;

9.

strict external debt management;

10.

export promotion to broaden the export base;

11.

adjustment of producer prices of agricultural commodities;

12.

review of on-going projects with a view to determining their priorities;

13.

classification of parastatals into social and economic activities for the

purpose of restructuring them to achieve cost effectiveness, accountability

•
and, for economic parastatals, profitability;
14.

phased removal of subsidies on fertilizer;

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------509 These conditionalities were adapted from Okome, A Sapped Democracy, supra, pp.93 & 94.
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15.

trade liberalization;

16.

removal of the subsidy on petroleum;

17.

the devaluation of the Naira51 0

Notwithstanding the government's willingness to comply with most of the
IMF imposed conditionalities, the government had great reservations
regarding the implementation of those relating to devaluation of the
Naira511, the removal subsidy and the liberalization oftrade.512

The government believed that the three conditions were irrelevant to the
context of the Nigerian economic situation and should be excluded from the
negotiations. Some scholars, however, attribute the government's reluctance
to comply to be based on the lack of administrative and political capacity.513
Some other scholars believe that while the government possessed sufficient
administrative capacity, it lacked at the time, the political capacity to
Comply.514 Why? The reason was that the government was facing general
elections and felt that the maintenance of the economic status quo will be
-------------------------------510 See the Nigerian NEWSWATCH magazine of October 14, 1985, p.14.
511 The Nigerian currency is denominated by Naira (paper denominations) and Kobo (coin denominations).
512 Footnote 279. supra
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, more beneficial to their prospects in the election. One major implication of
the maintenance of the economic status quo was the continuation of the
import license scheme which had been abused by the party officials, but
which had served the ruling party well in oiling their patronage scheme.

The government was faced with a fundamental decision: comply with all the
IMF conditionalities and risk losing the 1983 general elections, or refuse to
comply and hopefully win the general elections.515 The decision of the
government was facilitated by the mounting resistance to the IMF package
coming from the organized labor unions, civil servants, students, professional
:1

organizations, etc. The Shagari government predictably chose to refuse to
comply with the IMF conditionalities, particularly; those relating to

513 See Olukoshi, supra
514 See Okome, supra p.96
.
515 An interesting development during the government's negotiations with the IMF was the dispute regarding the
accurate amount of Nigeria's external indebtedness. According to Okome, "Throughout the negotiations, the Shagari
administration was never sure of the exact amount of Nigeria's indebtedness. Consequently, between 1982 and 1987,
the amount of Nigeria's external debt was a matter for debate, discussion and conjecture. Acrimonious disputes
ensued between Nigeria and its creditors on the amount of the debt and the extent of state responsibility for
~epayment. The claim submitted by the London Club to the Nigerian government was $8.8 billion while Nigerian
unporters submitted a counter claim of $6.4 billion. A conference was held on the matter and a "guesstimate" of $23
billion was made. The Central Bank of Nigeria's estimate in 1983 was $17.758 billion. Further complications were
caused by the discovery that many of the claims were fraudulent. Three financial advisers, S.G. Warburg and Co.,
Lehman Kuhn and Lazard Freres were hired to assist Nigeria in reconciling all the claims and in negotiating an
agreement with Nigeria's private creditors to whom $2 billion was owed on unconfirmed letters of credit." See also
;USUfBangura, "The Politics of Nigeria's Debt Crisis"; Olukoshi, The Management of Nigeria's External Debt, and
'The Role of the IMF & World Bank .... ", supra
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devaluation, subsidy removal and trade liberalization.
In the meantime, Nigeria sought and obtained an agreement from the London
Club of creditors to roll over Nigeria's trade debts. The package demanded
that the interest rolled over will be converted into a loan which will be repaid
in three years, commencing from January 1984. Thereafter, the creditor banks
insisted that Nigeria will not receive any new loans until they conclude an
agreement with the IMF. Consequently, creditors like the US Eximbank and
the U.K.'s Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) refused to insure
the country's imports without an IMF agreement.516
The Shagari party, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), won the majority of
the votes in the 1983 general elections. The victory was short-lived because
in December 1983, the newly elected government was overthrown by the
military government led by General Muhammadu Buhari who claimed that
the coup d'etat became necessary in order to save the ship of state from the
recklessness of the Shagari government.
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II.

THE BUHARI GOVERNMENT (1983-1985)

As earlier stated, the Buhari government justified their overthrow of the
Shagari government based on the latter's recklessness and indiscipline in
handling the affairs of the country.517 Thus, the new government
championed discipline in both thepublic and private sectors of the
country.518 The economic situation of the country was fast deteriorating
upon the seizure of power by the Buhari government. The main source of
foreign exchange for the country, the crude oil earnings, had plummeted from

$25 billion in 1980 to $11 billion in 1984. At the same time, the country's
debt service ratio had skyrocketed to 28.3 percent of the GDP. Consequently,
while the country was generating less than half of its 1980 earnings, its debt
obligation had more than doubled. Compounding the situation was the high
rate of domestic inflation, the low rate of industrial production, and the
overall impact on the standard of life of the average citizen.519

•
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------516 See 0lukoshi, "Role of the IMF & World Bank .... ", supra
517 See Buhari: Middlemen, Party Agents Ruined Economy," FBIS-MEA, January 30,1984, p. T3
518 Ibid
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The Buhari government immediately introduced what they termed a War
Against Indiscipline (WAI).520 The campaign was aimed at encouraging the
citizens to live an orderly and discipline life in private and public
relationships. It was also aimed at curbing the wanton recklessness in the
public sector which had fueled the prevalent rate of corruption in the public
sector. The campaign was carried out in the local and national print and
broadcast media. A combined team of the newly established and recruited

WAI Brigade officers and the military were empowered to strictly enforce
any act of indiscipline.521
The Nigerian public welcomed the Buhari government as a relief from the
corrupt and scandalous Shagari government. At the same time, they looked
forward to a faster containment of the economic crisis. The Buhari
government responded to the worsening economic crisis by adopting some
aUstere fiscal and monetary policies. These included drastic reduction in
public expenditure, increased interest rates and stricter tax laws enforcement.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------519 Biersteker, "Reaching Agreement .... ", supra
520 Ibid
521 Ibid
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Although the new government did not immediately abolish the corrupt
import license scheme of its predecessor, they, however, imposed stricter
guidelines in its operation. Predictably, these measures worsened the
economic conditions of the citizens and the industrial sector.
The high rate of unemployment implied the unavailability of jobs for the
citizens, both skilled and unskilled. For the employed, there was a higher
sense of job insecurity resulting from the daily retrenchments and layoffs
prevalent in the country. Concomitant to job insecurity was the state of
under-employment and irregular wage payments. Social services also became
increasingly expensive for both the employed and unemployed.522
The production sector of the economy fared worse. The full weight of the
austere fiscal and monetary policies, although necessary to combat the
economic situation, fell upon the industrial sector.523 Consequently, many
could not afford to continue producing on full capacity and had to layoff
their non-essential workers. Cost of procuring raw materials and replacement

•
equipment parts became exorbitant.524
-----------------------------------522 Bangura et aI, "The Deepening Economic Crisis", supra
523 Ibid
524 Ibid
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Buhari's Blue Book:

-

After initially imposing stricter fiscal and economic policies,525 the Buhari
government developed and released The Blue Book in 1984.526 The Blue
Book was a comprehensivEfeport t hat included some of the provisions of the
1982 Stabilization Act, some of the provisions of the Odama report, as well
as those recommendations of the IMF and the W orId Bank which were
acceptable to the government.527
The Blue Book stated the justifications for the overthrow of the Shagari
government as follows:
1. the mismanagement of the Nigerian economy;

2. lack of political accountability;

I:

3. causing the deterioration in the quality of life of the average citizen;

4. insensitive political leadership;
5. preemptive intervention to prevent the drift towards economic collapse and

•
-------------------------------------525 Okome, supra, classified these initial fiscal and economic responses by the Buhari government as domestic
solutions. I concur, but must add that they were aimed to serve as very interim measures while searching for more
effective measures. At the same time, the new government needed to buy time to undertake a more comprehensive
study of the extent of the situation and proffer more effective solutions. This position became evident in the
government's release of The Blue Book.
526 See Yusufu Bala Usman, Nigeria Against the IMF ... , supra
527 Ibid
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political chaos.528
The Blue Book also analyzed the consequences of the country's overdependence on oil revenue and identified the following consequences:
1. a shift in the pattern of investment to the construction and service
sectors;
2. an increase in the importation of goods;
3. neglect of the agricultural sector resulting in the shortage of food
supplies;
4. loss of foreign exchange earnings from agricultural exports; and

,.'

5. the massive population shift from the rural to the urban areas.529
Another critical aspect of The Blue Book report was the mismanagement and

:i

indiscipline of the Shagari government which they attributed to their policy
failures. Some of the consequences of the Shagari government's
mismanagement and indiscipline include the following:
1. overspending on social programs;
2. inflation and non-execution of contracts;

3. increased numbers of political appointees;

---------528 Ibid
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4. huge budget deficits; and
5. increased internal and external debts at all levels of government.530
Finally, The Blue Book made some recommendations for tackling the
economic crisis as follows:
1. the repayment of federal and state governments' external and domestic
debts as a matter of priority;
2. increased internal revenue through efficient collection of taxes and
levies;
3. reduction in government expenditure, particularly on social services to
combat budget deficits;
4. retrenchment of workers;
5. freeze on salaries and wages and the elimination of allowances;
6. freeze in hiring new government employees;
7. closer regulation and taxing of traders and artisans;
8. support of private capital in its industrial, agricultural and other
investments;
9. commercialization and privatization of parastatals;

--------529 Ibid
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10.

local sourcing of raw materials;

11.

government spending to foster improvements in power and

telecommunications;
12.

increased government involvement in distributing goods at many
different levels;

13.

increased controls on expenditure and foreign exchange
allocation.531

In February 1984, the Buhari government re-activated the negotiations
between the Nigerian government and the IMF.532 The Fund insisted that
the new government must devalue the naira, increase the cut in government
subsidies, increase the cut in government expenditure, freeze any new loans
to state governments, and divide the government parastatals into social and
economic categories. The Fund also demanded that domestic interest rates be
further reviewed, more trade liberalization, including review of the import
restrictions and promotion of export. Again, the Fund demanded that the
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------530 Ibid
531 Ibid
532 The talks had been stalemated due in part to the Shagari government's refusal to comply with all the
conditionalities imposed by the Fund prior to their full engagement in the crisis management or solution. The
Overthrow of the Shagari government further contributed to the cessation of talks between the government and the
Fund.
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Buhari government comply with all their demands before they can engage
them in solving the increasing economic crisis. Like the Shagari government,
the Buhari government through the Minister of Finance,533 countered that
they were willing to implement the non-disputable conditionalities while
engaging in further talks regarding the disputable conditionalities.

In order to prove their willingness to cooperate with the Fund, the
government cut the budget deficit from N6.2 billion in 1983 to N3.3 billion
in 1984.534 The government imposed a general wage freeze on all
government employees, while on the other hand, 250,000 government
employees were fired. The subsidies that had been extended to the education
sector and the social services sector were also withdrawn, and replaced with
levies and fees.535 The government further reduced grants and subventions
to parastatals and public enterprises. The parastatals were categorized into
economic enterprises and social services enterprises, with a view to

533 The Minister of Finance under the Buhari government was Dr. Onaolapo Soleye who led the team of Nigerian
negotiators during the talks.
534 See Thomas Callghy, "Lost between State and Market: The Politics of Econornic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia
Nigeria," in Joan Nelson, ed. Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, Princeton University Press, 1990.
535 Ibid
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commercializing the parastatals.536 The government resisted the demand to
remove the petroleum subsidy, but rather intensified their efforts to curb
crude oil bunkering and the smuggling of petroleum products.537

While the Buhari government was doing their very best to meet the
expectations of the Fund, it was also engaged in another battle of credibility
domestically.538 As part of their War Against Indiscipline (WAI) campaign,
the government commenced a series of military tribunal prosecutions to try
those charged with us crimes during the ousted Shagari government.
Concurrently, the vibrant Nigerian press was handicapped by draconian
decrees like the Decree number 2, which empowered the government to arrest

and detain any person without trial; and Decree number 4 (The Public
Officers Protection Against False Accusation Decree) which imposed prison
term for the publication of any information found to be false.539 At the same
time, government banned all public demonstrations and processions, subject
to government approval and authorization. The government refused to
--------------------------------536 See the Nigerian Newswatch magazine of October 14, 1985, p.14.
537 Ibid
307 For a good perspective on the Buhari government's policies, see, " Buhari Delivers Independence Day Speech,"
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engage the public in any discussions relating to a possible return to
democratic rule.540 At this point, the government was beginning to feel
threatened in both directions: one from the Fund and its uncompromising
conditionalities, and the other from the citizens who were beginning to lose
their patience with the draconian rule of the government and the slow pace of
economIc recovery.

The Buhari government refused to comply with all of the Fund's
conditionalities on the same argument advanced by the Shagari government.
The government was convinced that the devaluation of the naira,
privatization of the parastatals and the removal of the petroleum subsidy

.,

would have worse implications for the Nigerian economy. While the
government reserved the right to agree to devalue the currency as a last
resort, it advocated a gradual devaluation contrary to the wholesome 50
percent devaluation advocated by the Fund. Again, the Buhari government
.responded that the currency devaluation conditionality was "irrelevant"
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FBIS-MEA, 1 October, 1984, pp. Tl-T3
539 See "Idiagbon Cautions Press on Writings of Ex-Politicos", FBIS-MEA, 28 March, 1984 p. T4
540 See the West Africa magazine, 7 April, 1984, p.968; Shehu Othman, "Nigeria: Power for Profit: Class,
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because the country's petroleum exports were denominated in US dollars and
the local industries were import dependent. Moreover, the government feared
that such devaluation will cause sudden and unmanageable inflation in the
economy.541

While the negotiation with the Fund was in progress, the government
engaged the Paris and London Clubs for shorter term financial assistance. In
their negotiations with the Clubs, the issue of the exact amount of Nigeria's
debt as well as the interest amount owed on uninsured trade debts became
disputed. The government reacted by appointing the Chase Manhattan Bank
of New York to represent the government with a view to resolving the issues.
In the interim, the government succeeded in obtaining a loan of $1 billion
from a syndicate headed by the Barclay's Bank of London to facilitate
payment of trade debts owed to exporters insured by the British Export
Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD).542 Thereafter, Nigeria was
pressurized to reach complete agreement with the Fund before any further
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------COrporatism and Factionalism in the Military" in Doanl Cruise O'Brien, ed. Contemporary West African States,

New York, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p.137; cited in Okome, supra.
541 See, Biersteker, "Reaching Agreement. ... ", supra
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financial assistance will be approved.543 The World Ban~, for instance,
refused to approve the government's pending application for a SAL unless it

fully complies with the IMF's conditionalities. The country's lines of credit
were blocked, while the foreign creditors mounted increasing pressure on the
government to honor their debts.544 Some of the country's creditors agreed
to reschedule the debts owed in the amount of $2.5 billion in uninsured trade
arrears when the country's foreign exchange reserves fell to less than $1
billion. The deal allowed the country a grace period of two and a half years
and an interest rate of 1 percent above the London Inter-Bank Rate
(LIBOR)545

After the negotiation deadlock, the government and the Fund resumed a fresh
round of negotiations in May 1984. However, this round of talks did not last.
Although the Fund had lowered the bar on the naira devaluation from 50
percent to 30-35 percent, the government refused to comply with the
cnditionality, insisting on a gradual devaluation process. In frustration, the
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------542 Olukoshi, "The Role of the IMF & World Bank .... " supra
543 See, Government, U.K. Yet to Agree on Trade Payments" FBIS-MEA, 25 June, 1984, p. T2
544 Ibid
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Fund formally declined Nigeria's loan application in July 1984.546 The
government reacted by designing its own indigenous stabilization program in
1985. One of the goals of the program was to increase the debt service ratio
from 30.3 percent in 1984 to 44 percent in 1985.547 Also, the program
sought to increase the country's foreign exchange earnings by introducing
counter-trade schemes with trading partners like Brazil, lobbying OPEC to
increase production quota,548 cutting the price of Nigeria's crude oil and
overproduction of crude oil. In the meantime, Nigeria sought a short term
loan from Saudi Arabia in the amount ofN1.6 billion. The US government
blocked the loan by advising the Saudi government to insist that Nigeria
make a deal with IMF.549

The Buhari government notwithstanding the deadlock in formal negotiations
with the Fund, nevertheless, maintained informal negotiations with the Fund.
In October 1984, there appeared to be a breakthrough when the government
announced that the Fund was willing to conclude negotiations without
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------545 Biersteker, "Reaching Agreement ...... " supra
546 Ibid
.
547 Ibid
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insisting on two of the three disputed conditionalities.550 The Fund, through
its representative, confirmed the possibility of a deal in November 1984, if
the government will agree to a major devaluation of the naira. By January
1985 the Fund proposed that the naira be devalued by 25 percent immediately
and by another 25 percent later. Such a drastic devaluation was again rejected
by the government which on its own had devalued the naira from Nl = $1.33

in January 1984 to Nl

=

$1.12 in March 1985.551 The Fund insisted that the

rate of devaluation was still insignificant and unacceptable.

In the final analysis, the Buhari government continued to implement its
independently designed and indigenous stabilization program without the
Fund's approval and agreement.552 At the same time, it continued to wage
its self-proclaimed war against indiscipline domestically. The combined
effect of both "wars" on the government policies and the citizens contributed
tmmensely in fertilizing the conducive environment for the palace coup of

•
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------548 See "Oil Seen as Way To Achieve Self-Sufficiency," FBIS-MEA, 23 October, 1984, p. T5.
549 Biersteker, supra
550 The announcement was made by the Minister of Finance, Dr. Soleye. For further details, see, "Finance Minister
on Economy, IMF Loan," FBIS-MEA, 22 October, 1984.
551 See West Africa, 9 September, 1985.
552 See Olukoshi & Herbst, Nigeria, supra. See also Biersteker, "Reaching Agreement ..... " supra
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August 27, 1985.

III.

THE BABANGIDA GOVERNMENT (1985-1993)

On August 27, 1985, the Army Chief under the Buhari government, Major
General Ibrahim B. Babangida, popularly known as "IBB", overthrew the
government of Buhari in a palace coup. Immediately upon usurpation of
power, Babangida promised that his government would "break the deadlock
in the negotiations with a view to evaluating more objectively, both the
negative and positive implications of reaching a mutual agreement with the
IMF" (italics mine).553 At the same time, Nigerians, particularly; the
organized labor unions, professional groups, as well as student groups were
united in their opposition of IMF prescribed conditionalities.554 Cognizant
of the strong public opposition to the IMF and its conditionalities, and yet
Willing to appear to be conciliatory, the Babangida government appointed a

•
-----------------------------------553 See West Africa, September 9, 1985
554 See Financial Times of September 20, 1985, article captioned, "Nigerians reluctant to take IMF's bitter
r~llledy." Compounding the economic situation of the country at the same time was the unprecedented drop in crude
011 revenue from $28 per barrel to $1 per barrel.
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panel to study the desirability or otherwise of accepting the IMF deal.555
Some commentators argue that the establishment of the panel was primarily
aimed at accomplishing two objectives:556
1. to estimate the magnitude of anti-IMF sentiment, and
2. to demonstrate the regime's commitment to human rights to the
Nigerian public.
Others argue, however, that it was ploy by the new government to buy time
"until the regime had devised a strategy for taking a decision that it had
intended all along."557 This author concurs with the latter analysis given the
government's final position on the recommendations of the panel.

The new government also announced a couple of policy decisions aimed at
seeking public approval and cooperation.558 The notorious Decree number 4
was repealed, however; the sister Decree number 2 was continued. Some

journalists and politicians not yet charged and tried by the Buhari
-----------------------------------555 The Nigerian Newswatch magazine article of October 14, 1985, entitled, "The Great IMF Debate: Nigerians
argue the merits and demerits of an IMF loan."
556 Olukoshi & Herbst, supra
557 Okome, A Sapped Democracy, supra, p. 107
558 See Callaghy "Lost between State and Market. ... " supra. See also, "Newspapers Assess Babangida's
Performance, Regime," FBIS-MEA, December 6,1985, p. 13.

249

•

government were released. The National Security Organization which had
carried out most of the arrest and prosecution under the previous government
was disbanded and publicly ridiculed. The new government also signaled its
intention to begin the process to return the country to multi-party
democracy. 559

The IMF Debate: Whether to accept or reject the IMF loan
The nine-member panel that was set up by the Babangida government to
conduct the IMF debate was chaired by Abubakar Abdulkadir.560 The
committee was charged with the task of organizing the debate to determine
whether the Nigerian government should accept or reject a loan of $2.5
billion from the IMF. The debate was intended to be carried out by public
speeches, pronouncements, street demonstrations, discussions, seminars and
special reports and interviews in the mass media.561

•
--------------------------------~-SS9 Ibid, see also Olukoshi & Herbst, supra, p. 26
S60 At the time, Mr. Abdulkadir was the Managing Director of the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB).
Other members of the panel were drawn from the business community, the academia, bankers and civil service.
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Although the debate was meant as an opportunity for the government to
gather public opinion on the best policy choice to make, it was evident from
the beginning of the exercise that the government desired the choice to accept
the loan. Signaling the government's preference in the matter, Babangida had
stated in his maiden speech to the nation that: "Austerity without structural
adjustment is not the solution to our economic predicament. "(italics
mine)562 Leading the government's team in support of the acceptance of the
loan was the newly appointed Minister of Finance, Dr. Kalu Idika Kalu, who
was a former W orId Bank economist. Also, in support of the team was the
resident representative of the W orId Bank, Ishrat Hussain, as well as the
,t

commercial sector, some indigenous entrepreneurs, and representatives of

:·;:·i

foreign capita1.563 The supporters of the loan claimed that the loan and the
concomitant conditionalities were precisely the best prescription for the
ailing Nigerian economy. The position of this group could be summarized by
the remarks of the then Minister of Finance, Dr. Kalu Idika Kalu, when he
said, "in fact, you are getting yourself a new lease of life with the
----------------------~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

561 See Biersteker, "Reaching Agreement ...... " supra, p. 24.
562 See Financial Times, Friday, September 20, 1985.
563 See Newswatch, The Great Debate, supra. See also Remi Akano, ed., Nigeria and the IMF, supra.
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loan. "(italics mine)564 Other supporters of taking the loan included the US
deputy assistant secretary of commerce, David Diebold, who promised that
the Reagan administration will greatly assist the new government if it reached
an agreement with the Fund.565

In opposition of the loan was a formidable coalition comprised of organized
labor, bankers, intellectuals, local manufacturers, students, professionals,
journalists, market women, etc.566 According to this group, the rejection of
the IMF loan was critical in order to assert and maintain the economic
independence of the country. Whilst the group appreciated the influx of
additional capital from the loan, they nevertheless questioned the social and
economic implications of the loan. They were, no doubt, afraid of accepting
the loan which may tum out to be the proverbial "white elephant" gift. Some
within the group questioned the difference between the IMF's loan and
conditionalities and the Buhari's austerity policy hich was currently in

-------------------------------------564 Ibid
565 See the Report of the Conference: Nigeria'S Economic Recovery, Lagos, Nigeria, September 24-25, 1985. This
Conference was con-sponsored by the Nigerian-American Chamber of Commerce and the African American Institute.
See also the Africa Economic Digest, Vol. 6, No 35, 7-13 September, 1986.
566 Ibid
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place.567 The opposition group also feared that the combined effects of the
naira devaluation and subsidy removal will signal a huge increase in food
prices and basic social amenities.

While the debate progressed, the economic situation of the country worsened.
Some of the Western banks refused to confirm the letters of credit emanating
from Nigerian banks. Others went as far as withdrawing the lines of credit
that they had opened for some Nigerian banks.568 Time was running out for
the Babangida government and a choice had to be made.

Babangida's Final Choice:
We had concurred with the proposition that the Babangida government
wanted to buy time in order to implement the economic policy that they had
in mind. The establishment of the panel to conduct the IMF debate was
simply a ploy to appear to be sensitive to the wishes of the Nigerian public.
From inception, the government had maintained their neutrality in the whole
-------------------------------------567 See West Africa, "Nigeria and the IMF", 9 September, 1985
568 See the New Nigerian newspapers, Friday, September 27,1985. Article entitled, "Nigerians Must Belt up
PreSident Babangida."
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process, but in practice, the government had canvassed for the acceptance of
the loan. In his interview with the New Nigerian newspaper, Babangida
maintained that:
"I did emphasize that we wanted to break the deadlock as far as the
negotiation on IMP was concerned because we went into it as far back as
1983 ...... but in doing so, all our decisions must be governed by the yearnings
and aspirations of the Nigerian people and we threw it out for debate ....
It is the decision of the people that we will carry along to the negotiation
table. "569

Contrary to his assurances to abide "by the yearnings and aspirations of the
Nigerian people" in the outcome of the debate, Babangida ultimately made a
,;jl

choice that was totally contrary to the yearnings and aspirations of the
Nigerian people. In December 1985, the Abdulkadir-led panel submitted their
report from the debate to the Babangida government. The panel, in
consonance with the overwhelming wishes of the Nigerian public,
recommended that the government reject the IMF loan and the concomitant
IMF's structural adjustment program (SAP). The government responded by
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accepting the recommendation to reject the Fund's loan but announced that it
would design a "home-grown" adjustment program. 570

The government immediately developed a structural adjustment program that
was only "home-grown" in name, but essentially a prototype IMF/WorId
Bank strq,ctural adjustment program. It has been stated on good authority
that, indeed, the W orId Bank resident representative in Nigeria, Dr. Ishrat
Husain, who was actively involved in the debate also collaborated with the
government officials in designing the program.571
One commentator described the program as follows:
"A comprehensive reform program, one certainly unprecedented in the
;::'111

Nigerian context. It was, in effect, the equivalent of an IMF stabilization and
..structural change package. In fact, in some areas, it probably went further

569 See the New Nigerian, September 27, 1985
570 The term "home-grown" was used by Okome, supra. For greater details on the government's decision, see
"Babangida Announces Rejection ofIMF Loan" FBIS-MEA, 13 December, 1985 pp. T3-T4. See also, "Babangida
Discusses Economic Measures, Aims," FBIS-MEA, 27 December, 1985 p.T7. Also, West Africa, 13 January, 1986,
p.51.
571 See Paul Beckett, "Structural Adjustment and Democracy: Reflections on the Nigerian Experience" in Lual
Deng, Markus Kostner & Crawford Young eds, Democratization and Structural Adjustment in Africa in the 1990s,
Madison, Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 1991, p. 159. See also Callaghy, "Lost between State and
Market.. .. ", supra
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than the IMF would have. "572

On December 31, 1985, President Babangida573 presented the budget for the
1996 fiscal year. The budget essentially unveiled all the details of the new
economic reform program.574 It contained provisions regarding the
devaluation of the naira, subsidy removal and privatization. It also proposed a
cut of 3 percent and 19 percent for government spending and defense
spending, respectively. The country's debt servicing was reduced from 44
percent to 30 percent, while the government also re-iterated its commitment
to return the country to civil rule timely.575 Babangida praised the budget
provisions as "the beginning of a new path, and the inauguration of a new
era; the era of economic reconstruction, social justice and self-reliance."576
The budget practically ratified all the contentious aspects of the IMF
conditionalities which had served as the bottleneck in reaching an agreement

572 See Callaghy, "Lost between State and Market. .. " supra. See also, "Nigeria's Economy Under the Knife: The
Depth of Nigeria's Crisis is Spelled Out in the Government's own Confidential Assessment which AB has obtained,"
an article that appeared in the African Business of August 1986, pp. 42-43
573 Upon seizure of power, General Babangida adopted the title of "President," contrary to the practice offormer
Il1ilitary rulers who were addressed as "Head of State." Thus, he became the first military president of the country.
574 See "The Babangida Charter" in the West Africa of 13 January, 1986, p. 5l. See also the "Budget Speech" in
FSIS-MEA.
575 See the Africa Economic Digest, "Nigeria takes tough line on debt payments," 4 January 1986, p.2
576 Ibid
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between the previous Nigerian governments and the IMF. The government
acceded to the conditionality regarding subsidy removal in the oil sector by
proposing an 80 percent increase in the price of petroleum products.577 The
devaluation condition was met by the proposal to establish a two-tier foreign
exchange market. The first tier will be used for debt servicing and will
operate on the existing exchange rate of the naira. The second tier foreign
exchange market (SFEM) will service all other commercial transactions.
Under this latter tier, the value of the naira will be determined in a foreign
exchange auction mechanism that will be conducted by the Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN).578 Privatization will be conducted with regard to the
government's parastatals. The only contentious conditionality that the
government refused to accede to was the demand for trade liberalization.579

, Interestingly, although the Babangida's government had almost acceded to all
the previously contentious conditionalities, the IMF did not immediately give

•
its blessings to the reform program. This is notwithstanding the fact that the
-------------------------------577 Ibid
578 Ibid
579 Ibid
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World Bank had played a very critical role in the design and formulation of
the program. It may be that the IMF felt that the government had, like its
predecessors, cherry-picked the conditionalities to implement. It may also be
that the Fund was displeased with the government for the clever way it
manipulated the outcome of the debate. It is pertinent to note that the
government had cleverly manipulated the outcome of the debate by taking the
. following courses of action:
1. It appealed to the popular yearnings of the Nigerian public by
appearing to reject the IMF loan and conditionalities; yet
2. It jettisoned the Fund and accepted the World Bank loan through the
Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) of the Bank. As we stated earlier,
Mr. Husain Ishrat, World Bank representative in Nigeria, was not only
involved in the debate, but collaborated in fashioning the program.

Apparently, the IMF wanted the government to implement the whole

•
Contentious conditionalities even though the only one left out was the trade
liberalization condition. In fact, it has been said that the World Bank refused
to openly endorse the program due to pressure from the Fund and the US
258

Treasury Department.580
In the meantime, the London Club of creditors granted Nigeria a 90 day

moratorium on the outstanding debt of $7.5 billion. The Paris Club, under
pressure from the Fund, refused to grant the country any moratorium. On
October 16, 1986, the World Bank approved a loan of $452 million for the
implementation of the SFEM. The London Club later extended the
moratorium by an additional three months period.581 The IMF continued to
withhold its blessing for the economic program until September 5, 1986,
when the government and the Fund signed a letter of intent. That letter was
subsequently ratified by the Executive Board of the Fund on December 12,
1986. The agreement provided the country the long-awaited life-line in the
form ofSDR 650 million from the Fund, effective January 30,1987.582
Simultaneously, the London Club and the Paris Club agreed to re-schedule
the country's debts of $3.8 million and $6.5 million, respectively.583
At the same time that the government announced this economic reform
program, the government was also aggressively embarking upon a political
----------------------------------580 01ukoshi and Herbst, supra
581 See "World Bank Approves $452 Million Loan,"FBIS-MEA, 20 October, 1986, p. T2.
582 01ukoshi & Herbst, supra
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reform program. Thus, the Babangida government set out to accomplish the
unprecedented feat of embarking upon two major reforms at the same
time.584

IV

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S EXPERIENCE

INTRODUCTION

From 1910 to the end of World War II, Japan colonized what is currently
known as North and South Korea. However, after the war, the Soviet and the
th

United States embarked upon the division at the 38 Parallel, which created

the trusteeship rights over the North and South Korea, respectively.

~-------------------------------------------

583 Ibid
584 Okome, supra. The author also credits the adoption of SAP by the Babangida government to the influence
eXerted by the IMF, the W orid Bank and other external creditors, who insist that the fulfillment of conditionalities
Was a prerequisite for access to debt relief.
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Although the country is generally known as South Korea, it is officially
addressed as the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.). A product of the end of World
War II, with the surrender of Japan to the Allied Powers in 1945, the R.O.K.
was established on August 15, 1948.585 The Democratic People's Republic

of Korea (D.P.R.K.) or North Korea, on the contrary, was established on
September 9, 1948.586

Since the division of Korea into North and South, and establishment of the
trusteeship arrangement, there has been no love lost between the sisternations. Less than a year after their establishments, 587North Korean forces
invaded South Korea, sparking off another major international crisis which
pitched the R.O.K and the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) on the
one side and the D.P.R.K. and China on the other side. Eventually, the crisis
was brought to an end when the Armistice Agreement was signed by the
representatives of the Korean People's Army, the Chinese People's

•
Volunteers, and the U.S. -led United Nations Command (UNC). The R.O.K.

-----------------------585 The first President of the R.O.K. was Syngman Rhee.
586 The first leader of the D.P.R.K. was Kim II Sung.
587 North Korean forces invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950.
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refused to sign the Agreement.S88

With a population of 48.42 million people inhabiting a total land area of

98,477 square kilometers (38,022 square miles), the R.O.K has one of the
world's highest population densities. Also, given the fact that almost all
Koreans share the same cultural and linguistic heritage, the population is said
to be one of the most ethnically and linguistically homogenous in the
world.S89

Although ethnically and linguistically homogenous, only fifty percent of the
population actively practices religion. Amongst the religious group,
Christians comprise 49 percent, while Buddhists comprise 47 percent.
Confucianists comprise 3 percent, while the remaining 1 percent is comprised
of a combination of Shamanism (traditional spirit worship) and Chondogyo
(Heavenly Way).

•

-----------------------------------588 By the end of the war, almost three million Koreans were estimated dead or wounded, while another estimated
l11ilIions were left homeless and separated from their families.
589 The exception to the population mix is the very insignificant 20,000 people that comprise the Chinese
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The R.O.K. is governed by a republican form of government consisting of the
Executive branch, the Legislative branch and the Judiciary. The Executive
branch is comprised of the President, who acts as the head of state, and the
Prime Minister, who acts as the head of government. The Legislative branch
is comprised of a unicameral National Assembly, while the Judiciary is
comprised of the Supreme Court, the Appellate Courts, and the
Constitutional Court. The country is administratively divided into Nine
provinces and sevencities.590

Although the R.O.K has been governed mostly by the military, the economy
has performed impressively. For instance, in 1963, the per capita Gross
National Income (GNI) was estimated at $100. By 2004, the same GNI stood
at over $14,000. At thesame time, the country's Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), stood at $680.1 billion. The country's gross exports in 2004 was
estimated at $257.7 billion which was derived mainly from electronic
products, (semiconductors, cellular phones, computers), automobiles,
l11achinery and equipment, steel, ships, textiles, etc. The major markets for
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Community.
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these exports include China (and Hong Kong), which accounts for 19.6% of
the total exports, the United States, which accounts for 16.9% of the total
exports, the European Union which accounts for 12.8%, and Japan which
accounts for 8.50/0. On the contrary, the country's gross imports in the same
year was estimated at $219.6 billion, which comprised crude oil, food,
machinery and transportation equipment, chemicals and chemical products,
base metals and articles. These imports were supplied by Japan which
accounts for 20.60/0, China which accounts for 13.1 %, the U.S. which
accounts for 12.8%, and the European Union which accounts for 10.8%.

The R.O.K's economy has performed tremendously well that in 2004, it
ranked as the 11 th largest economy in the world. However, the economy has
. been showing signs of slowing down in recent years, particularly, since the
1997-98 economic crises.591 Some of the factors attributable for the weak
economic performance include the rigid relationship between the employers
and employees, the underdeveloped financial markets, the aging working
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------590 The seven cities are Seoul, Pusan, Incheon, Daegu, Gwangju, Daejeon, and Ulsan.
591 The R.O.K survived the 1997-98 economic crises due to a combination of the huge IMP assistance and the
extensive financial reforms that restored market stability and confidence.
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population, and the lack of efficient regulation of the sector.

THE R.O.K AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The scope of this research limits any attempt to cover all conceivable impacts
of the IFIs on the R.O.K. However, I will use the single most devastating
financial and economic crisis that beset the R.O.K. to illustrate the role of the
IFIs before, during and after the crisis. By so doing, hopefully, we can fully
appreciate the tremendous impact of the IFIs on the current shape, form and
direction of the R.O.K's economy, politics, society, etc.

The R.O.K. became a member of the IMF on August 26, 1955. But
membership of the IMF, or indeed, any other IFIs did not contribute to the
spectacular transformation of the one time poor country into what became the
model for many developing countries. The transformation can be appreciated
from the statistics that indicate that in 1965, for example, the country had a
per capita GDP that was less than that of the Philippines. However, by 1995,
the country's per capita income (GNP) was $13,269, compared with the
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$2,475 of the Philippines. Statistically, this accounted for a 770% increase in

30 years,592 while the economy grew averagely 7% per annum, making the
economy the 11 th largest in the world at the time. As a beautiful bride, the
R.O.K. was invited by many elite economic clubs, and consequently, joined
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on
September 30, 1996.593

Further, the R.O.K. was described in the 1996 report of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as the outstanding
example of an "emerging donor". The report also described the R.O.K. as a
"country that has successfully broken out of aid dependence"; having
received aids totaling $4.8 billion since independence in 1945.594

Less than a year later, the economic tide turned against the R.O.K. The
economy took a tum for the worse. The R.O.K's balance of trade with Japan
-----------------------------------592 Vinod Ahuja, et ai, Everyone's Miracle? Revisiting Poverty and Inequality in East Asia, Washington, World
Bank, 1997, cited by Walden, et ai, TAMIN THE TIGERS: THE IMF AND THE ASIAN CRISIS, Third World
Quarterly, 01436597, Sept 98, Vol. 19, Issue 3
593 See' South Korea leaves developing world', Inter Press Service, 30 September 1997. In fact, the admission of
the R.O.K into the OEeD was referred to as joining the elite 'rich man's club'.
594 id
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and the USA was worsening. For instance, in 1987, the R.O.K enjoyed a
trade surplus of$9.6 billion with the USA. But by 1996, the trade surplus had
turned into a trade deficit of over $10 billion, while its total trade deficit was
approximately $21 billion.

By October 1997, the situation had become very critical. In fact, by that time,

the total loan amount that was in default by the R.O.K's businesses was
estimated at over $50 billion. In the light of this situation, the foreign banks
which had provided the needed financial life-line froze all new loans to the
R.O.K.595 Not only the businesses were in default of their loan obligations;
the government also, was in financial dire straits faced with the repayment of

$66 billion in foreign debt. The R.O.K. had no alternative than to join
Thailand and Indonesia to apply for the IMF life-line.

•
-----------------------------------595 The foreign banks at the time already had about $200 billion worth of investments and loans in the R.O.K. In
reaction to the general economic and financial situation in the country, they apparently wanted to mitigate their
potential losses by freezing the approval of new loans. Note 257, supra.
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. THE IMF PACKAGE

Given the extreme situation that the R.O.K. was facing, the IMF had to
devise a means to circumvent its lending policy that no financial package
shall exceed five times the recipient country's IMF quota. Consequently, the

IMF invented a new kind of loan called the 'Supplemental Reserve Facility',
that allowed it to contribute $21 billion of the total $57 billion package to the
R.O.K.596

The total loan package of $57 billion was contributed by the IMF ($21
billion), the World Bank ($10 billion), the Asian Development Bank ($4
billion), Japan ($10 billion), the USA ($5 billion), Australia and Brunei ($1
billion each), while Canada, France, Germany, and the UK contributed ($1.25
billion each). The conditions attached to the package included a long list of
economic, institutional, labor and industrial reforms by the government.

•
--------------------------------596 It is noteworthy to point out that the $57 billion financial package extended to the R.O.K. exceeded the previous
record loan of $17.8 billion to Mexico in 1995. It also represents more than 20 times the quota available to the
a.O.K. in 1997.
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The key fiscal and monetary conditions of the package included tightening
monetary policy, raising interest rates from 12.50/0 to 21 % to curtail liquidity,
controlling money supply to contain inflation at or below 5%, floating the
exclmge rate, maintaining a balanced or slight surplus budget, increasing the
value added tax (V A T) and expanding corporate and income tax bases.

The key institutional conditions of the package included establishing an
independent central bank, closing ailing financial institutions, imposing the
debt-to-equity ratio of the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) on the
local banks as well as opening the local market for foreign banks to establish
their subsidiaries. Further, the package calls for more trade liberalization,
capital account liberalization, corporate governance and structure review, and
labor market reform.

Some commentators have suggested that the IMF as well as other donors to
the package used the opportunity to extract from the R.O.K. concessions that
they had long sought but could not get. Others posit that some of the
concessions or conditions of the package covered areas that were unrelated to
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the economic crisis.597 For instance, an editorial in the Financial Times
cautioned as follows598:
. "both the government and the IMF must exercise care. Korea faces a private
sector financial crisis, not the sort of government-inspired payments problem
to which the IMF is traditionally used. Its current account deficit is low and
falling, and there is a history of balanced budgets. Stringent fiscal restraint
would compound the impact of private sector adjustment. The government
can afford to borrow to finance its banks rescue. Insisting on tax increases
and spending cuts to meet the cost would smack of overkill."

Unfortunately, the IMF package caused a bad situation to become worse by
their insistence on fiscal restraint, tax increases, spending cuts, monetary
tightening and more financial liberalization. To buttress these contradictions,
Professor Sachs stated:
'The won has depreciated by about 80% in the past 12 months, from around

840 to the dollar to a (then) record low of 1565 yesterday (10 December,
-----------------------------------597 Jeffrey D. Sachs, the Harvard's Institute for International Development director, in the wake of the deal,
aCcused the IMF of secrecy and attempting to compel all the country's presidential candidates to endorse the
agreement which they had no part in drafting and no time to understand. For further reading, see, Jeffrey D. Sachs,
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1997). This currency depreciation will force up the price of traded goods.
Yet, despite that the IMF insists that Korea aim for essentially unchanged
inflation rates .... to achieve unchanged low inflation in the face of huge
currency depreciation Korea will need a monetary squeeze. And this is
indeed what the Fund has ordered. Short term interest rates jumped from
12.5. to 21 per cent on the signing of the agreement, and have since risen
further.' 599

The consequences of the IMF prescriptions were predictable: money is in
short supply, credit is expensive, companies can't afford credit, companies
collapse, and people lose their jobs, consumer demand declines, and so on. In
order to meet the new BIS debt-to-equity standards, the local banks closed
their lending services and refused to roll over existing loans. The situation
immediately got so bad that it has been correctly attributed to an equivalent
of 'fanning the flames'600, as well as 'overkill' .601

•
'------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------'IMF is a power unto itself, Financial Times, 11 December, 1997. Cited in Note 257, supra.
598 See the Financial Times of27 November, 1997.
599 Note 263, supra
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The general criticisms of the IMF in the handling of the R.O.K's crisis in
1997 can be summarized as follows:
1. Faulty advice
The Fund failed to distinguish between private sector debt crisis as was
faced by the R.O.K., and public sector crisis. Consequently, the measures
imposed by the Fund in dealing with the R.O.K's crisis like budget cuts,
hiking interest rates and taxes were in the domain of public sector debt
crisis management, and not private sector situation as was faced by the
R.O.K.602
2. Moral hazard
By bailing out countries in dire financial situations, the Fund has been
accused of creating a morally hazardous situation which saves creditors
and debtors who engage in unwise financial transactions.
3. Inequitable distribution of adjustment pain
The Fund has also been criticized for their inequitable distribution of the
adjustment pain between 'domestic' and 'foreign' interests. According to
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------600 Note 257, supra
601 Note 262, supra
602 In another scathing piece on the same subject matter, Professor Sachs noted 'the currency crisis is not the result
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the critics, domestic firms are expected to deal with the market forces,
while foreign firms are protected in the reforms that form part of the
rescue package.
4. Extra-jurisdictional coverage
The Fund has been accused, and rightly so, of exploiting the opportunity
afforded it to intervene in distressed countries to act as the' global
economic policeman. '603 Professor Martin Feldstein hit the point on the
head when he cautioned as follows: "a nation's desperate need for shortterm financial help does not give the IMF the moral right to substitute its
technical judgments for the outcomes of the nation's political
process."604
5. Same-size-fits-all approach
The generic prescription that has become the hallmark of most IMF
reform packages has been attributed to the intellectual arrogance of the
Fund. The perception is that the policy makers in the Fund arrogantly
~----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

of Asian government profligacy. This is a crisis mate mainly in the private, albeit under-regulated, financial markets'.
"See Jeffrey D. Sachs, 'The wrong medicine for Asia', New York Times, 3 November; 1997.
• 603 See Note 258, supra
604 See Martin Feldstein, 'Refocusing the IMF', Foreign Affairs, MarchiApril1998, cited in Note 258. Professor
Feldstein is of faculty at Harvard University and also the President of the National Bureau of Economic Research, as
Well as a former adviser to US President Ronald Reagan.
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believe that they have all the answers to the variety of financial problems
that challenge different countries. Their prescription, therefore, of the
same-size-fits-all reform package has been anything but the magical
solution that is needed in the variety of the situations. 60S

6. Agent ofneoliberalism
Finally the Fund has been labeled an agent of neoliberalism and free
market policies of its major shareholders, particularly, the United States.
This point was highlighted by Charlene Barshefsky in her testimony
before the US House Ways and Means Subcommittee, when she declared
as follows: 'Many of the structural reform components of the IMF
packages will contribute directly to improvements in the trade regimes in
those countries. If effectively implemented, these programs will
complement and reinforce our trade policy goals'. (Emphasis mine)606

•
-----------------------------------605 This scenario was illustrated by Joseph Stiglitz, when he wondered how effective the Fund's solutions can be
when those solutions were products of a system where 'economists would fly into a country, look at and attempt to
verify these data, and make macroeconomic recommendations for policy reforms, all in the space of a couple of
Weeks'. Cited in Note258.
606 This formed part of the testimony of Charlene Barshefsky, then us Trade Representative, before the us House
Ways and Means Trade Sub-committee in 1998. This was cited in Note 258.
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V

THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL'S EXPERIENCE

INTRODUCTION

Generally known as Brazil, the country is officially known as the Federative
Republic of Brazil. The country of 186 million people came into existence in
1500 when Pedro Alvares Cabral claimed the region called Brazil as a colony
of Portugal. From 1500 to 1808, the colony was ruled from Lisbon, Portugal.
When Napoleon's army invaded Lisbon, King Dom Joao VI and the entire
royal family fled and settled in Rio de Janeiro, where they set up the new
government. In 1821, however, King Dom Joao VI returned to Portugal. A
year later, his son, Dom Pedro I, declared Brazil's independence on
September 7, 1822, and became the first Emperor. After the reign of Dom
Pedro I, his son, Dom Pedro II took over and ruled Brazil from 1831 to 1889.

•
In 1889, Deodoro da Fonseca, Marshal of the Army, led a military coup and
thereafter established afederal republic. Under the republic form of
government, the presidency rotated between the dominant states of Sao Paulo
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and Minas Gerais from 1889 to 1930. In 1930, there was another military
coup which brought Getulio Vargas into the presidency. Vargas ruled Brazil
as a dictator until 1945. From 1945 to 1961, Brazil was ruled by Jose
Linhares, Gasper Dutra, Vargas (again), Cafe Filho, Carlos Luz, Nereu
Ramos, Juscelino Kubitschek, and Janio Quadros who was forced to resign in
1961. After the resignation of Quadros, his Vice President, Joao Goulart,
continued the presidency until 1964, when the military staged a coup.
Thereafter, the military began a long period of military rule that spanned
from 1964 to 1985.

By then, there had been established a transitional electoral college consisting

of all members of congress and six delegates chosen from each state to
choose the president. The electoral college, pursuant to its mandate, elected
Tancredo Neves as President on January 1, 1985. Shortly after his election,
President Neves took ill and died in April 1985 and was succeeded by his
Vice President, Jose Samey.
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In 1989, Brazil completed the electoral transition when Fernando Collor de
Mello was elected president in the first direct presidential election in over 20
years. Three years later, Mello's government was tarnished by a major
corruption scandal which culminated in his impeachment and resignation.
Consequently, Vice President Itamar Franco, succeeded him and completed
their term in 1994, when Fernando Henrique Cardoso was elected President.
President Cardoso was re-elected in 1998 for another four-year term due in
part to his aggressive economic reforms. In 2002, Luiz Inacio da Silva,
popularly known as Lula, was elected president for a four-year term.

In 2005, the population of Brazil was estimated to have reached 186 million
people, ranking the country the fifth in the world, as well as the most
populated country in Latin America. The population is comprised of six
major groups: the Portuguese, the Africans, other descents from Europe,
Middle East, Asia, as well as indigenous peoples of Tupi and Guarani.

•
However, it is worthy of note that Brazil remains the only Portuguesespeaking nation in the Americas with three quarters belonging to the Roman
Catholic Church, while the remainder belongs to the Protestant or indigenous
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African religions.
The country has a geographical land area of 8,511, 965 square kilometer (or
3,290,000 square miles). The major cities include the capital city, Brasilia,
with a population of 2.3 million residents; Sao Paulo, with a population of
10.8 million residents; Rio de Janeiro, with a population of 6.1 million
residents; Belo Horizonte with a population of 2.4 million residents. The
other cities include Salvador with a population of 2.6 million residents;
Fortaleza, with a population of 2.3 million residents; Recife with a population
of 1.5 million residents; Porto Alegre with a population of 1.4 million
residents; and Curitiba with a population of 1.7 million residents.

The federative republic of Brazil is comprised of 26 states and a federal
district. The federal government is made up of the executive branch, the
legislative branch, and the judicial branch. The 1988 constitution provides
that the president is the chief of state and head of government. The president
is elected to a four-year term of no more than two 4-year terms.607 The
legislature consists of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The Senators
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serve for eight years, however; two-thirds of the chamber undergoes election
at the same time, while the remaining one-third is up for election four years
later.608 On the contrary, the Chamber of Deputies serves for four years.609
The Judiciary consists of the Supreme Federal Tribunal. The 11 lifetime
members are appointed by the president.

Recently, the economy of Brazil has recorded steady growth in a variety of
the sectors. By 2005, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stood at $619.7
billion by official exchange rate, which was equivalent to $1.579 trillion in
purchasing power. The per capita Gross Domestic Product at the same period
was $8,400, while the annual real economic growth was approximately 2.4%.
Brazil's economic activities are based primarily on their huge natural
resources which included iron ore, manganese, bauxite, nickel, uranium,
gemstones, oil, wood, and aluminum. Given the fact that Brazil commands
14% of the world's renewable fresh water, agriculture plays a vital role in the
general economic activities of the country. Their agricultural products
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------607 President Luiz Inacio da Silva (Lula) was elected president in 2002 for a four year term.
608 The 81 member Senate have three representations for each state and the Federal District. They serve for 8 years.
609 The Chamber of Deputies has 513 members. They serve for 4 years.
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include coffee, soybeans, sugarcane, cocoa, rice, livestock, corn, oranges,
cotton, wheat, and tobacco. Another vital component of the economy are the
industrial products which include steel, commercial aircraft, chemicals,
petrochemicals, footwear, machinery, motors, vehicles, auto parts, consumer
durables, cement, and lumber. The services sector, another huge component
of the economy, includes mail, telecommunications, banking, energy,
commerce, and computing.

In 2005, Brazil recorded a $44 bi1lion trade balance surplus. The total export
receipts amounted to $118 bi1lion, while the exports were shipped to the
European Union which accounted for 25.00/0, United States which accounted
for 21.1 %, and Mercosur which accounted for 20.4%. Total imports under
the same period amounted to $62.8 bi1lion, and the major suppliers were
European Union which accounted for 25.4%, United States which accounted
for 2l.2%, Argentina which accounted for 7.6%, and China which accounted
for 5.6. 0/0.
Despite the modest growth recorded by the economy, there are sti1l some
critical economic and fiscal reforms that must be undertaken in order to
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guarantee a more vibrant and steady economic growth. The Lula
administration appears to be cognizant of these challenges and is poised to
remedy them. For instance, the government has passed key tax and pension
reforms to improve the fiscal accounts of the country. Part of the tax reform
was aimed at creating incentives for long-term savings and investments.
Also, judicial reform and the bankruptcy law reforms were embarked upon to
improve the credit market system. In an effort to attract private investment,
legislation has been passed aimed at promoting public private partnerships.

BRAZIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Again, the scope of this research limits any attempt to fully review the impact
of the international financial institutions (IF Is) on Brazil. Suffice it to say that
OUf

effort will be selective, yet covering the high points of the relationship

•
between the country and the IFIs. It is also worthy of mention that unlike the

R.O.K., Brazil has had a longer lasting interaction with the IFIs due to her
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endemic financial and economic challenges.61 0

Brazil joined the IMF on January 14, 1946. However, Brazil has become a
regular patron of the Fund undergoing a variety of Fund-mandated economic
and financial recovery programs.611 The genesis of the economic and
financial crises of Brazil have been attributed to a number of factors, yet, no
other set of factors is more dominant than the fiscal deficits incurred by the
Brazilian government from the late 70s to the early 80s.612 This point can be
highlighted by the fact that in four years613, Brazil, and indeed the other two
largest economies in the region (Mexico and Argentina), "more than doubled
the size of their nonfinancial public sector deficits, which rose from the
already high levels of around 6 percent of GDP to well over 15 percent."614
Fueling the increasing fiscal deficits were political pressures aimed at forcing
the government to continue to spend regardless of the negative economic and

610 See Brazil: Financial Position in the Fund As of July 31, 2006, at
!mt2:llwww.imf.org/externallnp/tre/tad/exfin2.cfm?memberKeyl =90, last visited August 22, 2006
611 id
612 The same case is applicable to most countries in Latin America under the same period. This position is
Supported and indeed advanced by Eduardo Wiesner in his paper, Latin American Debt: Lessons and Pending
Issues, American Economic Review, May 1985, Vol. 75, Issue 2,191. Infact, the author acknowledged that
although world recession and high real rates of interest in international markets aggravated the crisis, he doubts if
they created the crisis as did the fiscal deficits.
613 The four year period is from 1979 to 1982.

282

•

financial implications. Consequently, the external debt of Brazil, and indeed
other key countries in the region, more than doubled between the four year
periods.

These countries accumulated the huge debts principally from the external
financing facilities that were flowing from private international banks. The
attraction for the private international banks to continue to make the funds
available was the erroneous impression that these debts will be guaranteed by
the government of the respective countries.615 On the contrary, some
commentators attribute the attraction for the governments to continue to seek
more funds to the illusionary belief that such funds were actually causing real
appreciation of the exchange rate.616 The concomitant erroneous implication
was that the economy was experiencing low inflation, high growth, and
exchange rate stability.617 Unfortunately, after the initial appreciation of the
exchange rate, the situation turned into a drastic depreciation of the real
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------614 id
615 See Swoboda, A., "Debt and the Efficiency and Stability of the International Financial System," in 1.T.
Cuddington and G.W. Smith, eds., International Debt and the Developing Countries, Washington: World Bank,
1985.
616 See Kavalsky, B. and Squire, L, et al., "Debt and Adjustment in Selected Developing Countries," unpublished
paper, World Bank, July 1984. The authors acknowledge that in countries like Peru, Argentina, and Mexico, real
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exchange rate. 6 18 The reality, however, was that these countries realized in
the words of Rudiger Dornbusch and Stanley Fischer, that debt accumulation
was not a "financing investment that was productive by the test of net dollar
eamings."6l9

It is important to underscore two fundamental developments that manifested

in Brazil during the era of unregulated inflow of external financing. The first
was the negative implication on domestic savings, which resulted in a
derease in domestic savings as a proportion of GDP. In the same vein, gross
domestic investment was on the decline as a percentage of the GDP. The
reason had been that Brazil was amassing external resources primarily for
consumption and not for increased investment.620 Consequently, the country
was accumulating external debt faster than it was accumulating productive
investment, which made a debt crisis very imminent. The second was the
absence of oversight mechanism between the external finance and the
exchange rates actually appreciated during that era.
617 id
618 See Harberger, A.c., "Lessons for Debtor Country Managers and Policymakers," in J.T. Cuddington, and G.W.
Smith, eds., International Debt and the Developing Countries, Washington: World Bank, 1985.
619 See Dornbusch, R. and Fischer, S., "The World Debt Problem," Report to the Group of Twenty-Four,
DNDPIUNCTAD, September 1984.
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projects that the funds were intended to finance. This was a consequence of
the character of the two principal parties involved: the private international
banks and the public sectors of the Brazilian government. In the process, the
private international banks ignored the fundamentals that should have been
insisted upon in such financing, and in the words of a commentator, "the
importance of the economic feasibility of investment proj ects was
diluted."62l Again, as we stated earlier, the banks are willing to take this
kind of blind risk if there is a guarantee, particularly, a sovereign
guarantee. 622

•
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------620 Ffrench-Davis, R., "Que Paso con la Economia Chilena?" Estudios Publicos, Santiago, Chile, No 11, 1983.
621 Note 277, supra
622 Note 280, supra. The commentator, Alexander Swoboda, confirmed that banks are "willing to acquire assets at
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THE CONTAGION EFFECT

In addition to the fiscal deficits effect which we have covered thus far,
another major effect on the Brazilian economic and financial crises is the
contagion effect. By contagion effect, we imply the spill over effect on Brazil
from the economic and financial turbulences from other countries that have
fundamental economic and financial relationship with Brazil. As Professor
Charles W. Calomiris stated623, contagion effect may arise under one or
more of the following links:624

1. Export and Import links, either through competition among exporters,
as in the fallout for Indonesia and Malaysia after the Thai collapse, or
import market linkages, as in the case of Uruguay's reaction to
Argentina's crisis.

2. Direct financial links, between the crisis country and other countries
(which were of some importance for explaining the transmission of the

rates of return lower than the riskiness of these assets" if there is a sovereign guarantee.
623 Professor Charles W. Calomiris is the Henry Kaufman Professor in the Division of Finance and Economics at
the Columbia University Graduate School of Business. He is also the codirector of the Project on Financial
Deregulation at the American Enterprise Institute.
624 See Calomiris, C.W., "LESSONS FROM ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL", Cato Journal, Vol. 23, No 1
(Spring/Summer 2003).
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Russian crisis to Brazil, the Argentine crisis to Uruguay, and the Asian
crisis to Korea).

3. Indirect, general-equilibrium financial links associated with global
portfolio rebalancing, which explains the problems experienced by
Brazil and Argentina in the wake of the Mexican crisis, and of Brazil in
the wake of the Russian crisis.
It must be cautioned, however, that contagion effect is not automatic, and is

more likely selective in nature.625 The lesson, therefore, is that countries like
Brazil can safeguard their economy from the contagion effects if the policy
makers are willing to regulate the domestic banking sector, limit the
expansion of government debt while pursuing programs aimed at export
market growth and diversification.

IRE IMF PACKAGE

•
The IMF has been intervening in Brazil since the country became a regular
of the Fund's 'rescue prescriptions.' The Fund, predictably, has been
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offering Brazil its garden variety rescue prescriptions ranging from the
reform of the banking sector to a whole array of other economic and political
reforms aimed at stabilizing the economy and ensuring growth.

Apparently, the Fund's reform packages are not very effective in Brazil, or
they may be taking a rather longer period of time to translate into concrete
results. And the question remains, "Is the Fund not doing a good job at
diagnosing the Brazilian economic and financial crisis or alternatively, is the
Fund failing to prescribe the correct reform pills for the country?" Some
commentators have attempted to answer the question by placing the
substantial portion of the blame on the Fund and its allies,626 while some
others have suggestedhat the problem is twofold. 627 First, politicians do
not have long-time horizons. Consequently, they lack the political patience to
wait until after economic growth before increasing government expenditures.
Second, local bureaucratic interests can be impervious to change even when
politicians try to cut spending. This explains why huge spending policies are
'-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------625 This point can be buttressed by the fact that Chile was not fundamentally affected by the Mexican crisis of 1994
-95, neither was Singapore affected by the Asian crisis of 1997.
626 See Lerrick, A., and Meltzer, A., "Beyond IMF Bailouts: Default without Disruption." Quarterly International
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often decided at the local level but paid for at the national level.

VI

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we selected one sample country from Africa, Asia and Latin
America, respectively, to illustrate the roles played by the IFIs, particularly
the IMF, in the developing countries. Our analysis of the experience of each
of our selected country leads us to virtually the same conclusion: the Fund
has become in the words of a critic a 'modern day Trojan horse' .628 In this
ever-expanding role, the IFIs introduce a wide variety of trade, security and
commercial interests under the cover of rescue mission. The case of the
R.O.K. is very illustrative of how the IFIs used the opportunity of
intervention to practically impact the totality of the composition of the
country. As we indicated earlier, some of the reforms that formed part of the
package were way beyond the economic and financial crisis that the country

Economics Report, Carnegie Mellon Gailliot Center for Public Policy, May 2001.
627 Note 289, supra.
628 See Note 258. The authors contend that for more than 30 years, the R.O.K had creatively developed their
economy by keeping the doors closed to outsiders like the US. Consequently, when the opportunity presented itself
through the invitation of the IMF, the US and other interested parties used the Fund to prise open the closed market
doors.
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was confronted with. Yet, the IFIs insisted on those extraneous conditions as
part of the rescue package presented to the R.O.K. And given the desperate
situation that the R.O.K. government found itself in, it lacked the political or
financial muscle to rej ect all or some of those extraneous components of the
package, rather, they literally swallowed all hook, line, and sinker.

Under the same cover of rescue mission, the IMF, and indeed the IFIs, has
assumed the new and more powerful role of 'global economic policeman'
under their surveillance jurisdiction or strategy.629 In this role, the IFIs have
arrogated to themselves the role of monitoring directly and indirectly the
performance of the economic performance of each country, particularly, the
developing ones. However, experience has shown, and disappointelY so,
that the IFIs' surveillance mechanism is faulty and ineffective since they fail
to avert the crisis before maturation. Rather, they are apt to respond with their
predictable one-size-fits-all prescription when disaster strikes.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

PROPOSALS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

I

INTRODUCTION

As we stated in the introductory part of this work, the fundamental goal of a
doctoral dissertation must not be limited to the formulation of an academic
thesis. It must ensure that the academic thesis is strongly supported by a
variety of academic sources. Such sources must include among others,
concrete, practical and reasonable proposals, recommendations, and
suggestions on how best to deal with the enumerated challenges.
Consequently, our goal in this concluding chapter will be to attempt to
proffer some familiar as well as some unfamiliar recommendations.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------629 See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, 'The really new Bretton Woods', cited in Marc Uzan (ed) The Financial
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II

STRUCTURAL REFORMS

Under this category, we propose a comprehensive review of the
organizational structure of the key international financial institutions with a
view to making them more representative of, and more responsive to the
challenges of the twenty-first century. Granted that almost all of them were
products of the post World War II era, and consequently, are of the twentieth
century regime, it is imperative that they be re-organized to adequately meet
the new and more complex challenges of the new century.

Take for instance, the United Nations, which is the umbrella organization of
all the international financial institutions (IFls), although it is made up of 192
member states,630 it still retains its original structure which created among
others the Security Council with the concomitant powers of the permanent

•
System Under Stress: An Architecture for the New World Economy (New York: Routledge, 1996).
630 Montenegro became the 192 nd member of the United Nations when it was admitted on 28 June 2006 by the
General Assembly upon the approval of the Security Council. The countries that form the basis of this work became
members of the UN in this order: Brazil (24 October 1945), Nigeria (7 October 1960), and the Republic of Korea
(17 September 1991). For further reading on the UN membership, visit
!mp:llwww.un.orglNews/Press/docs/2006/orgl469.doc.htm. last visited on April 3, 2007.
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five and their vet0631. One wonders how truly representative such a body
can claim when all their deliberations and resolutions can be overridden by
the veto of one of the five permanent members on the Security Council.632
Unfortunately, this situation contradicts, in my humble opinion, the noble
objectives enshrined in the preamble of the Charter which reads in part:
"to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large
and smal/"633 (italics mine).

One wonders how the United Nations, the pre-eminent international
organization, is living up to its ideals when only five members hold the
ultimate veto power in the Security Council. Although the composition of the
Security Council has been expanded to 15 members, yet, the other members
with numerical majority on the Council lack the power to issue a resolution if
one of the big fives decides otherwise. The same trend was replicated in the
631 Although the amendment to Article 23 enlarges the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen,
it did not change the pre-eminence of the permanent five members. Amendment of Article 23 of the UN Charter was
adopted (inclusive of Articles 27 and 61) by the General Assembly on 17 December 1963 and came into force on 31
August 1965. In order to read the current membership of the Council as well as their term on the Council, visit
htm;llwww.un.org!sc/presidency.htrnl, last visited April 3, 2007.
632 The five permanent members are the United States of America, the Russian Federation, China, France and the
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organizational structure and the power structure of the international financial
institutions to the end that the poorer, weaker, member nations lack the
ability to make meaningful contributions to the critical decisions that most
affect them.

A case in point is Africa, which is the beneficiary of almost fifty percent of

combined IMF /W orId Bank loans to developing countries, yet, its combined
votes in both institutions is less than three percent, respectively. The current
imbalance in the power structures of both institutions has given rise to the
natural clamor by the affected developing countries for an immediate review
of the situation.634

Ironically, the combined votes of African nations in the Bretton Woods
institutions635, which are already low, have been targeted for further

United Kingdom.
633 Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice.
634 At a recent meeting held in Maputo, Mozambique, African Ministers of Finance resolved to push for more roles
and representations in the organs of the IMF and World Bank. Their strategy includes enlisting the support of their
Reads of State, through the African Union, to help them lobby their counterparts in the developed countries. One
doUbts if the leaders of the developed countries will pay anything more than lip service to the request in light of the
fact that they are currently enjoying the privileges that Africans want a piece of. See
!um.;;/www,ngrguardiannews.comlnews/articleOI, last visited August 7, 2006.
635 The Bretton Woods institutions are those institutions that were products of the Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,
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reduction in order to give the Asian developing countries more prominence in
the institutions. According to the Special Assistant to the Nigerian President
on NEPAD-ExtemaI636, Ambassador Aluko-Olokun, the Bretton Woods
institutions plan to make the recommendations for a further reduction of the
combined votes of African nations at their coming meeting in Singapore. In
the words of the Ambassador, who also served as a former Nigerian Minister
of National Planning, "Truly, we are not saying that the new Asian Tigers
should not be given some leverage. But we are saying Africa should not lose
its own relative position: 48 per cent of all the facilities given out by the
Bretton Woods institutions come to Africa and that in itself is about an index
that should show that we need to have a voice there. Weare losing our voice
in the Bretton Woods institutions. This is not a good development for Africa.
This is the essence ofNEPAD: to intervene in specific areas like this on
behalf of Africa ..... "637

•
USA, conferences, e.g. the IMF and the World Banle It is important to clarity that although the International Trade
Organization (ITO) was conceived at the conferences, it failed to materialize. Consequently, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became the default organization. The GATT later gave birth to the WTO.
636 NEP AD stands for the New Partnership for African Development.
637 See, Why Africa should protest reduced power in IMF', World Bank, by Aluko-Olokun, THE NIGERIAN
GUARDIAN NEWSPAPERS, at http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/news/article02. last visited August 14,2006.
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III

DISTINCT APPROACH

It would appear that two principal factors influence the international financial

institutions' (IFIs) dsign of a one-size-fits-all policy in most developing
countries. The first could be the lack of resources and manpower to develop
country-specific programs, while the second could be the economics of
applying a single policy across many countries as the case may be.638
Experience, however, has proven that the one-size-fits-all approach that is
currently been applied by the institutions, and indeed, the business world, is
anything but effective. Interestingly, Coca-Cola, the world's exemplar of the
success of standardization has realized the shortcomings of blind insistence
on standardization in the face of tremendous changes going on in the new
century. Douglas Daft, Coca-Cola's chair recently confessed as follows:
"As the century was drawing to a close, the world had changed course, and
we had not. The world was demanding greater flexibility, responsiveness and

•
local sensitivity, while we were further consolidating decision-making and

638 The business parlance for the application of a single marketing mix across different markets is called
Standardization. The benefits inherent in the standardization of a marketing mix include (1) lower costs, (2) easier
Control and coordination from headquarters, and (3) reduction of the time spent preparing the marketing plan ...
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standardizing our practices ....... The next big evolutionary step of 'going
global' now has to be 'going local.' "639

It is common knowledge that differences exist between one nation and

another within the same continent.640 It is equally common knowledge that
differences abound from one part of a country to another.641 Consequently,
the international financial institutions must resist the temptation of treating
all African countries, for instance, as if they are comprised of the same
human and environmental characteristics. Rather, great care must be taken to
develop country-specific policies that may involve the adaptation of existing
policies or the development of a completely new policy that will meet the
peculiar needs of the recipient country.642 It will also be more productive if
the developers of such programs are persons with sufficient knowledge of the
639 Cited in Donald A. Ball ... , et aI, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: The Challenge of Global Competition, 9th
ed., p. 525,2004.
640 A classical example will be found in the extreme cultural, geographical and political characteristics of a country
in the northern part of Africa, and another in the southern part. Many people in the US still confuse the fact that a
country like Egypt lies in Africa, rather than in the Middle East.
641 Take, for instance, Nigeria, with 36 states and three major ethnic groups, namely; lbo, Rausa, and Yoruba. The
other components of the country include a wide variety of groups that have peculiarly different customs, traditions,
languages, etc.
642 Adaptation or the development of completely different policies is the two alternatives to the blind
Unplementation of the standardized policies across board. Adaptation simply requires the tinkering of the existing
policy in order to meet the present needs. Development of completely new policy, however, calls for the
abandonment of the existing policy. It demands a completely new design taking into account the peculiar needs of
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recipient nation. Such persons will, no doubt, ensure that the programs are
consistent with the cultural, political, and economic peculiarities of the
nation.

IV

GUARANTEEING HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNIVERSAL

FREEDOM

Following from the call for a distinct approach in program formulation, is the
need for the international financial institutions (IFIs) to ensure that their
programs and policies are aimed at guaranteeing human rights and the
facilitation of universal freedom in the recipient nations.

The current situation which tends to ignore the incalculable burden of
sovereign debt on the citizenry, as well as the high corruption of the officials
which results in the national funds siphoned overseas, is unjustifiable. Such a
situation which denies the recipient nations and their citizens the right to
enjoy and benefit from their national resources is unproductive, and indeed,
the moment.
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contrary to the laudable goals of these institutions.643 It is common
knowledge that most citizens of developing countries view international
financial institutions (IFIs) suspiciously and have on occasions labeled them
as agents of neocolonialists. This can be understood given their perception of
the roles of the international financial institutions, and the harsh
consequences of the IFIs'economic policies on their daily lives. As Africans
poignantly put it: "People go to the doctor to get well. If, therefore, you visit
the doctor and your conditions keep getting worse, it is either that the doctor
lacks the knowledge to cure the sickness or the doctor is prescribing the
wrong drugs for the cure. "644 A situation where many of the recipient
nations are faring worse after many years of taking the IFIs' 'prescription
drugs' is not helpful to the image of the IFIs. Such a situation has re-inforced
the perception, particularly among developing countries, that many of the
recipient nations have indeed found themselves in worse economic and social
conditions than they were before they sought the intervention of the IFIs.

643 The right of the citizens to enjoy and benefit from the wealth of their nation has been classified as their
fundamental economic rights which must be protected and preserved. See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, International Law of
Responsibility for Economic Crimes: Holding Heads of State and Other High Ranking State Officials Individually
Liable for Acts of Fraudulent Enrichment, KIuwer Law Int'!, p.2, 1995. The latest edition of the work is titled, The
International Law of Responsibility for Economic Crimes, 2 nd ed, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006.
644 This is a common way that Africans express their frustration when a problem defies all known solutions.
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The diversion of public funds by government officials for private use has
been likened to a violation of the people's fundamental human right.645 The
contention is that when the government officials divert national funds for
their private use, the consequence is the deprivation of the basic rights of the
citizens.646 According to Professor Kofele-Kale:
"The right of a people not to be disposed of their wealth and natural
resources is not just any ordinary human right but thefundamental human
right. This right transcends all the other rights and gives some semblance of
form and shape to, and in a very real sense qualifies the other rights."647
The validity of the learned professor's position can be further justified by the
application of the needs theories like Maslow's648 and Adelfer's649. It is

645 Id, Ndiva, Kofele-Kale, p. 359, supra.
646 Jd., Ndiva Kofele-Kale, p. 359. Note 256, supra
647 According to Professor Kofele-Kale, the act of depriving the citizens of the national funds and resources is the
act of indigenous spoliation. The act of indigenous spoliation, according to Professor Kofele-Kale, is defined as the
illegal act of depredation which is committed for private ends by constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials
or private individuals. This view is contrary to the prevailing view in the intemationallegal community that the act is
merely a property dispute. The human rights view is emerging and was amplified by Peter Weiss as one of the
lawyers who represented the Philippines Government in the Marcos cases, cited in the 81 sl ANNUAL
CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
648 The two major need theories include Maslow's hierarchy of needs and Alderfer's existence-relatedness-growth
(ERG) theory. These two theories assume all people share a common set of basic needs. Maslow posited that people
are motivated to satisfy five basic needs as follows: physiological needs, security needs, and belonging needs, esteem
needs, self-actualization needs. The five basic needs are organized hierarchically, beginning from the physiological
level and graduating at the self-actualization level. Thus, they are called the hierarchy of needs. Accordingly, lower
level needs must be satisfied before the next higher level need would motivate further action on the part of a person.
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trite, and indeed, noticeable that citizens typically assert their rights to "finer
aspirations"650 (speech, association, and pursuit of higher goals), after
satisfying the basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter.651 The assertion of
any right or the degree of the assertion, nevertheless, depends largely on the
motivation of the people.652
Further, such "violation of a human right anywhere is also a violation against
the state as well as against the conscience of mankind as represented by the

international community, both as an integral whole and in its regional
fragmentations."653 (italics mine) In the same vein, Professor Sucharitkul
asserts that, "human rights, ................. are legal rights." He goes further to

See Maslow, A.H., Motivation and Personality, New York, Harper & Row, 1954.
649 Aderfer's existence-relatedness-growth (ERG) theory resembles Maslow's needs theory. For instance, the
existence needs correspond to Maslow's physiological and security needs; the relatedness needs correspond to the
social and esteem needs; while the growth needs correspond to the self-actualization need. Apart from those
similarities, Aderfer makes two fundamental distinctions in the ERG theory. First, is that people sometimes attempt
to satisfy more than one need at the same time. Second, is that the frustration in attempting to satisfy a higher-level
need can lead to the satisfaction of a lower-level need. See Aderfer, c.P., "An Empirical Test of a New Theory of
Human Needs," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 4 (1969), pp. 142-75
650 Id footnote 645
651 Id footnote 646 with reference to the physiological needs.
652 Kanfer, R., "Motivation Theory in Industrial and Organizational Psychology" cited in Handbook of Industrial
and Organizational Psychology, ed. M.D. Dunnette and L.M. Hough, Vol. 1, Palo Alto, California, Consulting
Psychologists Press, 1990, pp. 75-170. In Kanfer's opinion, motivation is anything that provides direction, intensity,
and persistence to behavior. See also Campbell, J.P., and R.D. Pritchard, "Motivation Theory in Industrial and
Organizational Psychology," in Handbook ofIndustrial and Organizational Psychology, ed. M.D. Dunnette,
Chicago, Rand McNally, 1976, pp.60-130. On the same subject of motivation, the authors as a manifestation of
choosing an activity or task to engage in, establishing the level of effort to put forth on it, and determining the degree
of persistence in it over time. Thus, motivation is not directly observable, rather it must be inferred from the behavior
of the person involved.
653 Sucharitkul, Sompong, A Multi-Dimensional Concept of Human Rights in International Law, Notre Dame Law
Review, Vol. 62:305, 1987, p. 312
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contend as follows:654
"They are legal as opposed to moral or ethical rights, and as such a given
legal system should enforce them and give them full effect, at any level or in
any dimension. Legal rights are meaningful only if they can be correlated to
the corresponding legal duties."
Professor Sucharitkul goes further to place the obligation to protect human
rights or to prevent the violations of them upon three identifiable and
separate levels of enforcement or dimensions. The primary or first systemic
dimension falls upon the state (including its administrative and police
authorities). The intermediate dimension covers the regional agencies or
commissions, while the ultimate dimension falls upon the international
community (italics mine).655

Given the apparent inability of the first and second dimensions of
enforcement to prevent the violations of human rights with regard to

654 Ibid, footnote 640, p. 311. See also the reference made to the work of Professor Hohfeld in Hohfeld, W,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (1923) wherein the
distinguished professor provided a practical test to measure the effectiveness and scope of a human right in relation
to its "correlative," i.e. the duty or obligation and the duty bearers. See also J. Stone, THE PROVINCE AND
FUNCTION OF LAW 115-34 (1950), as well as Radin, A Restatement ofHohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141 (1938).
655 Sucharitkul, ibid, footnote 641, p. 312
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economic spoliation, the last vestige of hope lies in the international
community, represented by the IFIs. In light of the clout that the IFIs
currently enjoy in developing countries where they have expanded their
traditional role as lending institutions to the new role of law-making
institutions, they can contribute immensely t> the guarantee of the human
rights and universal freedom of the citizens. The World Bank, particularly, in
its new law-making role can do more by leveraging its financial resources in
developing countries.656

V

FUNDS REPATRIATION/SURRENDER

A common characteristic of the governments of developing nations is the
high level of corruption of the officials.657 It is, unfortunately, these same
corrupt government officials that seek and receive the funds meant to develop

,
656 Paul Mosley, et aI, AID AND POWER: THE WORLD BANK AND POLICY-BASED LENDING:
ANALYSIS AND POLICY PROPOSALS 66-77 (1979). The new law-making role of the World Bank evolved from
the shifting perspective of conditionality from the probability of repayment of the loan to the removal of fundamental
obstacles to economic growth.
657 Classical examples abound in Nigeria under Generals Babangida and Abacha, in Zaire under Mobutu Sese
Seko, in Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos, in Haiti under Jean-Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc), in Panama under
Noriega, etc.
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their respective countries.658 Again, it is common knowledge that most of
these funds do not make it to the country's treasury, neither are they applied
to the benefit of the citizens.659 In the few cases where the funds actually
make it to the government's treasury, the same officials find creative ways to
siphon the funds into their private bank accounts located mostly in developed
countries.660 Consequently, the same developed nation party to the creditor
bank will eventually get to keep the funds in their country for more economic
and social development. On the contrary, the poor recipient country is
deprived of the benefits of the loan, but at the same time is burdened by the
overwhelming weight of the debt. In fact, this practice of massively looting
the national wealth and resources have been attributed, and correctly so, as
658 Most governments designate the officials that can seek and obtain financial and other technical assistance on
behalf of the country. Either as the Head of the central government or head of the component units, like states, or the
Ministers of Finance, etc., these officials have the responsibility to negotiate and obtain sovereign loans and other
assistance packages on behalf of the government. It becomes understandable, therefore, to imagine what these
officials can do in their positions if they decide, (as many are wont to do), to line their own pockets from such
transactions.
659 A good example can be found in the case of Sierra Leone's former diplomat and government minister, Aiah
M'bayo, who received on behalf of his government, $4 million, 500 tons of fuel and a ship load of provisions from
Algeria as assistance to Sierra Leone in their hosting of the OAU summit. For negotiating the aid package, Mr.
M'bayo received $25,000 from the proceeds, while the rest of the package was distributed among some of the
Country's ambassadors. A similar example can be found in the case of a former Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone,
Alhaji Abdul Karim Koroma, who sold food aid from Italy that was meant for starving Sierra Leone citizens and
converted the proceeds into his personal account. These were some ofthe revelations that emerged from the three
Commissions of Inquiry set up by the military government after the overthrow of the Momoh government in Sierra
Leone. The Commissions were the Beccles-Davis Commission ofInquiry, the Lynton Nylander Commission and the
Marcus-Jones Commission.
660 Some of the creative ways that the government funds are siphoned include fake contracts, upfront kickbacks of
designated contract amount percentage, outright conversion of public funds, the demand of huge monetary payments
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the single most important obstacle to economic development.661
Unfortunately, in the light of the massive looting of the treasury, the local
law enforcement apparatus as well as the national judiciary, lack the
resources and political will to prosecute the culprits who are high ranking
public officials.662

Another dimension to the issue of indigenous spoliation is the attempt by the
sympathizers of the practice of indigenous spoliation to apportion greater
blame for economic exploitation on multinational corporations. The tendency
has been to focus primarily on the exploitative practices of the multinational
corporations and consequently place all the blames on them. Granted that the
multinational corporations have been less than ethical in their business
practices in developing countries, the consequences of indigenous spoliation
for the exercise of their official duties, etc.
661 Id, Note 256, supra. See also Joseph Nye, Corruption and Political Development: a cost-benefit analysis, in
POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A HANDBOOK 966 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnson & Victor T. Levine
eds. 1989); Robert Williams, POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN AFRICA (1987).
662 It is heart-warming to note that some developing countries are creating specialized anti-corruption agencies that
will solely focus on the investigation and prosecution of corrupt government and non-government officials. A good
example is the establishment by the Nigerian government ofthe much dreaded Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC). In the same light of fighting corruption, a former Attorney General of the Nigerian
government, Prince Bola Ajibola, advocated the expansion of the fight against corruption by empowering the
government to issue a writ of restitution against public officials who are alleged to have looted the public treasury.
Such a writ, the Attorney General asserted, carries a lower burden of proof as the government needs prove their case
by a preponderance of evidence. See Ajibola seeks law on restitution to recover ill-gotten wealth, THE
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can not be minimized either. This position was amplified by Michael
Reisman when he argued that the "ritual of condemnation of foreign
corporations" and their exploitative practices in developing countries as well
as the elevation of the issue internationally has obscured the equally
important and damaging consequences of indigenous spoliation by
government officials. He asserted that it was time to apply all necessary tools
in international law to "restrain and recapture" looted national wealth from
wherever they are hidden.663

The international financial institutions (IFIs) should lead efforts to correct
this ugly situation for two main reasons - it minimizes their efforts in
assisting the developing countries and it will help launder their current image
of willing benefactors of this crime. When the corrupt government officials
are faced with a situation where they can no longer find a safe haven for their
ill-gotten wealth, they will be somewhat discouraged from looting their
government's treasury. But so long as they know that one of the developed
VANGUARD NEWSPAPERS, http://odili.net/news/source/2006/aug/l0/322.html, last visited August 10,2006.
663 W. Michael Reisman, Harnessing International Law to Restrain and Recapture Indigenous Spoliations, 83
AMJ.INT'L L. 56-57 (1989). See also Abram Chayes, Pursuing the Assets ofFormer Dictators, PROCEEDINGS
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countries will willingly accept their looted wealth, they will continue to
deprive their fellow citizens of the funds needed for development, while in
the same process increasing the sovereign debt.

VI

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC)

Commentators of intemationallaw acknowledge that one of the most
important developments in the field was the establishment of a permanent
International Criminal Court (ICC).664 The significance of the development
lies in the fact that efforts to establish such a court have failed since the end
of WorId War 1. According to Dr. Cherif Bassiouni who also served as Chair
of the Drafting Committee at the ICC Conference, "since the end of World
War I (1919), the world community has sought to establish a permanent
international criminal court. "665

•
OF THE 81 ST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 394 (1987)
(Michael P. Malloyed. 1990).
664 The Rome Statute o/the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. AlCONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998) reprinted in
37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).
665 CherifBassiouni, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 3 (1998)., cited in Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court: A

307

At the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries666 which was convened
by the United Nations to finalize and adopt a statute to establish an
international criminal court, were delegates from 160 countries and
representatives from nongovernmental organizations.667 Upon the
conclusion of the conference, the conferees voted overwhelmingly in favor of
adopting the statute and the establishment of the International Criminal Court
(ICC).668 Since then, there has been tremendous support for the ICC which
is evidenced by the number of countries that have signed the statute and
ratified it.669 Consequently, on July 1, 2002, the ICC statute became
effective after it was ratified by more than 66 countries.670

Paradox of "Operation Enduring Freedom", Golden Gate University School of Law, Annual Survey ofInt'l &
Comparative Law, Vol. IX, 2003.
666 The United Nations convened the conference in Rome, Italy, from June 15 to July 17, 1998.
667 See the Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference ofPlenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183110, Annex II, III (1998).
668 The conferees voted 120 in favor of adopting the statute, while 7 conferees voted against the adoption of the
statute. The countries that voted against adoption are the United States of America, China, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and
Libya. See also the Final Act, supra, note 253.
669 As at February 18,2003, 139 countries have signed the statute, while 89 countries have ratified the statute. For
further reading, see the Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, available at
http://untreaty. un. org/Eng/ishlhible/englishinternetbiblelpartIlchapterXVIII/treaty 10. asp
670 Article 126 of the ICC Statute provides that the statute shall become effective after it has been ratified by 60
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The ICC Statute empowers the Court to exercise complementary jurisdiction
with the national courts in cases involving international crimes that fall under
three main categories: genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.671
The court's jurisdiction over other areas including the crime of aggression,
terrorism and drug-related crimes were suspended until acceptable definitions
of the words are agreed upon in the future.672

ICC JURISDICTION

As we stated earlier, the original jurisdiction of the ICC covers three main
areas as follows:

1. Genocide
The drafters of the ICC Statute adopted the provisions of the Geneva

•

Countries.
671 Art, 1,!d.
672 Articles 5(1), (2), Id.
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Convention of 1948 on the definition of'genocide'.673 In so doing, the
ICC Statute clearly limits the jurisdiction of the court to cases where an
accused is charged with the crime of genocide if s/he intentionally planned
to destroy, in whole or in part, national, ethnical, racial or religious
groups.674 This definition excludes acts of genocide intentionally directed
against members of an opposing political group as well as other social
groups that may not conveniently fall under the Geneva classifications.675

2. Crimes Against Humanity
Article 7 of the ICC Statute states that crimes against humanity must have
been committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. Further,
Article 7(2) elaborates that 'attack directed against any civilian
population' includes a course of conduct involving the multiple
commission of acts referred to in paragraph one pursuant to or in

673 Article 6, Id
674 Id
675 It has been argued that the ICC Statute's definition of genocide will not cover crimes of genocide against
members of an opposing political group and other social groups, e.g. as is the case involving the former Chilean
dictator Augusto Pinochet. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Putting Limits on Lawlessness: From Nuremberg to Pinochet,
Washington Post, Oct 25, 1998, cited in Chibueze, et al.
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furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.676

3. War Crimes
The Court's jurisdiction over war crimes is triggered when the crimes are
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes.677 This jurisdictional area appeared to have
generated most controversy and opposition. In response to the controversy
led by the United States government, Article 124 was approved under the
transitional provision which permits a member to "opt out" of this
provision for a non renewable period of seven years.678

INVOCATION OF ICC'S JURISDICTION

Under Article 13, the ICC's jurisdiction may be invoked by any of the
following procedures:

•

676 Id

677 Article 8, ICC Statute, supra
678 Article 124, Id
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1.

State Referral
The ICC Statute provides for two principal ways that states may
refer a breach of the provisions of the statute to the Court. The first
instance may be from a State that is party to the Statute. Under this
provision679, the State may refer the breach to the ICC prosecutor,
who in tum, is required to investigate the complaint to determine its
merits or otherwise.
The second instance may be from a State that is not a party to the
Statute. Under this provision680, a non party State may refer the
case to the ICC prosecutor if either the crime was committed in its
territory, or the accused person is a national of the non party State.

2.

Independent Prosecutor
The ICC's Independent Prosecutor may initiate investigations based
on complaints from victims of crimes covered under the statute,
non-governmental organizations, or any other credible source.
However, the Independent Prosecutor must first seek and obtain the

312

•

approval of the court's pretrial judges who must determine the
merits or otherwise of the complaints.681 Consequently, if in the
view of the judges the complaint warrants investigation and
prosecution, they will approve of the investigation. If, on the
contrary, they are of the opinion that the complaint lacks merit, they
will disapprove of the investigation. Disapproval by the judges does
not bar the prosecutor from subsequently ~epresenting the complaint
if new facts and evidence arise in the future.682
In order to check potential abuse of discretion by the Independent
Prosecutor, the Statute also empowers the UN Security Council by
resolution to stop a prosecution for an initial period of twelve
months if the Security Council believes that such prosecution will
negatively impact the Council '8 work. After the expiration of the
initial twelve months period, the Security Council may renew its
request indefinitely, in twelve month intervals.683

679 Article 13(a), Id
680 Article 12(3), Id
681 Article 15(2), Id
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3.

Security Council
The UN Security Council can, suo motu, refer a breach under the
ICC Statute to the Court pursuant to the exercise of their functions
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Such a referral by the Security Council, acting under the powers of
the UN Charter, has given rise to the suggestion that the ICC acting
under the direction of the UN Security Council, can exercise
jurisdiction over nationals of States that are both parties and nonparties to the

S~atute.

Such jurisdiction, it has been argued, may

include both territorial as well as personal jurisdiction. Further, the
logic is that the UN Security Council can lend its enforcement tools
to the ICC if the State in question fails to cooperate with the
ICC.684

•
682 Article 15(5),Id
683 Article 16,Id
684 See Je1ena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and
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INCLUSION OF THE CRIME OF EMBEZZLING PUBLIC
FUNDS UNDER THE ICC STATUTE

When high ranking public officials embezzle the public funds, like
they do in most developing countries, the consequences are
disastrous for the citizens. Such a criminal conduct deprives the
country of the necessary funds to allocate to education, health, social
infrastructure, as well as add to the sovereign debt of the country.
The impact of such a conduct on the fragile economy is dangerous,
while the moral implications on the citizens are far more dangerous.

It is, therefore, my opinion that such a crime should be included
under Article 7 of the ICC Statute, which covers the crimes against
humanity. Such inclusion will serve as a deterrent to the heinous
crime of embezzling public funds with impunity which is currently
the case in most developing countries.
The crimes enumerated under Article 7 of the ICC Statute should be
Effectiveness, 29 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 291,297 (1998).
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enlarged to include such a crime. Moreover, since the law
enforcement agencies of the affected country lacks the courage to
initiate prosecution under the country's legal system, the ICC must
rise up to the occasion and be, "a new institution that gives hope to
the entire world that we can hope to bring to justice those who
transgress the most basic human principles."685

VII

CONCLUSION

We must first acknowledge that the recommendations and suggestions so far
proposed are in no way exhaustive. However, we believe that they will add to
the pool of other suggestions and recommendations that have been proposed
in other materials. While some of them will be fairly simple to implement in
the short term, others will require tremendous diplomatic and leadership
skills and determination to implement in the long term.

685 A quote by Adriaan Bos, cited in John Hooper,

u.s. Plan to Thwart War Crimes Court, Guardian Weekly, July
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Our belief is grounded on the conviction that the organizational structure of
the international financial institutions (IFIs) as presently composed is grossly
inadequate to realistically meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.
Again, as we acknowledged earlier, these institutions have done fairly well in
serving the needs of the twentieth century during which time they were
formed. However, in light of the tremendous political, economic, and social
challenges brought about by the twenty-first century, there is an urgent need
to re-position these institutions for the present realities.

Secondly, more adaptation and sensitivity is needed in the formulation of
recovery programs formulated by the international financial institutions
(lFIs). The one-size-fits-all strategy in program development is no longer
working. Although it may be more cost effective for the institutions, it is not
as effective as it should be given the negative outcomes.

•
Thirdly, successful relief programs must do more than apply a band-aid
therapy to the recipient country's economic, political and social development.
26, 1998.
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Developing countries deserve sustainable development programs that will
facilitate their immediate recovery as well as chart the course to a permanent
healthy condition.

Fourth, every effort must be put in place to discourage corrupt government
officials from looting their national treasury and transferring their loot to
their private accounts in banks located in developed countries. Also, efforts
must be intensified to repatriate the already looted funds back to the
government's treasury. Such a situation will greatly discourage such corrupt
government officials from engaging in such criminal conduct.

Fifth, the International Criminal Court (ICC), deserves the support and
encouragement of all countries, particularly, the developed countries.
686Experience has shown that municipal courts lack the jurisdiction and
political will to try cases involving high ranking government officials who
abuse their positions. It appears that the only hope left to bring such officials
686 The opposition of the United States government to the ICC is unfortunate, given their pre-eminent leadership
position in the world. Some of the actions it has taken in opposition to the ICC includes the withdrawal of their
signature from the treaty, the enactment of the American Service-Members' Protection Act 2002, and the signing of
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to justice will be the ICC. Again, the fear of prosecution after losing their
political immunity will checkmate corrupt government officials while in
office.

•

Bilateral ICC Immunity Agreements with some countries, under Article 98 of the ICC Statute.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
GENERAL CONCLUSION

I

INTRODUCTION

The roles of the international financial institutions (IFIs) in the world
economy have drastically changed. As the world expands in population,
commerce, industry, technology, etc., the challenges that face the IFIs
increase daily. These global developments have drastically changed the
original goals, functions and roles of these IFIs.687 Consequently, the IFIs
must develop new capacities in order to meet these evolving roles and
challenges. The institutions that house the IFIs must also become more
flexible and responsive to these evolving global challenges in order to remain
effective.688 No doubt, the world in the 20th century when the major
components of the IFIs were created is completely different from the world in
this 21 st century that we currently live in.

687 Refer to the Articles of the IMF, the IBRD, and the World Trade Organization, supra.
688 The key institutions include the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, as well as the Paris Club
and the London Club.
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In order to establish a good basis to appreciate the evolving roles and
challenges of the IFIs in developing countries, we chose to understudy three
countries in different parts of the world. From Africa, we chose Nigeria.689
In addition to the fact that this writer is a citizen of Nigeria, the country is the
most populated country in Africa.690 A richly endowed country, with
abundant human and material resources,691 Nigeria still fails to translate its
abundant resources into a commensurate level of development since
independence in 1960.692 From Asia, we chose the Republic of Korea
(R.O.K.) The R.O.K. presents an interesting case in the league of developing
countries.693 From a very poor and humble beginning, the R.O.K.
successfully transformed its economy into an enviable one in a relatively
short period of time. At the height of its glory, it became the beautiful bride
of all the IFIs.694 However, when the economy began to suffer from the
consequences of over-expansion, the same IFIs and its financiers treated
689 See Nigeria under Chapter 5, supra.
690 The population of Nigeria is estimated to be over 120 million people. Infact, the result of the recently concluded
census exercise puts the population at over 140 million. Ibid.
691 Nigeria has produced many excellent professionals in almost all fields of human endeavors, who are equally
spread all over the world as a result of the massive brain drain that the country experienced in the early 1990s.
Nigeria also ranks as one of the major producers of crude oil in the world. Ibid.
692 Unfortunately, inspite of all its natural and human resources, the country is still ranked as one of the poorest
countries in the world. Principally, because the majority of the citizens lack the most basic necessities oflife like
affordable housing, decent food, clean drinking water, good and affordable social infrastructure, jobs, etc.
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them the same way that they treat other less successful countries.695
From Latin America, we chose Brazi1.696 Again, one of the most populated
countries in Latin America; Brazil has become a regular patron of the IFIs.
With huge industrial and commercial base, the country, however, fails to
elevate its status from one of the developing countries to a developed
country.697 Which forces us to question: Why have these countries failed to
become developed given the enormous influence and policy directives of the
IFls in these countries?

Many scholars have pondered this question in various forms and come up
with equally varied responses.698 Although the responses vary from one
scholar to another, there is a consensus that the underlying factors that attract
the IFIs include decline in foreign exchange revenue, high level of national
indebtedness, balance of payment crisis, corruption, etc. These factors cause
the economies of developing countries to suffer serious economic imbalance

693
694
695
696
697
698

Refer to the Republic of Korea under Chapter 5, supra.
Ibid.
Ibid. The economy of the R.O.K took a down tum in the late 1990s.
Refer to Brazil in Chapter 5, supra.
Ibid.
See Okome, supra.
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which consequently compel the government to seek help from the IFIs.699
When the IFIs respond, they recommend corrective actions that involve the
adoption of an adjustment program with very strict conditionalities.
700Typically, the adjustment program imposes heavy costs on the affected
society. Such costs, in turn, sets in motion, forces which are destabilizing to

both economic and political transformation. 701 The garden variety of these
costs include stabilization measures, inflation, unemployment and underemployment, decline in social services, which in turn breeds violence and
distrust for the government in power. 702

We have argued earlier that the IF Is were created after World War II
principally to facilitate the speedy repair of the economies of the European
countries that had suffered enormous destruction during the war.703 We also
argued that the developing countries were not in the consideration of the
founders of the IFIs since most of them did not actively participate in the

699 These conditions were present in the economies of Nigeria, the Republic of Korea, and Brazil when they were
compelled to invite the IFIs. Refer to Chapter 5, supra.
700 Ibid.
701 Okome, supra, p. 268
702 Ibid.
703 Refer to Chapter 4, supra.
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war, and consequently, did not suffer much destruction.704 Further, the
leadership of the developing countries did not participate in the creation and
formulation of the goals and objectives of the IFls.705 After all the countries
that presently constitute the developing countries did not play active or
critical roles in the propagation of the war. The implications of the noninvolvement of the developing countries in the formation and formulation of
the goals and objectives of the IFls are enormous. For example, the IMF was
created to specifically facilitate the speedy repair of the international
monetary system after the war. 706 But the international monetary system that
was in shambles was that of the European countries, not the system of the

developing countries (emphasis mine). For example, the Fund's
organizational structure as well as the power structure was created in a
manner that gave the European countries the dominant control of the decision
making apparatus of the Fund.707

fj

704 Ibid
705 Ibid.
706 See the IMF Articles, supra.
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Another major component of the IFIs, the World Bank, was also created from
the prism of the dominant European powers. The Bank was created
principally to stimulate and support foreign investment. 708 We have argued
that the goal of the Bank is to stimulate and support foreign investment which
implies investment flowing from developed countries ofEurope to developing

countries like Nigeria, the Republic ofKorea, and Brazil ( emphasis mine).
This anticipated flow of investment did not envisage investment flow from
developing countries to developed countries. Again, the Bank's
organizational structure as well as the dominant powers of control was
allocated to the countries that played critical roles in the formation of the
Bank.709 The same applies to all the other members of the IFIs.
By implication, since the IFIs were created by the leaders of the mainly
European countries that won the war,710 with the mandate to serve the
principal needs of the affected European countries, it is no wonder that the
original roles of the IFIs were tailored for the European countries. It is,

707 See the Fund's Quota System and the Special Drawing Rights system, supra Chapter 4.
708 See the IBRD Articles, supra.
709 Ibid.
710 Although the US was a principal player in the World War II, and played a vital role in the formation of the
World Bank, it did not suffer much destruction as a consequence of the war. The only part ofthe US that was
affected by the war was the Pearl Harbor.
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therefore, my position that upon creation, the original roles created for the
IFls were to serve the European countries principally, and the developing
countries by extension.711

However, the current roles of the IFIs appear to have shifted and focused
principally upon the developing countries. As the economies of the
European countries have become more stabilized, the IFls have paid more
attention to the economies of the developing countries. Further, as the
economies of the developing countries continue to suffer from chronic
distress, the leaders have been compelled to seek financial and technical
assistance from the IFls. 712

It is important to re-iterate that one of the primary purposes for the creation

of the Fund is the provision of balance-of-payments finance for members
experiencing temporary difficulties.713 Inclusive in the primary purposes
was the mandate for the Fund to maintain high levels of employment,
711 See the Articles of the IMF and the World Bank, supra. See also the Marshal Plan, supra.
712 Refer to Chapter 5, supra, where we understudied the three sample developing countries of Nigeria, The
Republic of Korea, and Brazil. Further, underlying the circumstances that compelled all three ofthem to seek the
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income, and economic development through balance of payments
support.714 The Fund has attempted to serve these current roles, particularly,
in the developing countries by the prescription of economic reforms that
impose strict conditionalities.715 Some of the garden variety conditionalities
of the Fund include the prescription of privatization of public parastatals,
devaluation of the currency, trade liberalization, removal of subsidy on
critical components of the economy, etc.716

It is worthy of note that the IFIs have strenuously emphasized their

preference of market-oriented economy to the post-colonial state-led
economy in almost all the developing countries.717 At the same time, they
have attempted to convince the developing countries of Africa, Asia and
Latin America that not only are the market-oriented economy the only
solution, but one that can be attained in a relatively short period oftime.718
Thus, they succeeded in creating the illusion of a quick-fix policy in the

•
assistance of the IFIs was their unmanageable economic imbalance.
713 See the IMF Articles, supra.
714 Ibid.
715 Refer to the case studies undertaken of Nigeria, the Republic of Korea, and Brazil under Chapter 5, supra. In all
those countries, economic reforms were prescribed which called for strict conditionalities.
716 Ibid.
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minds of the leaders and people of the developing countries. However,
experience has proven that the market-oriented economic policy does not
impact the economy in a short period of time; rather, it requires a consistent
application over a relatively long period of time. 719 This may have
contributed to the often expressed frustration of the government and peoples
of the developing countries on the effectiveness of the market-oriented
economic policy.720

Compounding the

fail~re

of the market-oriented economic policy in the

developing countries is the enormous toll that such policy takes on the
sovereignty of the affected state. According to Dr. Okome, in the case of
Nigeria, state sovereignty was eroded in four ways. First, the Nigerian state

717 See Okome, supra, p. 120
718 Ibid
719 Again, in Nigeria under the Babangida administration, both the government and the citizens began to lose faith
in the SAP when the gains failed to materialize in the short period of implementation. Rather, the pains of the SAP
became so unbearable that the citizens began to oppose its implementation.
720 Such expression of frustration on the failure of SAP in Nigeria can be seen in the conclusions of Professor A. H.
Ekpo, a professor of Economics and Dean, Faculty of Management Science, University of Abuja. According to
Professor Ekpo, the World Bank's SAP in Nigeria in the early 1990 failed to achieve its objectives. First, production
Was not stimulated; rather, speculation and commerce were encouraged. Foreign direct investment was not attracted
to Nigeria as projected. Secondly, state involvement in the economy was reduced in some respects and increased in
others. Third, the private sector failed to become the driving force in economic growth, contrary to the claim of the
Bank. Fourth, privatization and commercialization led to increased prices for public utilities but no improvements in
services, consequently, workers suffered from reduced real wages. Fifth, devaluation and the operation of the foreign
exchange market led to economic distortions such as increased uncertainty and inflation. See A.H. Ekpo, Nigeria:
Giant in the Tropics: A Compendium, Lagos, Nigeria, Gabumo Publishing Company, 1993.
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lost its autonomy in the economic policymaking to the IFIs which dictated
the state goals and objectives. Second, was the active involvement of World
Bank and the Fund's staff in the policy implementation process by ensuring
that the government kept to the terms of the policy. Third was the
subordination of the domestic social contract to the payment and servicing of
external debts. Fourth was the lack of a consciously and independently
determined and articulated national interest. 721

Like in Nigeria, the IFIs have succeeded in exercising their leverage in the
developing countries when some common variables are present. Stallings
identified these variables as inclusive of resource scarcity, combined with
creditor unity, as well as credible sanctions from the multilaterals.722 No
doubt, these variables were present in Nigeria when the country embarked
upon the World Bank's prescribed Structural Adjustment Program. Same as
in the Republic of Korea in the late 1990s, as well as in Brazil when they

721 Okome, supra, p. 180
722 See Frieden in Stallings & Kaufman, ed. See also Jeffrey Frieden in Debt, Development and Democracy:
Modem Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-1985.
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were heavily under the Fund's policy.723 Although such leverage succeeds
in forcing the hands of the leaders to adopt the IFIs' economic policy, it
nevertheless fails to guarantee the successful implementation of the policy in
the face of stiff domestic opposition.724 Again, according to Okome, the
reasons for such failure lie in the following premises. First, the policy is
perceived by the citizens as a foreign imposition.725 Second, the government
is tom between a tough choice of striving to salvage the economy at the
expense of economic hardship for the people. Third, in order to compel
compliance, the government resorts to draconian laws and decrees, thereby
further alienating the people from the policy.726 Such alienation provides a
recipe for failure of the program, because "programmes of adjustment cannot
be effective unless they command the support of government and of public
opinion. "72 7 According to M. de Larosiere in the same address to the
ECOSOC, he argued further that:
723 Ibid
724 A classical example is the case of Nigeria under General Ibrahim Babangida which was covered under the case
study of Nigeria in Chapter 5. In the face of stiff domestic opposition to the SAP, Babangida resorted to draconian
measures and decrees in order to contain the growing opposition to the SAP. At the end, Babangida was forced out
of power, having failed in his dual political and economic reforms.
725 Okome, supra, p. 122, where the author identified the one reason why the SAP policy failed in Nigeria as a
result of lack of domestic commitment.
726 Ibid.
727 See M. de Larosiere; address to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), July 4, 1986., quoted in
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" ... this support will be progressively harder to maintain the longer
adjustment continues without some pay-off in terms ofgrowth and while
human conditions are deteriorating. Likewise, it is hard to visualize how a
viable external position can be achieved if large segments of the work force
lack the vocational skills - or even worse, the basic nutritional and health
standards - to produce goods that are competitive in world markets. Human
capital is after all the most important factor ofproduction in developing and
industrial countries alike. "728

Consequently, we have seen that from the perspective of the developing
countries, the IFIs have played not such a successful role. The leaders of the
developing countries have suffered great political loss as a result of their
invitation and subsequent adoption of the economic policy of the IFIs.729
Infact, some of them have lost their political mandate when the citizens fail to

•
Ihonvbere, J.O., Economic Crisis, Structural Adjustment and Social Crisis in Nigeria, supra.
728 Ibid.
729 In Nigeria, for example, the Shagari government, although democratically elected, was overthrown by a military
government due to its minimal adoption ofIMF-imposed austerity measures. The military government of General
Buhari which overthrew Shagari' s government was also overthrown in a palace coup by General Babangida who
preferred a full-blown Structural Adjustment Program. General Babangida himself was equally forced to 'step aside'
after his government failed to succeed in the implementation of the dual economic and political reforms of the
country.
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see the gains from the adoption of such economic policy.730 On the other
hand, the citizens of the affected developing countries have resisted the
imposition of such 'foreign' economic policy with the resultant loss of
economic and political sovereignty.731 Further, Professor Ihonvbere argues
that "the further impoverishment of already disadvantaged groups has only
encouraged political opposition to the process of adjustment thus creating
major problems, tension, waste and the diversion or abandonment of the
adjustment process."732 The fallout of such sense of failure from the leaders
and the led in the developing countries is that the IFls have become so
distrusted and very unpopular in the larger segment of the developing
countries.733

Further, such sense of failure has provided the conducive political
environment for some commentators to label the IFls as the veritable organs

•
730 Ibid. See also Ihonvbere, lO., "Economic Crisis, Structural Adjustment and Social Crisis in Nigeria," World
Development, Vol. 21, No.1, pp. 141-153, 1993, which reported that the Babangida's government suffered two
attempted coups d'etat, six major religious riots, three serious nationwide protests and several riots and
demonstrations by workers, farmers, the unemployed, students, traders and other disadvantaged groups as a result of
the fallout of the SAP implementation in Nigeria.
731 Ibid.
732 Ibid.
733 Ibid.
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for modem day economic and political imperialism.734 In other words, that
the IFIs were created and funded b)the former European colonial rulers and
although the developing countries have gained political independence from
their former colonial rulers, the modem day colonialism continues through
the instrumentality of the IFIs and their economic policies. 735

The prevalent situation forces us to raise a very familiar question from the
citizens and governments of most developing countries: Why did the IFls

succeed in repairing the devastated economies of the European countries,
while the economies of the developing countries remain chronically poor? Or
put differently, why have the developed countries failed to formulate and
implement a massive economic recovery plan for the developing countries in
the size and speed of the Marshall Plan?
While we are still pondering that question, it may be comforting to take into
consideration the impact of the global challenges not just on developing

•

734 See Ihonvbere, supra, p. 145, wherein Professor Aluko was quoted as saying that government officials "don't
understand what SAP is all about. They swallow hook, line and sinker the economic policies from Europe and
America which is second line of slavery ... " See also "Interview with Sam Aluko," Quality (Lagos), September 27,
1990, p.28.
735 It is important to distinguish the fact that although the United States of America is one of the founders of the
IFIs, it nevertheless did not have colonies in the developing countries as did Europe.
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countries, but also on the IFIs themselves. These global challenges that began
in the late twentieth century and continued into tht21

st

century have

tremendously impacted the IFIs. The extent of the impact can not be fully
analyzed in the context of this research; however, suffice it to say that it is
sufficient to have changed the original goals and roles of the IFIs.

We have seen that the economies of the developing countries have struggled
all the way into the 21 st century. These economies are fragile and operate in a
very precarious condition. It behooves the IFIs to be cognizant of the peculiar
nature of these developing economies in their formulation of policies that
impact these economies, particularly, the impact of the policies on the most
vulnerable segment of the popu1ation.736 It is against this backdrop that we
have argued with other learned scholars that a blanket or one-size-fits-all
policy will not meet the challenges of these economies73 7, instead,

"adjustment packages must be designed to take due cognizance of the
specificities of these countries, the character of regimes, the content and
context of national political discourses and the degree ofgovernmental
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credibility and accountability."738 We also argue that failure on the part of
these IFIs to be sensitive to the consequences of their policies, particularly, in
the developing economies, will result in catastrophic consequences for the
affected economies in particular, and the rest of the world in genera1.739

While the formulation and implementation of recovery economic policy is
aimed at correcting the economic imbalance of an economy, effort must also
be made to prevent some of the factors that give rise to such economic
imbalance. Again, as we have argued earlier740, developed countries and
their leaders have much to do to discourage the leaders of the developing
countries from finding safe havens in their countries where they can deposit
looted public funds. At the same time, the IFIs must insist on strict
accounting of the funds that the leaders of the developing countries borrow as
sovereign debts. Since such debts are borrowed on behalf of the country, the
leaders must be held accountable if the funds fail to make it back to the

•
government's treasury or be applied to the specific projects for which they
736 Refer to Chapter 6, supra. Refer also to Ihonvbere, J.O., supra.
737 Ibid.
738 See Ihonvbere, ibid.
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were borrowed. 741 The IFIs also have to work better at monitoring the
economic performance of the developillg countries with a view to minimizing
the consequences of a sudden collapse of the economy.742 Although this
raises the familiar dilemma of how much involvement the IFIs should have in
the economy of a sovereign country, it nevertheless provides us the present
basis and need for a research such as this.

In the final analysis, we hope we have reasonably articulated the 'original'
and the 'current' roles played by the IFIs in the developing countries in
general, with particular emphasis on Nigeria, the Republic of Korea and
Brazil. The articulation of the roles of the IFIs does not translate into a
rectification of the negative consequences of the roles, however; we feel
comforted by the words of Charles F. Kethering that "a problem well stated is
a problem half solved."

•
1,
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739
740
741
742

Ibid.
Refer to Chapter 6, supra.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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